As large language models increasingly participate in scientific evaluation, we investigate a potential form of reward hacking: how rhetorical choices shape AI-review judgments when reported scientific content is preserved and how these effects vary across evaluation conditions. We construct a controlled corpus of 4,200 full-paper manuscripts derived from 120 anonymized ICLR 2026 submissions. Two LLM rewriters transform six rhetorical dimensions in opposing directions, and five LLM reviewers evaluate the resulting manuscripts under standard and strict protocols. We also test joint, recursive, and reviewer-guided rewriting. Our results show that rhetorical sensitivity is structured rather than uniform. Evidence framing and novelty stance produce the largest positive-negative contrasts in overall assessment, with scope framing forming a weaker second tier; the remaining dimensions have smaller or less stable effects. This hierarchy persists across human-assessed quality levels, but score movement depends strongly on the AI reviewer's original score: lower scores tend to rise, higher scores tend to fall, and directional contrasts are clearest in the middle ranges. More elaborate workflows do not reliably yield larger gains. Joint rewriting is strongly rewriter-dependent, reviewer guidance does not consistently outperform an unguided second pass, and repeated rewriting yields diminishing, configuration-dependent returns. Across conditions, the rewriter primarily determines the separation between opposing variants, whereas the reviewer determines the magnitude and sign of their score effects. Strict review lowers mean OA by 1.36 points without consistently changing rhetorical sensitivity. These findings identify when rhetorical presentation influences AI scientific review and motivate evaluation systems robust to content-preserving variation in scientific writing.
As AI-generated reviews move from experimental tools into peer-review infrastructure, most robustness concerns have focused on explicit attacks such as hidden instructions and prompt injection. We study a harder and more policy-relevant failure mode: no hidden text, no prompt injection, and no changes to methods, experiments, figures, equations, proofs, or numerical results. The attacker modifies only presentation-level content, such as the abstract, contribution framing, related work, discussion, and narrative structure. We introduce adversarial repackaging: a closed-loop attack that uses AI-reviewer feedback to search for presentation-level revisions while keeping the scientific evidence fixed. Across three mainstream AI reviewers, adversarial repackaging achieves a 75.1% attack success rate and a mean score gain of +1.21/10. The effect is not explained by ordinary prose polishing. We also reveal that strategies that change how the reviewer interprets the paper, such as related-work repositioning and analytical discussion expansion, substantially outperform surface edits such as local polishing, table formatting, and algorithm boxes. Our analysis reveals two deeper structural failure modes. First, AI reviewers are easier to impress than to convince: highlighting strengths reliably increases perceived merit, while attempts to dissolve weaknesses frequently backfire. Second, AI reviewers can confuse the appearance of addressing a limitation with actually resolving it, allowing unchanged evidence to be reinterpreted as stronger scientific contribution. These results show that the deployment risk is not only malicious hidden instructions, but the emergence of paper presentation itself as an optimization surface. We release a contamination-free rolling benchmark and attack framework for testing whether AI reviewers remain anchored to scientific content under presentation-only edits.