Computing Actual Causes for Neural Network Predictions under Structured Causal Inputs

Explaining the predictions of neural networks is a central challenge in trustworthy AI. Existing explanation methods, such as those based on feature attribution or minimal sufficient sets, typically treat input features as independent, which can yield misleading explanations when inputs exhibit structured dependencies. We address this by formalizing explanations as Halpern-Pearl (HP) actual causes, modeling input dependencies using Boolean Structural Causal Models (SCMs). We compute HP causes by applying bound propagation and branch-and-bound techniques, while providing formal guarantees of completeness and minimality. Our experiments show that we substantially outperform brute-force and ILP baselines in scalability, and outperform heuristic search as graph size grows, computing all minimal actual causes on instances with search spaces of up to $2.3\times10^{13}$ candidate (cause, contingency) pairs, on SCMs with up to 28 nodes, within a 180s per-instance budget. In a case study, we further show that ignoring input dependencies inflates the number of reported causes, 14.9% of which are spurious under our SCM.

Difference-Making without Making a Difference

Over a series of seven papers, Andreas & Günther have introduced seven definitions of actual causation and have classified them as belonging to three different, competing, types of accounts: factual difference-making, counterfactual difference-making, and regularity-based. I show that their most recent - factual difference-making - definition instantiates all three types, thereby proving that these are distinctions without a difference. I further compare their novel account to the other six accounts on several crucial examples, revealing that this undermines all seven of their accounts.