Differentially private (DP) training of text-conditioned generative models suffers a utility cliff at strong privacy. We revisit this problem through the geometry of rectified flows: along the straight interpolation between noise and data, the Bayes-optimal velocity is governed to leading order at the noise end by a few class-conditional moments, and increasingly sample-specific structure matters toward the data end. StraightDP exploits this heterogeneity end to end. A small budget share releases whitened class-conditional moments once, to be distilled into the weights or injected at sampling time. The rest is spent by pre-declared DP-SGD toward the data end, beyond the moments' reach. At $\varepsilon=1$ on MNIST, the released moments alone already attain $0.76$ downstream accuracy with prototype-like samples and an FID of $237$, and uniform DP-SGD attains $0.21$. The pipeline built on the release reaches $0.81$ accuracy at FID $56$ in a public latent space. Constraining per-token stream norms of the multimodal backbone leaves the pretraining loss unchanged yet improves downstream accuracy in the extreme-noise pixel-space regime, and its accuracy effect becomes monotonically more favorable as privacy strengthens. The released moments also port to frozen SD3-medium, where sampling-time injection beats DP-LoRA training at a fraction of the budget.
We present the dithered Gaussian mechanism, a novel alternative to the discrete Gaussian mechanism for differential privacy that discretizes the private output rather than the noise distribution itself. By interpreting this discretization as post-processing of the Gaussian mechanism, our construction directly inherits the privacy guarantees of the standard Gaussian mechanism while avoiding vulnerabilities caused by finite-precision floating-point outputs. We show that the mechanism is provably randomness-efficient: by sampling the discretized output values directly, the number of high-quality random bits required for privacy can be reduced significantly and made independent of the noise level. This is achieved by separating the randomness into two sources: a high-quality source used for the privacy-critical sampling step, and a high-performance public source, possibly known to the adversary, that supplies the additional randomness needed for randomized discretization. This separation enables the use of cryptographically secure randomness without substantial performance loss. As an application, we study model training with DP-SGD and show that cryptographically secure noise generation with reduced exposure to floating-point vulnerabilities can be achieved with modest practical overhead.
Differentially private (DP) training of neural networks is often hindered by the large amount of noise required by gradient-based methods such as DP-SGD, which repeatedly inject high-dimensional noise in parameter space throughout training. In this paper, we propose a new framework for DP learning that avoids iterative optimization in parameter space. Instead of updating the target model using privatized gradients, we employ a hypernetwork trained on public datasets to map a private dataset to the parameters of the target model. Specifically, each example is embedded into a low-dimensional representation, the embeddings are aggregated and perturbed to obtain a DP dataset embedding, and the hypernetwork generates the target model parameters from this noisy embedding. Because privacy noise is injected only once into a low-dimensional dataset representation, our approach can significantly reduce the adverse effect of noise. We theoretically show in a synthetic setting that, under a fixed privacy budget, models produced by our approach achieve higher utility than those trained with DP-SGD. Moreover, we apply our approach to LoRA fine-tuning of diffusion models and show that it achieves lower FID than LoRA models trained with DP-SGD and other public-data-guided methods.
EEG foundation-model releases are usually audited one endpoint at a time: raw-reconstruction, membership inference, identity linkage, or DP-SGD on the downstream head. We audit the same released embeddings under all four endpoints jointly, on BIOT, LaBraM, and EEGPT, and show that each single-endpoint audit clears releases that still leak spectral attributes. The decisive evidence is a cross-encoder transfer audit: a single ridge attribute decoder learned from one frozen encoder transfers, via a fitted linear bridge, to held-out-subject test splits of every other encoder, with subject-disjoint matched-control 95% CI lower bound at least 0.081 across all six BIOT/LaBraM/EEGPT directions. We prove a sufficient condition: two encoders sharing a nontrivial attribute-coordinate projector overlap beta admit a chained ridge bridge attacker with centered-gain lower bound sqrt(beta/(1+tau^2)) - eps_br - rho_0, and back-solve beta in [0.008, 0.198]. To turn the joint audit into a deployment-readable decision rule we introduce an audit-endpoint disagreement score (AEDS), prove sufficient conditions for its positivity, and bootstrap-calibrate it per cell; AEDS is positive in all eight matched-CI cells (BIOT/LaBraM/EEGPT on EEGMMI; LaBraM on Sleep-EDF, 54-channel LIMO, CHB-MIT pediatric scalp EEG) with p<0.001, while a head-level Carlini LiRA membership audit reaches AUC only 0.50-0.70. Standard defenses fail under audit: a Wiener-style noise-aware adaptive attacker, the LiRA audit, and DP-SGD at every utility-preserving epsilon in {4,8} leave the attribute channel essentially unchanged. The contribution is an audit framework that turns scattered single-endpoint defenses into a joint release decision, supported by a cross-encoder bridge theorem and adaptive-attacker, LiRA, and DP-SGD baselines; the audit licenses release-blocking, not raw-waveform exfiltration or held-out-subject identity recovery.