Modelpedia: A Catalog of Model Findings for the Meta-Science of AI

Scientific knowledge about AI models is produced faster than the community can organize it. Every few months a new foundation model reshapes the field and hundreds of papers, blogs, and technical reports document how each behaves or fails. Yet, these findings remain scattered and effectively unretrievable. To address this gap we present Modelpedia, an automated, LLM-assisted framework that extracts findings about models from published papers, links it to the model, dataset, method, and concept it concerns, and aggregates the result into a searchable public catalog. Applying the prototype to accepted ICLR 2024 and 2025 papers, we extract over a thousand findings and, treating the catalog itself as an object of study, run a meta-analysis of how the community investigates models. Now, we invite the community to explore, contribute to, and build on the open catalog, and to help establish model findings as a shared foundation for the meta-science of AI.

An Automated Framework for Extracting Reachable Attack Chains from Cyber Threat Intelligence Reports

Cyber Threat Intelligence (CTI) reports richly describe real-world attack processes, but their unstructured narratives cannot be directly used for automated attack-path reasoning. Existing CTI extraction methods focus on indicators, entities, or TTP labels without modeling the execution conditions and resulting states of each attack step, so the extracted knowledge supports neither state matching nor reachability analysis across multi-stage attack chains. This paper proposes an automated framework that extracts reachable attack chains by modeling each attack step as an attack unit of preconditions, an attack behavior, and postconditions. A multi-stage pipeline assisted by large language models (LLMs) extracts attack behavior skeletons, recovers their preconditions and postconditions, normalizes them into predefined predicates, and repairs broken dependencies; the resulting units are compiled into Datalog-style rules for attack-goal reachability reasoning. On a dataset of 20 CTI reports containing 334 human-validated annotated steps, our framework achieves higher annotated-step coverage than representative CTI extraction systems in recovering attack behaviors. Moreover, by explicitly generating preconditions and postconditions, it produces attack units that are more complete and consistent than those generated by end-to-end LLM baselines. On the extracted chains, Datalog inference reaches the specified attack goal in 19 of 20 reports, while backward search yields 34 attack paths under the generated rules. The source code and experimental artifacts are available in an anonymized repository. .