The OWASP Top 10 for LLM Applications ranks the risks that a community of security practitioners judges most important. We ask a narrower question: checked against the record of real incidents, does that expert ranking agree with the data? We assembled a large-scale corpus of LLM-security incidents (7,714 snapshotted and 6,639 labeled against the 20-entry taxonomy) drawn from CVE, GHSA, OSV, and AIAAIC, and derived an incident-based ranking with a Bayesian measurement-error model that corrects each category's count for classifier precision and recall. The 2026 candidate list blends the two signals at fixed weights, 0.75 on the expert vote and 0.25 on the data, so the corpus corrects the consensus without overturning it. The agreement between the two rankings is weak: Cohen's $κ\approx 0.20$, with a 90% interval that crosses zero. The expert ranking is nonetheless robust. A pre-registered bake-off of four frontier classifiers returns no winner. None beats the incidence floor's balanced accuracy of 0.863. A ground-truth check leaves the floor's ordering (Spearman $ρ= 0.918$ against held-out truth) in place. This is an exploratory analysis by two working-group members, not the official OWASP release, and it does not supersede the official list or process.
AI coding agents are being adopted at historic speed, yet security and risk concerns remain the primary barrier to scaling agentic AI across organizations. Existing security controls for coding agents are not systematically distributed to engineering teams, and vendor-native solutions introduce ecosystem dependencies that may not suit every deployment context. This paper investigates whether off-the-shelf security controls can be implemented on commercial AI coding agents and scaled to a distributed user base via a custom agent harness. A phased testing methodology was applied across four agent configurations --- two commercial agents with and without controls, a baseline harness, and a security-hardened harness --- using a 23-test suite derived from the OWASP Top 10 for Agentic Applications. SHarD (Secure Harness Distribution), a distributable harness built on the Pi agent harness, demonstrated that three categories of security controls --- OS sandboxing, skill scanning, and tool restriction --- can be embedded and distributed via a single install command while retaining equivalent efficacy to direct installation on commercial agents. SHarD achieved an adjusted score of 100\%, matching the best securely configured commercial agent, with no regression across any test category. Notable observations include evidence that model non-determinism produces inconsistent security outcomes and that autonomous agent behavior can cross system boundaries in ways that OS sandboxing directly mitigates. Initial characteristics toward a control harness fitness framework are proposed, and a third research question is identified for future investigation.