Yifan Zhu, Sammie Katt, Samuel Kaskics.AI cs.HC cs.MA
AI assistants often collaborate by proposing candidate edits, plans, or designs that users evaluate before adoption. Existing assistance methods focus on proposal quality or user-goal inference, often assuming that the user can reliably evaluate any proposal, which can fail in practice because of bounded rationality. We study evaluability-aware proposal planning, where proposals serve both as task interventions and as probes for learning latent preferences and evaluation constraints, where the resulting belief updates then guide later proposals. We formalise this setting as ProSE, a hidden-parameter sequential assistance problem, and instantiate it with a KL-regularised bounded-rational binary response model in which acceptance trades off value gain against a distance-dependent evaluability penalty. Analysing the planning consequence of this likelihood reveals that likely accepted proposals and informative probes need not coincide, which explains why planners that only pursue acceptance systematically underperform. We operationalise ProSE with \textsc{ProSE-Plan}, a depth-2 Bayes-adaptive planner that scores proposals by possible responses and response-induced posterior beliefs. In controlled graph simulations, \textsc{ProSE-Plan} improves over evaluability-unaware and myopic baselines when evaluation cost is the bottleneck, and a probe-commit ablation confirms that our approach selects informative proposals that simpler methods miss. Our results thus identify user evaluability as a planning-relevant dimension of AI assistance, complementary to generation quality and preference inference.
While AI assistance can improve human task performance in the short term, it may also undermine the development of skills in the longer term. We examine this tension in a controlled logic-puzzle experiment involving on-demand AI assistance, where participants complete tasks before, during, and after AI is available. By experimentally varying AI request costs, we find that lower-cost assistance induces more frequent AI use. We also find that participants who request AI assistance during the AI-access phase perform worse at the task after assistance is removed, and their subsequent unassisted performance is overestimated when predicted from earlier AI-assisted performance. We use a Bayesian latent ability model to separate initial ability, post-AI ability, and participant-specific skill change, while estimating how independent reasoning during the AI-access phase relates to skill development. The results show that greater independent problem-solving effort is associated with larger gains in latent ability, consistent with the interpretation that skill development is weaker when AI assistance substitutes for independent reasoning.