Optimal learners are tailored to exploit the i.i.d.\ data assumption underlying the classic PAC model. What if an i.i.d.\ training sample were corrupted with correctly labeled examples drawn from an otherwise unrelated, even adversarial source? This model of learning with monotone adversarial corruptions was recently introduced by Larsen et al. (2026), who demonstrated that all known optimal binary learners suffer increased error rates in this setting, from $O(d / n)$ in the PAC model to $Ω(d \log(n / d) / n)$ under monotone corruption. Mehrotra (2026) proved this logarithmic factor to be necessary for binary classification, but left open the consequences of corruption for more general learning settings, such as multiclass classification and partial binary concept classes. As our primary result, we demonstrate that monotone adversaries are frighteningly more powerful in each of these settings. We exhibit a learnable multiclass problem, of DS dimension only 2, that becomes altogether unlearnable under a monotone adversary, and show an analogous result for partial binary concept classes. These results are achieved by an adaptive adversary permitted to view the original i.i.d.\ training set $S$ and to insert $b < \infty$ corrupted datapoints into $S$. In the multiclass example, the adversary need only insert a linear number $b = |S| = n$ of datapoints. We complement these impossibility results by proving that every class remains learnable when the number of adaptive additions is $o(n)$, which our previous multiclass lower bound proves to be tight. We further observe that the classic multiclass error rate of $O(d_{\mathrm{DS}} / n)$ remains achievable against adaptive adversaries restricted to a known constant budget $b = O(1)$, against semi-adaptive adversaries viewing only a $p$-fraction of $S$ for $p \in (0, 1)$, and against oblivious adversaries that cannot view $S$.
Motivated by reinforcement learning in harsh environments, we consider the problem of learning an optimal policy subject to adversarially corrupted feedback. Specifically, at each time-step, an adversary can perturb both the reward and state observations of the learner following the Huber contamination model. To defend against such data corruption, we propose {\texttt{BR-Async-Q}}: a novel, epoch-based, robust \(Q\)-learning algorithm built upon two key ideas: (i) partitioning the online data stream into batches to reduce variance, and (ii) constructing robust estimates of the Bellman optimality operator using such batched data. We prove a high-probability $\ell_\infty$ error bound for {\texttt{BR-Async-Q}} that matches that for vanilla \(Q\)-learning, up to a small additive term that scales with the fraction of corrupted samples. To our knowledge, this provides the first robustness guarantee for asynchronous \(Q\)-learning subject to both reward and state corruption. Furthermore, when only rewards are corrupted, the dependence of our algorithm's bound on the corruption fraction is minimax optimal.
Marco Bressan, Nicolò Cesa-Bianchi, Tommaso d`Orsi +2cs.LG stat.ML
Motivated by real-world scenarios where malicious entities tamper with existing networks, we define a model where an adversary seeks to hide a set of \emph{corrupted vertices} inside a graph $G^*$. To this end, the adversary can add edges between the corrupted vertices, as well as edges between the corrupted vertices and $G^*$, and its power is then measured by the size of the \emph{neighborhood} of the corrupted vertices in $G^*$. Our goal is to design an active learning algorithm that efficiently finds the subset of corrupted vertices using a small number of label queries. We devise an efficient algorithm that approximately recovers the corrupted vertices with a query complexity that depends polynomially on both the power of the adversary and the \emph{vertex expansion} of $G^*$, a fundamental measure of graph connectivity. At the heart of this result is a polynomial-time algorithm, obtained by carefully adapting sum-of-squares algorithms for approximating minimum expansion, that finds a set with small vertex expansion subject to cardinality constraints. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first time that the vertex expansion is shown to play a key role in determining the query complexity of active learning algorithms robust to structural adversarial attacks.
Online learning in non-stationary streams is often formulated as tracking a point estimate, but many applications require predicting the full data-generating distribution. We study online distributional prediction under drift and adversarial corruption. Our approach represents each candidate law through a latent cluster geometry: a variable-size configuration of centers that organizes probability mass and induces a predictive distribution. A Gibbs quasi-posterior over these configurations yields an online predictor by posterior averaging, and the resulting variable-dimensional posterior can be sampled with reversible-jump MCMC. The method therefore avoids specifying a parametric streaming law while retaining a structured latent space for uncertainty, regularization, and comparison. We evaluate performance by cumulative Wasserstein-1 regret against the time-varying true law. The analysis separates two effects: corruption perturbs the loss-based posterior update, whereas drift makes long-horizon posterior memory stale. We address the latter with a restarted variant that temporally localizes the same quasi-Bayesian update. The resulting high-probability bounds decompose into a PAC-Bayesian complexity term, a corruption-sensitive posterior perturbation term, and a dynamic optimal-transport term driven by \(A_T^{\mathrm{OT}}=\sum_{t=2}^T W_2^2(p_{t-1}^*,p_t^*)\). Under bounded support, stable latent geometry, predictive-map regularity, oracle realizability, localized restart windows, sublinear transport action, and sublinear corruption budget, the restarted predictor achieves sublinear cumulative Wasserstein regret. These guarantees require no parametric model for the stream, drift mechanism, or corruption process.