Robust PAC Learning of Concurrent Stochastic Games

We introduce the first Probably Approximately Correct (PAC) learning framework for general-sum concurrent stochastic games (CSGs) with transition uncertainty, while addressing the challenge of Nash equilibrium (NE) existence. Our algorithm maintains data-driven $L^1$ confidence sets over transition kernels and solves a robust CSG to compute a social-welfare optimal $\varepsilon$-NE, using a robust MDP-based exploration mechanism to drive joint state-action coverage. Crucially, we introduce a Nash margin characterisation that enables principled reasoning about equilibrium existence: the framework either returns an $\varepsilon$-approximate NE whose social-welfare value is $\varepsilon$-close to optimal, or provides a sound certificate that no exact NE exists. Under a minimum reachability condition $p_{\mathrm{reach}}>0$ over relevant state-action pairs, the algorithm terminates after a polynomial number of trajectory samples, with sample complexity $\widetilde{O}\left( {R_{\max}^2 H^4 |S|^2 |A| / (p_{\mathrm{reach}} \varepsilon^2)} \right)$. Empirical results on benchmark CSGs demonstrate near-optimal performance, correct handling of equilibrium (non-)existence, and sample complexity consistent with theory.

Learning under Opponent Unawareness in Linear-Quadratic Stochastic Games

As firms increasingly deploy machine learning for strategic decision-making, understanding algorithmic interactions has become central to operations research and economics. This paper studies learning in infinite-horizon, nonzero-sum linear-quadratic stochastic games under a radically uncoupled information structure, where players are either unaware of opponents or strategically oblivious, observing only a common state and their own action history. Under this minimal information, we analyze an asynchronous decentralized learning process in which each player independently runs a single-agent $ε$-greedy iterated least-squares algorithm. We prove that, despite being unable to identify the system parameters, players' learning dynamics converge almost surely to the complete-information Nash equilibrium and characterize the convergence rate. We then apply the framework to a dynamic Cournot competition with sticky prices. Numerical experiments validate the theoretical results and show that learning under limited information reduces firm profits under both low and high price stickiness, while total surplus declines and market concentration increases when price stickiness is high. Publicly revealing aggregate market output substantially accelerates convergence and mitigates these welfare losses.

PAC Learning in Turn-Based Stochastic Games with Reachability Objectives: A Decentralized Private Approach via Expected Conditional Distance

Reachability is the most fundamental logical objective, yet it is notoriously difficult to learn in reinforcement learning settings: even for Markov decision processes, PAC learning of reachability is impossible without additional assumptions. This difficulty also holds in turn-based stochastic games (TBSGs), where two adversarial players interact on a finite state space. In this work, we consider turn-based stochastic games with reachability objectives. For such settings, adversarial learning, in which players are adversarial even in the learning phase, is impossible. Therefore, the goal is to consider learning, in which both players learn the unknown model together. In this spirit, previous literature on PAC learning in TBSGs considers (a)~public information shared by both players; and (b)~centralized learning, which means that players share the same learning algorithm. In this work, our contribution is two-fold. First, we relax these strong assumptions and ensure learning: (i)~with private information not shared with the other player; and (ii)~decentralized learning where the players do not share the same learning algorithm. To the best of our knowledge, this work is the first positive result for decentralized and private information learning of TBSGs with reachability objectives. Second, we introduce a game-theoretic generalization of the Expected Conditional Distance (ECD) parameter, which measures the expected length of reaching the target set. We establish a polynomial-sample complexity bound with respect to the number of states, actions, ECD parameter, and inverses of error tolerance and failure probability.