An international agreement to limit AI development could be crucial to mitigate risks from AI. However, it remains unclear which conditions should determine when the limiting measures are relaxed. We survey existing international agreements, outline what properties appropriate conditions should satisfy, list possible conditions, and finally give a recommendation in an example scenario. We recommend a fixed time period after which a new organization established at the start of the period specifies conditions that address when AI development can be safely conducted, with a possibility of withdrawal in extraordinary circumstances. We hope to illustrate the considerations that would likely go into an international agreement to limit AI.
AI agents can now take irreversible actions in operational systems, but agent-caused losses are still not clearly assigned, priced, or transferred. Providers often disclaim consequential damages, users are left with uncompensated losses, and default human review limits the efficiency gains of automation. We ask when autonomous AI deployment can become economically acceptable despite failure risk. Our answer is to quantify risk at the customer-task-trace episode level and transfer it through insurance. Automation is acceptable when its expected benefit exceeds the premium, control cost, and remaining risk. This requires a defined role with bounded permissions and comparable traces. We introduce trace-economic underwriting, which maps tool-use traces to customer exposure and claimable loss, then uses this representation for pricing, control, and risk transfer. It uses deterministic economic labels rather than an LLM judge. In our trace-to-loss testbed, trace-economic pricing reduces pricing MAE from $17.7K to $569 and removes regressive cross-subsidy. A 300-trace expert audit accepts 295 labels unchanged. On 1,000 real SWE-smith traces, trace-conditioned controls reduce CVaR95 by 72%. Theorem~1 gives a finite-sample scope condition. We release code, labels, and audit sheets.