Mechanistic interpretability is increasingly used to guide interventions such as activation steering, circuit removal, and safety monitoring. Yet an internal estimate that is accurate on average can still choose a poor action. We present ObserverBench, a benchmark framework for testing whether an internal estimator---an observer---is adequate for the intervention, control, or safety task it directs. Each task fixes the model, information boundary, allowed actions, decision rule, held-out cases, and loss. The benchmark reports estimation accuracy separately from the loss caused by the chosen action. Theory and experiments show why both are needed. In closed-loop control, observer errors matter at the starting point and along directions the allowed intervention can reach. On circuit-intervention tasks in GPT-2-small and Qwen2.5-7B, pairwise observers predict unseen effects more accurately without always choosing better actions; observers trained on action loss choose lower-loss actions. In safety triage, a score that perfectly separates violations can allocate a fixed intervention budget poorly when violations have different costs. Across Qwen2.5-7B, Gemma-2-9B-it, and prospectively frozen Qwen3.5-9B APPS tasks, AUROC can rank monitors differently from deployment loss, and the best information source changes across models. Sparse SAE readouts also trail their layer-matched dense controls on the reported Qwen panels, under disclosed activation-density or checkpoint mismatches. ObserverBench provides fixed task contracts, runnable baselines, and table-based submissions for evaluating interpretability methods through the actions they enable.
Moghis Fereidouni, Muhammad Umair Haider, Hassan Sajjad +1cs.CL
Activation steering suppresses undesired behaviors in language models by adding a steering vector to the hidden state during generation. Recent conditional methods such as CAST and DSAS improve the behavior-capability trade-off by deciding when to intervene, but once active, they apply the full dense vector to all hidden dimensions, regardless of whether a neuron carries concept information or already lies in the desired regime. We introduce dimension-level conditioning as a complementary axis of selectivity that also decides which neurons to intervene on. Our method, GAPS (Gated Activation steering via Posterior and Separability), combines two training-free gates: a static separability gate that restricts steering to neurons with statistically reliable concept information (via AUROC), and a dynamic posterior gate that steers a neuron only when its current activation is better explained by the undesired concept under a Gaussian model. The gates add O(D) overhead per token, and they plug into existing conditional methods. On toxicity mitigation (RealToxicityPrompts) and concept removal (OneSeC) with Gemma-3 (4B) and Qwen-3 (1.7B), GAPS consistently matches or improves the Pareto front of its token-level counterparts; under a fixed capability budget, DSAS+GAPS reduces Gemma-3's toxicity rate from 6.52% to 0.48%, versus 3.52% for DSAS alone. Ablations attribute most of the gain to the posterior gate.
Large language models often answer the same multiple-choice question inconsistently when it is posed under support-oriented and elimination-oriented framings. We investigate whether these discrepancies arise from different internal representations induced by the two framings. We introduce a dual-framing protocol with minimally varied prompts that use either support- or elimination-oriented framing while keeping the evaluation target fixed. To probe the internal computation, we append an untrained special token, [STATE], and treat its residual-stream activation as an intervention interface. Across both models, the two framings induce separable [STATE] activations concentrated in intermediate layers. Swapping these activations between paired prompts systematically changes predictions and improves cross-framing agreement, providing intervention-based evidence that the activations are behaviorally relevant. Beyond instance-level substitution, mean-difference steering directions derived from the dual-framing contrast exhibit more bounded layer-wise responses than matched contrastive activation addition directions under the evaluated protocol.
Benjamin Shih, John Winnicki, Arianna Caocs.LG cs.CL
When contextual information conflicts with the knowledge stored in model parameters, activation directions can be used to decode and steer which source the model follows. However, steering along a direction does not establish causality: whether the unedited model would naturally use that direction or whether the direction is reusable across tasks. We test these distinctions through counterfactual experiments in unambiguous settings. First, we estimate authority directions from agreement prompts, in which the context and parametric knowledge support the same answer. We then interchange naturally occurring coordinates along these directions between matched prompts that direct the model to prioritize either the supplied context or its parametric knowledge. Across Qwen, Llama, and OLMo models, this intervention reproduces 30-68% of the authority-induced shift in source choice, whereas matched controls reproduce almost none. To test cross-task reuse, we learn authority directions on two tasks separately and see that cross-task transferability closes only 9% of the authority gap while the local direction learned on the given task closes 57%. These results distinguish authority representation, causal use, and cross-task causal reuse, and suggest that authority computations may be task-dependent, rather than reusable across tasks.
Kirill Bunin, Dmitry Bylinkin, Vladimir Aletov +3cs.LG cs.CL
Activation steering has emerged as a lightweight approach for controlling model refusal at inference time. A growing line of research explores trainable rotations of activations to develop geometrically principled intervention mechanisms. However, existing techniques rely on auxiliary constructs, such as refusal vectors, to define these rotations. In our work, we develop a self-contained methodology for learning parameter-efficient rotational transformations based on Riemannian optimization. We empirically validate the proposed scheme, demonstrating its superiority in intervention efficiency. An extensive ablation study highlights the importance of key design choices in our method. Our results identify the proposed rotation-based steering scheme as a promising direction for more reliable control over the behavior of LLMs.
Hoejoon Kwon, Byeonggeuk Lim, Kahyeon Kim +1cs.CL cs.SE
Safety alignment is essential for deploying large language models, requiring systems to prevent harmful compliance while preserving helpfulness on benign requests. Activation steering offers a training-free inference-time approach to safety control, but effective safety steering requires addressing two coupled questions: when to intervene and how generation should be shaped after intervention. However, existing safety steering methods remain limited along both dimensions, as their triggering mechanisms can be unstable across domains and refusal-oriented steering often yields rigid refusals rather than constructive safe guidance. To address these limitations, we propose ALTSTEER, an inference-time framework that couples selective intervention with refusal-anchored constructive redirection within a single inference pass. ALTSTEER uses an internal refusal-relevant signal to decide when to steer, and applies staged steering to shift generation from refusal-oriented control toward constructive alternatives. Evaluations on Llama-3.1 and Qwen2.5 show that ALTSTEER preserves benign utility while improving constructive safe-completion behavior, especially on models that otherwise tend to produce short refusals for harmful requests.
Linh Le, Hong Kiat Tan, David Williams-Kingcs.LG cs.AI
Sandbagging, in which a model deliberately underperforms on an evaluation despite retaining the underlying capability, threatens the safety evaluations that frontier-model governance depends on. The Elicitation Game found that fine-tuning elicits hidden capability from sandbagging model organisms whereas additive activation steering fails. We revisit that verdict with reference-grafting, which sets an activation's coordinate along a contrast direction to the value it takes in an honest reference, at a small set of circuits chosen by active learning. Across eleven fine-tuned password-locked models (1.5-32B, three architecture lineages), it recovers +94 to +101% of the honest-sandbagging gap, matching fine-tuning elicitation without weight updates or training labels; two to five paired examples suffice to fit the direction. Similar recovery holds for reinforcement-learning-induced sandbagging and for password-locked code generation. Grafting works because the fine-tuned lock is a thresholded gate: held-out accuracy stays at the sandbagged level until the grafted coordinate crosses a threshold near the honest reference, which is why additive steering and zeroing the coordinate often fail. The direction tracks how the sandbagging was induced rather than what is withheld -- fit on grade-school science (ARC) it elicits withheld hazardous knowledge (WMDP), yet prompting, fine-tuning, and reinforcement learning each carry a different direction. Circuit-breaking marks the boundary: it reroutes activations on every forward pass, so the fixed edits we test are re-broken downstream and do not restore coherent generation.
Philipp E. Glass, Allan Tucker, Yongmin Li +1cs.CL cs.AI cs.LG
Activation steering can be embedded directly into a language model's weights, shaping behaviour without inference-time intervention and offering a way to encode alignment prior to release. However, models are routinely fine-tuned after deployment, and it is unknown whether embedded interventions survive this. We study the stability of embedded steering for refusal suppression and brevity induction across five instruction-tuned models (3B-14B) under non-adversarial SFT and RLHF. Behaviourally, preservation tracks the training data: steering degrades when optimisation pressure contradicts the targeted behaviour and persists otherwise, with refusal ablation losing 64% of its effect on average under SFT. Mechanistically, however, the weight edit survives almost untouched even where behaviour reverts: mean vector recovery is $ρ= 0.004$, and the fine-tuning update along the steering direction is near-orthogonal to its pre-edit weight pattern (mean $\cosθ= 0.074$). When steered behaviour degrades, fine-tuning does not achieve it by dismantling or reversing the steering mechanism itself. Embedded steering is therefore mechanistically durable but functionally vulnerable, and requires behavioural re-validation after downstream training.
Activation steering can change behaviour without establishing that the effect is specific to the intended concept. We introduce SteerCheck, a preregistered attribution audit that matches off-target KL and separates mean, protected-tail, polarity, transfer, and semantic claims. Exact replay of 960 Qwen3-14B interventions reveals complementary limits of common controls: isotropic directions occupy a narrow near-orthogonal region, whereas sign-randomized same-construction directions often retain substantial target alignment. Effect is strongly associated with signed cosine within the sign-randomized family ($ρ=.94$); $25.3\%$ of its draws exceed cosine $.5$, and every draw exceeding the observed mean effect has cosine above $.80$. This alignment leakage does not by itself invalidate a conditional randomization test; it limits what the comparator can distinguish and motivates reporting exchangeability assumptions, a construction diagnostic $A$, and the empirical cosine distribution. The primary Qwen complete gate remains negative because the protected tail fails all families. On independent data, continuous margin transfers only in Qwen and accuracy transfers in no selected cell. Prospectively registered language controls pass the complete gate in Qwen and DeepSeek, while a passing DeepSeek detox comparator rules out categorical separation; all nominal passes are sensitive to $Γ=1.10$. Frozen three-rater open-generation evaluation supports factual correction in DeepSeek but not Qwen; the automatic judge fails calibration (macro-F1 $.562$), so null-wide semantic results remain descriptive. SteerCheck makes these conditional and mixed conclusions auditable.
Sycophancy and hallucination are persistent failure modes of Large Language Models (LLMs) across domains. However, it becomes particularly consequential in clinical question answering, where responses must remain grounded in the provided context and robust to user pressure. Hallucination can introduce information that is unsupported by the context, while sycophancy can cause a model to abandon a previously correct answer when challenged by the user. Existing approaches, such as prompt-based safeguards and always-on activation steering, often address these behaviors separately or apply interventions broadly across turns, which can unnecessarily deteriorate responses that were already correct. To address these limitations within a single framework, we employ Inference Time Intervention (ITI) to jointly control both behaviors by learning separate steering directions for hallucination and sycophancy from contrastive clinical pairs and applying them to causally verified attention heads. During runtime, behavior-specific gates then determine when intervention is needed: the hallucination component mitigates unsupported claims, while the sycophancy component mitigates answer shifts caused by user pressure. We evaluate this framework on clinical questions grounded in EHR data while keeping the model weights frozen. Across all evaluation settings, we conducted 15,900 model-response runs. Across 600 pressure trajectories for the 4-billion-parameter model, the unsteered model caved in 570 cases. At the same time, gated steering helped it last longer in 551 of them. It held its ground under pressure at levels comparable to those of models with more than 100 billion parameters, showing that targeted inference-time steering can improve robustness without intervening at every turn.
Activation steering is often evaluated under the answer encoding used to construct the direction. A reported gain may reflect the intended judgment or compatibility with answer identifiers seen during construction. We introduce Cross-Encoding Steering Evaluation, which freezes an intervention while re-encoding answers to the same held-out items. On NormBank, after A/B/C identifiers are reassigned, contrastive activation addition (CAA) induces larger target-versus-source score changes for the extraction indices than for the semantic labels under the new mapping. We call this extraction-index following. Varying identifier vocabulary (A/B/C, X/Y/Z, or 1/2/3) and row order shows that the effect tracks extraction index rather than row position. After matching direction norms across layers, extraction-index following emerges mainly at later depths. A low-rank output-sensitive component containing 15.4% of the direction's squared norm retains 96.3% of this effect. An Inference-Time Intervention (ITI)-style method also favors extraction-index over semantic-label following on NormBank in three models. In aggregate, MNLI favors extraction-index following, whereas Social Chemistry 101 (SC101) favors semantic-label following. Multiple-choice and open-ended evaluations can yield different behavioral conclusions. Thus, a steering gain under one answer encoding does not by itself identify what the intervention controls.
Souptik Kumar Majumdar, Fabian Kögel, Andreas Bullingcs.CV cs.AI
Linear probes and activation steering have uncovered that vision-language models (VLMs) internally represent mental states such as agents' beliefs, knowledge, and intentions. However, it is unclear whether and how these representations are used by downstream predictions along these axes. To close this gap, we introduce Cross-Axis Routing Diagnostic (CARD), which steers activations along one axis while measuring the response of a different axis's prediction. Applied to open-weight VLMs on Relay Chain -- a new cooperative grid-world benchmark we propose -- we diagnose a critical routing failure: models fail to incorporate belief representations into their next action prediction, effectively leaving valuable information about their partners unused.
Large language models (LLMs) exhibit sycophancy, a tendency to agree with user beliefs regardless of factual accuracy. This can reinforce misconceptions, but eliminating it entirely risks over-correction against valid opinions. Effective control must therefore both reduce and increase sycophancy with predictable and gradual effect. Yet, existing methods fail to ensure a bidirectional and monotonic relationship between steering strength and behavioral outcome across models and datasets. We introduce PCA-guided Activation Scaling (PAS), an activation steering framework that decomposes residual stream activations into a PCA-identified sycophancy-honesty subspace and an orthogonal residual, then applies distinct scaling exponents to achieve monotonic, bidirectional control. Across three LLMs and three datasets, PAS achieves strong monotonicity (Spearman $ρ$ = +0.92) and an average shift of 15.4% per direction, compared with 8.7% for the baselines. Ablation studies confirm that the decomposition, asymmetric exponents, and layer selection are each essential for maintaining monotonic control. The data and code are available at https://github.com/Bellafc/PCS.
Large language models (LLMs) are deployed globally in high-stakes settings, yet most safety research and alignment efforts remain concentrated on English. Thus, users interacting with LLMs in other languages may encounter weaker safeguards despite relying on the same systems for similarly sensitive tasks. In this work, we investigate whether safety signals learned from a high-resource language, like English, can improve multilingual safety. We propose BabelSteering, an activation steering method that acts as a lightweight inference- time intervention, using refusal directions derived from English safety supervision to generalize across languages. Our evaluation includes eight languages and jointly measures refusal of harmful requests, over-refusal, and general task utility. The results show that BabelSteering increases the refusal of harmful requests across languages, with only a marginal to no reduction in task utility but with some increase in refusal of pseudo-harmful prompts. For example, for Gemma 7B, we see an average increase in the refusal of harmful prompts across languages of 11 percentage points (pp), with individual languages like Bengali seeing an increase of 17 pp, with no loss of utility on Global MMLU, while pseudo-harmful refusals increase by 13 pp on average. We also introduce a multilingual translation-and-evaluation pipeline to facilitate future work on cross-lingual safety interventions. Overall, our findings suggest that activation steering may provide a practical, low- cost mechanism for extending English-derived safety signals to other languages. Warning: this paper contains examples with unsafe content
Kareem Hassani, Chaymaa Abbas, Lama Mawlawi +1cs.AI
Sycophancy, the tendency of a language model to change its answer to match a user's stated belief, is a common alignment failure. Existing activation steering methods typically apply a single contrastive direction uniformly throughout the model, which is an unconditional intervention that alters activations even when no sycophantic behavior is present, trading knowledge retention for behavioral correction. In Mixture-of-Experts (MoE) models, prior work further suggests that behavior is encoded within expert computations rather than routing decisions alone, making precise behavioral steering particularly challenging. In this work, we introduce a shared contrastive signal, built from matched prompts with and without a stated belief, that identifies where sycophancy lives across the MoE hierarchy and drives interventions that act only where the behavior is present. We formulate localization as a causal search over a granularity ladder of MoE blocks, experts, attention blocks, and heads, and compare unconditional subtraction against two conditional alternatives: an analytic projection-based subtraction and a learned per-token gate that steers the model away from sycophancy while keeping its weights frozen. We evaluate on three MoE models measuring sycophancy alongside general knowledge and reasoning benchmarks. Our conditional interventions removed up to 90\% of the belief-induced sycophancy. Our results demonstrate that sycophancy resides in identifiable computational subcircuits and can be selectively steered while maintaining a favorable removal-retention trade-off.
Jinhao Jing, Tian Zeyu, Lucas Qingyang Fang +4cs.AI
Activation steering turns localized representations into control directions, but localization alone does not reveal whether a direction has a selective operating regime. We introduce Predictive Memory Localization (PML), which treats the measured-grid intervention path as the predictive object of memory localization. PML separates random-calibrated target movement from semantic-neighbor and capability damage, and compares static localization and supervised geometry with a strength-disjoint low-dose causal response. Our frozen study covers 3,000 records from nine datasets and fourteen domains, yielding 30,000 distinct record-direction-layer paths and 210,000 distinct path-strength evaluations. At layer 7, the geometry-derived RFM/AGOP direction reaches 13.1% target-any and 12.3% clean-any, exceeding random by 3.6 and 3.4 percentage points under a record-paired bootstrap. Across record-, dataset-, and domain-grouped splits, responses at $|α|=0.1$ are the strongest signal for outcomes at disjoint strengths $|α|\in\{0.25,0.5\}$. On held-out records, a predictor-driven selector chooses a coefficient or abstains, improves utility and reduces semantic-neighbor damage relative to a train-tuned fixed-strength policy, and avoids most evaluations in a dense scan. Across three residual-norm-matched base models, learned directions retain selective-path gains and low-dose responses yield 0.801-0.828 record-held-out macro AUROC. PML therefore turns memory localization into a falsifiable forecast of margin-level selective outcomes and a risk-aware intervention decision.
Haoze Liu, Run Liu, Haiying Xu +6cs.LG cs.AI cs.CL cs.HC
Large language models (LLMs) increasingly act in interactive settings where their behavioral styles affect user experience, safety, and downstream decision making. Existing LLM personality studies largely rely on self-report questionnaires administered in first-person settings, making the resulting profiles sensitive to surface elicitation choices and poorly grounded in concrete model behavior. In this work, we introduce a situated behavioral-data (B-data) framework for studying and controlling LLM behavioral personality. We construct 3,200 contrastive behavioral scenarios spanning 20 behavioral patterns and four prompt registers, grounded in validated psychometric facets such as BFI-2, DOSPERT, and HEXACO. Using this framework, we find that LLMs exhibit stable and model-specific behavioral profiles, while also revealing register-dependent shifts across first-person decisions, advice-giving, and task execution. We then show that these behavioral patterns can be controlled through Behavioral Mode Axes (BMAs), activation-space directions derived from contrastive behavioral traces. Compared with response-derived BMAs, which are more prone to trait drift, thought-derived BMAs more faithfully capture the intended behavioral mechanism and provide cleaner control over situated behavioral styles. Our results suggest that LLM personality-like tendencies are better understood not as abstract self-report traits, but as measurable and controllable behavioral modes grounded in concrete interaction contexts. Our code and data are available at https://github.com/lhz191/LLM-Behavioral-Personality.
Muhammad Faishal Adly Nelwan, Alfan Farizki Wicaksonocs.CL cs.AI
Activation steering edits the behaviour of a frozen language model by adding a learned vector to its residual stream, and current practice fixes the injection layers globally per task. We argue that the best layers are an instance-level decision, and we make per-instance, multi-layer selection both well understood and deployable. On two open-weight 8B models and six binary persona traits, a per-instance oracle over layer subsets shows that the best layers vary from one input to the next: on most trait-model pairs, no fixed global layer set recovers the per-instance benefit. A greedy rule that ranks layers by single-layer marginal effect recovers nearly all of the oracle's benefit, but both must score candidate layers against the gold answer, so neither can run at deployment; the rule instead becomes the target a prompt-only predictor is trained to reproduce. Our deployable recipe needs no label at inference: a per-instance layer ranker read off the prompt embedding, a classifier that infers the steering direction, and an adaptive gate that scores short steered passes against that inferred direction and steers no more layers than necessary. The recipe recovers most of the oracle's lift (the bulk on the stronger model, a clear majority on the harder one), never drives any trait-model pair below its unsteered alignment baseline on average, and largely avoids the fluency collapse that strong global selection incurs at higher layer counts. A mechanistic account, "direction over magnitude", explains the behavioural flip under a mis-directed global set, the output collapse from steering too many layers, and the ceiling of unsteerable inputs.
Steering vectors are a lightweight tool for controlling LLM behavior. However, emerging evidence shows that steering vectors can unintentionally compromise a model's safety mechanisms and increase compliance with harmful requests, while no effective mitigation yet exists. In this work, we show that this safety degradation arises from a separable component in the vector that disrupts the model's safety mechanisms but contributes little to the steering objective. We identify and remove this safety-degrading component, formulating the task as a constrained optimization problem solved through primal-dual updates, subject to preserving the intended steering effect and bounding false refusal. The resulting solution is both interpretable and surgical: the optimization recovers a single direction whose ablation from the steering vector restores model safety with minimal utility cost. Across models, steering behaviors, and attack suites, including unseen attacks types, our method substantially reduces steering-induced safety degradation while preserving the original steering effect with minimal impact on false refusal. Our method offers a post-hoc correction to steering vectors that mitigates their safety cost, and more broadly, it provides a general recipe for applying activation-level model interventions without paying a safety tax.
Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly reported to exhibit human-like neural and cognitive signatures, including concept cells, mental number lines, and cognitive maps. These claims often rely on linear probing and activation steering applied to a single model, yet both methods are highly sensitive to measurement choices. A reported parallel may therefore reflect the model, the measurement procedure, or both. We audit four representative neuroscience-inspired paradigms across 17 models from five families, spanning $0.6$B to $72$B parameters. Our main experiment examines the causal steerability of concept directions. With raw activation units and a fixed layer and coefficient, steerability appears to increase with model scale, resembling an emergent capability. However, this pattern is produced by an uncalibrated pipeline rather than by a claim established in the steering literature. The trend depends jointly on raw units, the readout metric, and the operating point; correcting any one of these removes it. With residual-norm-comparable interventions and held-out operating-point selection, concept steering remains significant at every scale, but shows no significant trend across the Qwen3 series, although the confidence interval does not rule out a moderate positive slope. The remaining results are mixed. A linear geographic world map is consistently decodable in every tested checkpoint up to $72$B. Number magnitude is strongly encoded, but whether individual neurons appear bell-shaped or monotonic depends on the selection criterion. Language-specific structure is localizable, but the direction of the cross-lingual asymmetry reverses under a different attribution method. These results suggest that the main constraint on AI neuroscience is not a lack of phenomena, but a lack of comparable measurements and adequate controls. We release the protocol, stimuli, and code.
Agentic LLMs exhibit three consequential tool-use failures: invalid arguments (validity), unnecessary calls (over-calling), and omitted calls when tools are needed (missing). We find that a small, failure-specific set of MLP neurons could distinguish such failures with linearly separable decision boundaries. Building on this observation, we introduce PRISMS (Probing Representations In Support of Monitoring and Steering), a closed-loop framework that shares a failure-specific neuron basis between sparse detection and activation steering. PRISMS selects contribution-critical MLP neurons and fits an L1-regularized detector on their activations. Across six models from the Qwen3, Llama, and Gemma families, over-calling and missing are detected at the pre-generation prompt boundary with ROC-AUC 0.90-1.00, while validity is detected from the generated tool-call span with ROC-AUC 0.86-0.90. These results are achieved with highly sparse readouts: only 1-2 MLP neurons for missing, 2-16 for over-calling, and approximately 128 for validity. These sparse detectors match or outperform dense residual-stream baselines using 23-627 times fewer features. The shared neuron basis also supports bidirectional control over tool-calling behavior, suppressing unnecessary calls and eliciting omitted ones. PRISMS therefore gates intervention on predicted failure risk to mitigate the collateral effects of unconditional steering. Across all six models, PRISMS reduces pooled over-calling rate by 80% (from 0.131 to 0.026) while increasing tool-required accuracy by 14.2 percentage points (from 0.689 to 0.831). PRISMS thus provides lightweight failure detection and selective intervention across model families.
Sycophancy refers to the tendency for large language models (LLMs) to match user beliefs at the cost of factual correctness, thereby undermining model reliability. Prior work on evaluating sycophancy in LLMs aims to assess whether a model's output matches an authority's claim, but cannot reveal which part of the prompt drives this sycophantic behavior. To bridge this gap, we investigate the relationship of sycophantic responses with an authority's credentials, their assertive claim, and the problem statement. We introduce the Authority Share Index (ASI), an Integrated Gradients-based token attribution method, which measures the degree to which a model's decision is driven by authority-related text. Through extensive experiments across five models and 30 test configurations, we find that sycophantic responses consistently direct more attention toward authority tokens than resistant ones. Moreover, our token attribution method reveals that for the sycophantic cases, the claim asserted by the authority receives more attention than the authority's credentials. Building on these findings, we propose attribution-guided contrastive activation steering to mitigate LLM sycophancy. Our method constructs a steering vector from high-attribution tokens of sycophantic and resistant responses, selectively pushing models toward resistance. This enables inference-time steering without retraining, lowering sycophancy from 96% to 25% in the strongest case. Together, our results show that token-level attribution can both explain what drives sycophancy and directly inform a practical intervention.
Yoann Poupart, Aurélie Beynier, Nicolas Maudetcs.LG cs.MA
Activation steering has emerged in large language models as a lightweight alternative for dynamically changing a model's behavior at inference time. However, we show that existing steering methods fail to steer even a simple policy in a two-route gridworld environment. To address this limitation, we propose Policy Gradient Steering (PGS), which formulates steering as a reinforcement learning problem. PGS accumulates gradients of a temporary behavioral objective over a small set of rollouts or demonstrations to construct a removable task vector. We first demonstrate the calibration and reversibility of PGS in a two-route gridworld environment. Using chess puzzles, we then evaluate independently fitted PGS vectors both in isolation and in combination, finding that compatible tactical objectives accumulate constructively. Finally, in competitive football, we show that PGS can alter specific team behaviors and that its effects transfer across opponents. Together, these results show that policy gradients provide a natural interface for constructing temporary and composable behavioral adaptations across diverse decision-making domains.
Activation steering controls model behavior by editing internal activations at inference time. We study its input-side dual: optimizing a fluent prompt so that a chosen internal latent is driven toward zero, with no inference-time model access. Our target is an "evaluation-awareness" latent-linearly readable and steerable in recent work-whose control would threaten the validity of safety evaluations if models behave differently when they detect being tested. Adapting Fluent Dreaming / EPO with a negated feature term (GCG-style token optimization plus a self-cross-entropy fluency regularizer, swept over a fluency weight), we suppress the latent under five target constructions-a CAA direction, a subspace norm, an SAE feature, a single MLP neuron, and a behavioral logit-on Llama-3.2-3B and Llama-3.1-8B. The latent is robustly suppressible ($z\approx-7$), and a causally-validated Llama Scope SAE feature can be fully and selectively turned off. But our controls tell a cautionary story about the CAA direction: a placebo random direction is suppressed just as hard and shifts behavior just as far, and when we hold a real eval passage in context and optimize only a prefix, suppressing the eval-direction fails to reduce-and slightly increases-the model's behavioral eval judgment. Activation-readability, in short, is not behavioral controllability. We further find that a single MLP neuron is eval-correlated but not causal at both scales, and that scanning the real Pile yields a natural-text baseline competitive with the optimizer for the internal direction. A positive control validates our erasure detector, bounding an erasure-vs-rotation question earlier left open.
Activation steering modifies a language model by adding a learned direction to its hidden activations, enabling targeted behavioral changes without retraining. While effective, steering often produces unintended side effects on other behaviors, making it difficult to deploy safely. We therefore ask: can these side effects be forecasted before steering is applied? We answer this question by constructing a cross-effect matrix over a taxonomy of 67 behaviors across three open-weight language models. We find that side effects are common, structured, and often asymmetric, revealing interactions that cannot be explained by existing similarity-based heuristics. Despite this complexity, we show that side effects are largely predictable before steering is performed. Their magnitude depends primarily on the target behavior, while their direction can be forecasted from the model's unsteered representations with substantially higher accuracy than simple baselines. Our results demonstrate that activation steering has systematic and forecastable side effects, enabling proactive safety auditing and more informed deployment of steering interventions.
Jiaran Ye, Lingxu Ran, Zijun Yao +5cs.CL cs.AI cs.LG
Activation steering controls language models by adding vectors or features to hidden states at inference time, but the upstream source of these steering signals is often treated as a secondary detail. We study this source choice as activation source selection: the combination of source context and activation readout policy used to collect the hidden states from which a steering signal is built. Holding the downstream intervention fixed, we show across three instruction-tuned models and four steering task families that changing only the source activations substantially changes steering success. We further find that effective steering is not explained simply by whether the desired behavior appears in the source text. Instead, strong signals come from execution-boundary states, where the model is about to produce or continue the target behavior. This pre-/post-realization distinction explains why answer-based sources sometimes work: their useful component aligns with execution-boundary directions rather than target appearance alone. Building on this view, we introduce tail subtraction, which removes shared prompt and continuation semantics from boundary states and yields cleaner, more stable steering signals. Overall, our results suggest that steering depends on representations of what the model is about to do, not merely on what has already appeared.
Gender-inclusive language generation seeks to transform biased text into inclusive alternatives while preserving semantic meaning and contextual coherence. This paper presents the IHLC system for the LT-EDI 2026 Shared Task, addressing both gender-inclusive rewriting and counter-narrative generation. For gender-inclusive rewriting, we employ parameter-efficient Low-Rank Adaptation (LoRA) fine-tuning, achieving an official score of 80.00%. Our primary contribution is a compute-efficient inference-time representation engineering approach for counter-narrative generation. We derive a principal steering direction from contrastive hidden-state activations using principal component analysis (PCA) and inject it into the intermediate representations of Gemma-3-4B-it during inference, enabling behavioral steering toward inclusive responses without modifying model weights. Combined with constrained prompting, this approach produces polite and contextually appropriate counter-narratives, achieving an official score of 78.12%. We further present a manual analysis of steering behavior, identifying key failure modes including semantic drift, residual bias leakage, layer sensitivity, over-steering, and text degeneration. Our findings highlight both the practical potential and current limitations of activation steering as a lightweight alternative to parameter updates for controllable and socially aligned language generation.
Liu Zai, Yumeng Wang, Junchen Fu +1cs.CL cs.AI cs.LG
Activation steering enables control and interpretation of LLMs, yet existing work primarily models personality through static trait frameworks such as the Big Five. We investigate whether personality can instead be represented and controlled as a set of cognitive processes using the eight Jungian Cognitive Functions. To this end, we introduce a framework comprising a Jungian evaluation protocol and a dataset of over 2,100 role-playing character narrations. Activation steering vector extraction and evaluation experiments on Llama-3.1-8B demonstrate effective monotonic control over all eight cognitive functions through activation steering. Beyond controllability, our analysis reveals that: 1. personality information is concentrated in middle transformer layers; 2. steering vectors exhibit structured geometric relationships consistent with distinctions between rational and irrational functions; 3. effective multi-dimensional steering directions cannot be recovered as linear combinations of single-function directions. These findings provide new insights into the representation of personality in LLM activation space and establish a framework for studying interpretable, effective, and multi-dimensional personality control.
Activation steering provides a lightweight mechanism for controlling large language models at inference time, but steering vectors can have unintended externalities: utility vectors may weaken safety behavior, while refusal vectors may induce over-refusal on benign prompts. We introduce OPIUM (Optimizing Protected Injections via Utility Manifolds), a training-free method for sanitizing steering vectors through representation matching. Given reference behaviors on two prompt sets, OPIUM optimizes a new steering vector that preserves the downstream representations induced by the desired intervention while matching a safer reference behavior on prompts where the original vector fails. Across steering-externality and over-refusal settings, OPIUM improves the safety--utility tradeoff relative to vanilla steering and directional ablation, suggesting that harmful side effects of activation steering can often be mitigated directly in activation space.
Task arithmetic, sequential fine-tuning, activation steering, and first-order random search all operate through relatively small perturbations around an already trained checkpoint, and they rely on different local approximations: individual perturbations should be first-order predictable, task updates should compose with controlled interference, useful tangent structure should be stable and possible to estimate, and weight edits should have counterparts in representation space. We measure 8 such properties with the same harness around a multitask LoRA operating point, on 9 transformers (82M-7B), with a prospectively registered property list, thresholds, and test split. We find a shared one-direction validity window up to the tested scale $10^{-2}$, but no universal radius for pairwise composition or update ordering. Along individual directions, changes of the probe loss remain first-order predictable throughout the grid: a perturbation's effect on the loss is essentially its projection onto the gradient, which is also what makes local random search work. Pairwise structure, however, proves to be far more fragile: on over a third of the measured (model, task pair) combinations, two-update order sensitivity sets in strictly inside that window; task-gradient subspaces rotate within tens of steps; additivity under our fixed activation probe fails at full task-vector scale on several models, including both held-out 7B models; and no model median passes the registered global mean-vector weight-to-steering correspondence bar. For two sequential task-gradient steps, the leading order-dependent term is the Lie bracket $H_B\textbf{g}_A-H_A\textbf{g}_B$; its normalized prediction $c(η)=ηκ+O(η^2)$ tracks the measured defect at median ratio 1.002, while the onset scale $η^\dagger\approx0.10/κ$ spans three orders of magnitude across models and task pairs.