Inferential Capability Does Not Determine Legal Scope

Two instruments of EU digital law place inference at their centre and mean different things by it. Article 3(1) of the AI Act uses the capability to infer constitutively: it is the central feature separating the regulated category from conventional software. The GDPR never defines inference, yet governs it protectively: the consequences follow from the processing of personal data and from what the inference says about, or does to, a person, whether or not the technology that produced it qualifies as an AI system. The two perimeters are not concentric. Their non-coincidence remained invisible in single-shot systems; agentic architectures make it operationally acute. The thesis: inferential capability does not determine legal scope, and its absence does not create immunity. The framework is two-level. Inference performs two legal functions, constitutive and protective; the protective function operates through three pathways - identificatory, attributive and decisional. Composition is not a fourth pathway but a cross-cutting architectural dimension which, with reach, persistence and reviewability, is what agentic architectures modify. Three concepts support it: the inferential threshold, the inferential reach and the inferential chain, mapped onto the chain of imputation. Regulation (EU) 2026/1744 left the constitutive criterion untouched and inserted a provision contemplating outputs that influence the inputs of future operations, without supplying any rule of aggregation. The article proposes an interpretive rule, a compositional-effects test identifying the decision unit under Article 22 GDPR together with the allocation of the burden of establishing it, and documentation duties calibrated to inference chains.

Explainable AI for the EU Right to Explanation: A Systematic Review of the Law-XAI Translation Gap

When algorithms make or influence consequential decisions---about loan eligibility, hiring, or healthcare---EU law grants affected individuals a Right to Explanation. Yet whether (and how) Explainable AI (XAI) can satisfy this right in practice remains poorly understood, with direct implications for individuals' ability to contest automated decisions that affect their lives. This paper presents a systematic literature review of XAI in the context of the EU Right to Explanation, with particular focus on Art. 15(1)(h) GDPR, Art. 86 AI Act (AIA), and related instruments. We consider papers published from 2024 onwards, as the final version of the AIA was published in July 2024---with Art. 86 being added late. From 2643 initial records identified by a deliberately broad search, we review 57 full texts, of which only 19 papers demonstrate substantive integration of both legal and technical perspectives, showing gaps in the interdisciplinary synthesis of the current regulatory framework. We document three problematic patterns across the corpus: Most misidentify the GDPR legal basis; few engage with the CJEU's Dun & Bradstreet judgment (likely due to publication timing); and the distinction between explanation form (governed by addressee) and content (governed by legal purpose) is often conflated. We conceptualize this as the Addressee/Purpose Framework, propose a four-phase blueprint for operationalization, and identify six concrete open research questions. Without further progress, the Right to Explanation risks remaining a formal obligation without a technically realizable path to compliance.

From Regulation to Requirements: An Automated Requirement Derivation and Explanation Pipeline

Ensuring software compliance with regulations such as the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) and the Artificial Intelligence Act (EU AI Act) poses a significant challenge, as requirements engineers must translate complex legal text into actionable software requirements - a process that remains largely manual and error-prone in practice. We present an automated regulation-to-requirements pipeline that identifies requirement-bearing clauses in regulatory documents and derives system-agnostic software requirements, accompanied by plain-language explanations, traceable to their legal sources. We evaluate the pipeline on the full clause sets of the GDPR (398 clauses) and the EU AI Act (574 clauses). For requirement-bearing clause identification, the approach achieves macro-averaged F1 scores of 0.82 and 0.78, respectively, outperforming a SetFit-based baseline. Human evaluation shows high completeness (4.60 and 4.45) and correctness (3.74 and 3.54) of derived requirements, while explanation clarity scores are near-ceiling (4.92 and 4.94) on a 1-5 scale. We implement the approach in Reg2Req, a publicly released tool that further supports requirement classification, use case seeding, cross-reference analysis, definition indexing, and a traceability matrix to operationalize regulatory compliance in practice. A user study with 25 practitioners shows that the plain-language explanations significantly improve comprehension of derived requirements and confidence in acting on them (p < 0.001), and that all participants would use Reg2Req as a starting point for deriving software requirements from a regulation.

Short paper: Models in the dark -- Rectification and erasure under GDPR in ML supply chains

The rights to rectification and erasure, as established under the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), are central to protecting individuals' privacy. However, their effective enforcement in machine learning (ML) systems remains challenging. Existing work has largely addressed these rights from either a legal or a technical perspective in isolation and disregards the fact that models are produced in complex supply chains involving multiple actors across development, distribution, and deployment. This paper presents a holistic survey of challenges in implementing the rights to rectification and erasure in ML models. Drawing on academic literature and guidance from data protection authorities, we find that many GDPR requirements cannot yet be technically met in practice. Our findings further suggest that issues arising in ML supply chains are insufficiently addressed in research. To tackle this gap, we introduce the notion of models in the dark -- derived models created further downstream in an ML chain without sufficient transparency or traceability -- and analyse the urgent challenges posed by this phenomenon. By adopting an interdisciplinary perspective, this work contributes to bridging the gap between legal requirements and the technical implementation of data subject rights in ML, ultimately supporting the development of trustworthy artificial intelligence.