Beyond Detection Accuracy: Measuring Explanation Cost, Stability, and Utility for Resource-Aware IoT Intrusion Detection

Machine-learning intrusion-detection studies commonly emphasize predictive accuracy while treating explanation generation as a computationally free post-processing step. This study jointly evaluates predictive effectiveness, explanation cost, local explanation stability, and selective explanation for binary Internet of Things (IoT) intrusion detection. A leakage-safe CICIoT2023 corpus was constructed using exact 39-feature hashes, non-finite-value handling, exact-feature deduplication, conservative label-collision removal, and deterministic hash-level partitioning. Logistic Regression, Decision Tree, Random Forest, and XGBoost were evaluated on natural and balanced test distributions. TreeSHAP cost was measured, stability was assessed under prediction-preserving perturbations, and validation-calibrated policies were used to allocate explanation workload. XGBoost provided the strongest overall predictive profile, while Random Forest produced the lowest false-positive rate. At 5,000 samples, TreeSHAP required 700.759 s for Random Forest and 1.471 s for XGBoost. Random Forest showed the strongest overall base-level explanation stability; XGBoost retained high rank and directional consistency but showed greater top-feature turnover and attribution-magnitude drift. On the balanced test, about 90% false-negative explanation coverage permitted 28-32% compute savings, while about 95% coverage permitted 15-23% savings. Savings were much smaller under the attack-heavy natural prevalence. These results show that operationally useful explainable IoT intrusion detection depends on predictive quality, explanation cost, local stability, workload prevalence, and selective invocation rather than detection accuracy alone.

SHAP-Weighted Cross-Modal Expert Fusion for Emotion and Sentiment Recognition: Evidence and Limits

Multimodal emotion and sentiment recognition is commonly addressed by early fusion, which concatenates modalities before classification, or late fusion, which combines independently trained unimodal predictors. Early fusion can be accurate but monolithic, while late fusion is modular but may lose cross-modal interactions. This paper revisits XAI-guided adaptive fusion (\xgaf), a tree-based mixture of unimodal and cross-modal experts whose sample-level weights are derived from TreeSHAP attribution magnitudes. We focus on the effect of SHAP attribution reduction when experts have unequal feature dimensionalities. In this setting, mean-abs and median-abs reductions can suppress high-dimensional cross-modal experts, whereas sum-abs reduction preserves total attribution mass. On MELD 7-class emotion recognition, sum-abs \xgaf{} nearly matches early fusion across three face-sequence aggregators; the Transformer variant reaches 0.5983 \wf{}, compared with 0.6018 for early fusion and 0.4598 for probability-average late fusion. McNemar testing shows no significant difference between sum-abs \xgaf{} and early fusion on MELD ($p=1.000$), while \xgaf{} remains significantly better than late fusion ($p<0.0001$). On CMU-MOSEI 3-class sentiment recognition, sum-abs \xgaf{} reaches 0.6519 \wf{}, slightly exceeding early fusion (0.6485) and late fusion (0.5696). Ablation studies show that the main gain comes from adding cross-modal experts, especially the trimodal expert, rather than from complex per-sample routing. Diagnostics further show that mean-abs and median-abs weights are nearly uniform, while sum-abs weights concentrate on the trimodal expert. Thus, the main contribution is a transparent empirical analysis of how SHAP reduction, expert dimensionality, and cross-modal expert design affect modular multimodal fusion.

Beyond Gradient-Based Attacks: Adversarial Robustness and Explainability Stability in Cybersecurity Classifiers

Adversarial attacks on cybersecurity classifiers pose a dual threat: degrading predictions and destabilising the SHAP-based explanations that security analysts rely on to understand and triage alerts. We extend our prior MLP conference study to Random Forest and XGBoost across four tabular security datasets (phishing URLs, UNSW-NB15, NF-ToN-IoT, HIKARI-2021), evaluating five attacks including three black-box methods applicable to non-differentiable tree models. We introduce the Explainability Stability Index (ESI), a scalar metric computed from TreeSHAP attribution drift under adversarial perturbation, reported on the same [0,1] scale as the Robustness Index (RI). A key finding is that gradient-based black-box attacks (ZOO) produce degenerate results against XGBoost (apparent RI ~0.98) due to piecewise-constant prediction surfaces, while score-based Square Attack reveals genuine vulnerability (RI ~0.36). These degenerate perturbations still drive substantial attribution drift: XGBoost ESI ~0.06-0.16 despite near-perfect ZOO robustness, versus 0.14-0.29 for RF, showing that prediction robustness and explanation stability are distinct axes requiring joint measurement. A two-axis framework (gradient dependence, query efficiency) explains the observed attack ranking and yields practical guidance for tree ensemble evaluation. A step-size ablation explains a counterintuitive PGD anomaly on z-score normalised tabular data.

NLLog: Lightweight, Explainable SOC Anomaly Detection via Log-to-Language Rewriting

System-generated logs underpin security monitoring, yet their rigid template-based format hinders both automated analysis and human comprehension. We present NLLog (Natural-Language Log), a lightweight pipeline that deterministically rewrites parsed templates into WHO-WHAT-SEVERITY sentences, pools them with term-frequency-inverse-document-frequency weighting, classifies sessions with tree ensembles, and back-projects evidence with TreeSHAP for analyst review. On Hadoop Distributed File System (HDFS) and Blue Gene/L (BGL) corpora, NLLog exceeds two reproduced matched-protocol baselines; across HDFS, BGL, and the AIT Alert Data Set, it sustains low false-positive rates with commodity-hardware latency suitable for security operations center triage. Coverage, sparse-versus-dense, faithfulness, and adversarial ablations show that fallback sufficiency is corpus-dependent, that an enrollment-time coverage check can surface refinement requirements before deployment, and that an auditable deterministic rewrite combined with lightweight dense encoding provides a measurable representation layer for log-anomaly detection and triage.