ProvenanceGuard: Source-Aware Factuality Verification for MCP-Based LLM Agents

Tool-using LLM agents increasingly use the Model Context Protocol (MCP) to answer from heterogeneous evidence sources, including search, APIs, databases, clinical records, and formulary tools. Standard factuality metrics usually test whether an answer is supported by pooled evidence, missing a provenance-sensitive failure mode: a claim may be supported somewhere while being attributed to the wrong source. We call this cross-source conflation. We introduce ProvenanceGuard, a source-aware verifier for MCP-grounded answers. It consumes captured MCP traces with stable tool IDs, source IDs, and raw outputs; decomposes answers into atomic claims; routes claims to source-specific evidence; checks support with NLI and a token-alignment proxy; compares stated attribution with the routed source; and returns per-claim verdicts plus an answer-level allow/block decision. Blocked answers can be repaired with retrieval-augmented answer revision and re-verified. We evaluate on 281 medical-domain MCP-agent traces. A 266-trace adjudicated subset yields 2,325 LLM-assisted claim labels split by trace; 361 held-out labels are human-verified. On the 40-trace held-out split, ProvenanceGuard achieves block F1 0.802 and source accuracy 0.858 over 260 source-eligible claims, outperforming source-blind baselines that do not emit claim-to-source IDs. On a harder multi-source benchmark it reaches block F1 0.846, while source-plus-relation accuracy drops to 0.229, showing that exact source ownership remains difficult with semantically close sources. Repair-and-reverify resolves all blocked answers in the full trace set, often via conservative fallback. In 50 controlled clinical conflation probes, ProvenanceGuard detects all injected attribution swaps with no retained wrong attribution. These results show that source attribution is an independent axis for factuality verification in MCP-based agents.

MCPHunt: An Evaluation Framework for Cross-Boundary Data Propagation in Multi-Server MCP Agents

Multi-server MCP agents create an information-flow control problem: faithful tool composition can turn individually benign read/write permissions into cross-boundary credential propagation -- a structural side effect of workflow topology, not necessarily malicious model behavior. We present MCPHunt, to our knowledge the first controlled benchmark that isolates non-adversarial, verbatim credential propagation across multi-server MCP trust boundaries, with three methodological contributions: (1) canary-based taint tracking that reduces propagation detection to objective string matching; (2) an environment-controlled coverage design with risky, benign, and hard-negative conditions that validates pipeline soundness and controls for credential-format confounds; (3) CRS stratification that disentangles task-mandated propagation (faithful execution of verbatim-transfer instructions) from policy-violating propagation (credentials included despite the option to redact). Across 3,615 main-benchmark traces from 5 models spanning 147 tasks and 9 mechanism families, policy-violating propagation rates reach 11.5--41.3% across all models. This propagation is pathway-specific (25x cross-mechanism range) and concentrated in browser-mediated data flows; hard-negative controls provide evidence that production-format credentials are not necessary -- prompt-directed cross-boundary data flow is sufficient. A prompt-mitigation study across 3 models reduces policy-violating propagation by up to 97% while preserving 80.5% utility, but effectiveness varies with instruction-following capability -- suggesting that prompt-level defenses alone may not suffice. Code, traces, and labeling pipeline are released under MIT and CC BY 4.0.