Artificial intelligence (AI) is increasingly used to augment software engineering (SE) workflows. While code generation remains the main use case, organizations are actively seeking AI integration in other practices such as test cases generation and code reviews. Organizational AI adoption strategies seem to focus on tangible outcomes such as productivity. However, AI is a disruptive force, introduced into settings where role identity, team norms, and the sources of job satisfaction were well established before the recent advances in generative AI. Historically, technological disruptions have caused psychological and social strains in workplaces, ranging from anxiety and eroded meaning to deskilling and disrupted professional identities. The assumption that AI for SE is cost-free may not be accurate. Therefore, in this study we sought to understand the psychological costs software professionals experience during organizational AI adoption. We carried out a case study in a large software development services company, one year after the company launched its AI adoption. We collected qualitative data through meetings and semi-structured interviews (N = 21). We found that software professionals experience accountability anxiety, craft identity disruption, meaning and satisfaction erosion, cognitive and workload intensification, and uncertainty distress. Practitioners manage these costs through practices that restore control, mitigate them through protective and identity-preserving adaptations, or absorb them, carrying what neither can resolve. We contribute to AI-human collaboration in SE by repositioning AI adoption as a human transition, not only a technological and organizational one.
Zanna Iscenko, Scott Strand, Yiyuan Chen +15econ.GN cs.AI
This paper introduces the AI & Economy ATLAS (Activity, Task, Landscape, and Adoption Study), an ongoing economic research initiative using Google AI usage data. The first iteration of ATLAS is built on 15 million de-identified interactions across the Gemini App, Google AI Mode, and Gemini API. Using privacy-preserving algorithms as well as established and bespoke classification methods, we map AI usage to over 800 occupations, 4000 tasks, 300 household activities, 150 countries, and 140 languages. We then make a number of observations on what the data reveals about AI's diffusion, and its usage at work and in day-to-day life. In the workplace, we show that while AI adoption spans occupations covering just above 88% of US employment, penetration remains shallow and overwhelmingly collaborative in nature, with end-to-end task automation limited in scope. Outside of work, AI spans activities making up about 98% of Americans' non-sleep time, with disproportionately high use in high-friction tasks such as engaging with government and professional service providers, likely delivering economic value that standard national accounts may miss. Globally, adoption scales with national wealth and has broad linguistic distribution, with English queries representing only around a third of volume. As we build upon ATLAS and expand its scope and capabilities, we will continue to provide large-scale empirical evidence to inform the public, policy and academic questions about the ongoing AI transformation.
We develop a formal theory of cognitive debt: the stock of unverified reasoning obligations that accumulates when individuals use AI as a substitute rather than a complement for first-principles cognition. The model features two state variables per agent, cognitive capital and cognitive debt, and a multiplicative production technology in which cognitive capital functions as collateral that determines the return to AI adoption. We establish six propositions. Rational agents incur positive cognitive debt because the costs are deferred, partially external, and masked by short-run productivity gains. Tranquil periods lower subjective risk assessments, raise AI substitution intensity, and compound leverage, generating a cognitive Minsky moment in which subjective risk falls while true systemic fragility rises. Expected crisis losses are convex in aggregate leverage. Post-crisis, output-target pressure can produce a false-correction loop in which agents patch AI failures with more AI. The decentralised equilibrium over-adopts substitutive AI relative to the social optimum because of systemic risk, cognitive public goods, and arms-race externalities. In a two-type heterogeneous-agent economy, high-cognitive-capital agents adopt AI more intensively and may eventually erode their unaided cognitive capital below that of initially lower-skilled agents.
Recent evidence reported by Tully, Longoni, and Appel (2025) suggests that lower artificial intelligence (AI) literacy predicts greater receptivity toward AI. We revisit this claim using the public data from Study 3 of that article, which measures past usage of five AI tool categories on a five-point frequency scale. We first reproduce the negative association between AI literacy and aggregate AI usage using OLS on participant-level averages, binary logit, ordered logit, and multinomial logit specifications. We then show that the aggregate relationship masks substantial heterogeneity by tool type. In our demographic-adjusted primary specification, AI literacy does not significantly predict text AI usage (ordered-logit $β$ = -0.090, p = .387), whereas it remains a strong predictor of non-text AI adoption ($β$ = -0.377, p < .001). The non-text effect is also robust under Tully et al.'s original Study 3 control specification ($β$ = -0.502, p < .001). Binary, ordered-logit, and multinomial specifications suggest that the non-text relationship is primarily an adoption/non-adoption pattern rather than evidence of intensive use: the demographic-adjusted odds ratio of ever having used a non-text AI tool is 0.68. Thus, in the study that measures self-reported past usage rather than stated preferences, the evidence does not support a simple claim that lower AI literacy predicts greater receptivity to AI in general. It points instead to a narrower pattern of broader adoption across lower-penetration, non-text AI tools.
Background: Dermatology AI has mainly focused on image-based diagnosis, while chronic disease workflows have received less attention. We surveyed Indian dermatologists to map routine clinical challenges, with a focus on atopic dermatitis (AD), and assess current AI use. Methods: A nationwide cross-sectional survey commissioned by the Society for Eczema Studies included 377 practicing Indian dermatologists. The survey assessed clinical challenges, AD workflow barriers, AI use, adoption barriers, and ethical concerns. Analyses used descriptive statistics, chi-square tests, false discovery rate correction, and multivariable logistic regression. Results: Patient adherence (61.3%) and treatment planning in difficult or refractory cases (57.0%) were reported more often than diagnostic uncertainty (48.0%). In AD care, severity scoring was reported as a challenge by 47.7% and had the lowest satisfaction among measured workflow areas. Current AI use was reported by 49.9%, most often involving general large language models for literature synthesis, documentation, and academic tasks rather than specialized image analysis. Barriers differed by experience: dermatologists with more than 20 years of practice more often cited lack of training, while those with 5 years or less more often cited lack of clinical utility after trying AI tools. AI users were more likely than non-users to report concern about patient self-misdiagnosis and anxiety, which remained significant after adjustment for experience and academic affiliation. Conclusion: Respondents reported using general-purpose AI mainly for cognitive and administrative tasks, while their clinical needs centered on chronic disease management and AD workflow support. Clinician-supervised workflow tools may be more useful than standalone diagnostic applications.