Cong Chen, Jean-Philippe Monteuuis, Jonathan Petitcs.CV cs.AI
Deep Neural Networks (DNNs) have found successful deployment in numerous vision perception systems. However, their susceptibility to adversarial attacks has prompted concerns regarding their practical applications, specifically in the context of autonomous driving. Existing defenses often suffer from cost inefficiency, rendering their deployment impractical for resource-constrained applications. In this work, we propose an efficient and effective adversarial attack detection scheme leveraging the multi-task perception within a complex vision system. Adversarial perturbations are detected by the inconsistencies between the inference outputs of multiple vision tasks, e.g., object detection and instance segmentation. To this end, we developed a consistency score metric to measure the inconsistency between vision tasks. Next, we designed an approach to select the best model pairs for detecting inconsistencies effectively. Finally, we evaluated our defense against PGD attacks across multiple vision models on the BDD100k validation dataset. The experimental results demonstrated that our defense achieved a ROC-AUC performance of 99.9% detection within the considered attacker model.
Afsaneh Hasanebrahimi, Hanxun Huang, Christopher Leckie +2cs.CV cs.LG
Vision-language pre-trained models (VLPs) are widely used in real-world applications. However, they remain vulnerable to adversarial attacks. Although adversarial detection methods have demonstrated success in single-modality settings (either vision or language), their effectiveness and reliability in multimodal models such as VLPs remain largely unexplored. In this work, we study the geometry of VLP embedding spaces and observe structured anisotropy that differs from unimodal vision models. Our theoretical analysis shows that under this anisotropic structure, adversarial attacks increase the expected geometric separation between clean and adversarial examples (AEs). Specifically, we demonstrate that AEs consistently exhibit greater expected distances to randomly sampled points than their clean counterparts, indicating that AEs tend to push representations out of manifold regions. Building on these insights, we propose GeoDetect, which leverages these off-manifold deviations via geometric scores to identify AEs. Through comprehensive evaluations, we show that our approach reliably detects AEs across diverse VLP architectures and threat settings, covering unimodal and multimodal attacks as well as adaptive attacks, thereby providing a robust and practical approach to improving the safety and reliability of these models.
Hodaya Krakover, Meir Yossef Levi, Eyal Gofer +1cs.CV
Adversarial attacks pose a challenge to the reliability of deep learning models, motivating effective detection methods. Existing techniques often rely on attack-specific assumptions, access to adversarial samples, or knowledge of the underlying classifier (white-box). We propose \textit{$A^4D$ (\textbf{A}ttack- and \textbf{A}rchitecture-\textbf{A}gnostic \textbf{A}dversarial \textbf{D}etector)}, a completely black-box, zero-shot adversarial attack detection framework that utilizes prompt-based similarity scores derived from CLIP. To the best of our knowledge this is the first attempt to utilize CLIP for such a task. The method is based on two key observations: (i) CLIP is sensitive even to small imperceptible non-semantic perturbations; (ii) The shift in CLIP embedding space is not arbitrary and can be used as a robust attack indicator. Experiments across multiple attacks, datasets and classifiers validate that $A^4D$ achieves SOTA detection results in the attack-agnostic and classifier-agnostic setting.
Statistical adversarial detection (SAD) treats detection as a two-sample test. Given a reference set of clean examples (CEs) and a batch of queries, potentially containing an unknown mixture of CEs and adversarial examples (AEs), SAD decides whether the query distribution drifts away from the CE distribution while controlling the false-alarm rate. Existing SAD-based methods mainly use maximum mean discrepancy (MMD) to measure the distributional discrepancy. However, MMD's distributional properties limit its ability to capture characteristic uncertainty patterns of AEs that are crucial for detection: AEs typically exhibit abnormal feature spread (i.e., global uncertainty) and instability under perturbations (i.e., local uncertainty). To close the gap, we propose Uncertainty-aware Statistical Adversarial Detection (USAD), which explicitly captures these uncertainty patterns with two new statistics: (1) Variance Discrepancy (VD), which measures the difference in feature spread between AEs and CEs to capture global uncertainty differences. (2) Perturbation-based Covariance Discrepancy (PCD), which compares feature covariance under Gaussian perturbations to capture local uncertainty differences. By aggregating VD and PCD, USAD achieves superior detection performances over baseline methods against various adversarial attacks, highlighting the importance of considering characteristic behaviors of AEs for effective SAD. Our code is available at: https://anonymous.4open.science/r/USAD.
Maher Boughdiri, Mounira Msahli, Albert Bifetcs.CV cs.AI
Deep neural networks (DNNs) have shown outstanding performance in visual recognition tasks within vision sensor networks; however, they are still vulnerable to adversarial manipulations and imperceptible perturbations that can lead to erroneous predictions. To address that, this paper presents AEGIS, a semantic aware and uncertainty guided adversarial detection framework designed for robust image classification in vision sensors pipelines. At its core, a SemantiGAN module functions as a multi class semantic discriminator, identifying and filtering visually inconsistent adversarial inputs before they propagate further in the pipeline. For inputs that pass this stage, a stochastic augmentation process generates test time variations, from which handcrafted instability metrics FlipScore, Prediction Inconsistency, Layerwise Cosine Similarity (early and mid layers), and Entropy are computed. These features are aggregated into a compact five dimensional vector and processed by an Evidential Deep Learning (EDL) classifier, which models output evidence using a Dirichlet distribution to yield both class predictions and calibrated uncertainty estimates. Evaluations on the Tiny ImageNet dataset across six categories clean, FGSM, PGD, patch based, functional, and geometric attacks demonstrate the effectiveness of AEGIS. The proposed framework achieves an AUROC of 92.1\%, an AUPRC of 90.2\%, and an accuracy of 90.7\%, outperforming conventional softmax-based detectors in terms of detection performance, robustness, interpretability, and uncertainty calibration.
This paper develops a variational framework for regulated language generation. Starting from autoregressive token sampling, we derive the induced distribution over complete messages and relate it to an entropy-regularized Gibbs law. Regulation is modeled as an optimal discriminator whose convex-dual value is an f-divergence, and the generator-regulator interaction is formulated as a saddle-point problem. The framework applies to moderation, censorship, AI deception detection, compliance auditing, phishing defense, and manipulation control, where regulation concerns a distribution over possible messages rather than a single output. The equilibrium clarifies the tradeoff among utility, entropy, regulatory alignment, and finite-length detectability. Two finite-vocabulary case studies, censorship filtering and phishing defense, illustrate how the theory can be evaluated through utility, entropy, divergence, receiver-side scores, and detection probability.
Lucas Görnhardt, Timo Bartels, Niklas Schwarz +1cs.CV
Conventional one-hot encodings often yield poorly calibrated models, being overconfident under attack, and letting entropy-based detection algorithms fail. Previous image classification works have demonstrated that Hadamard-coded output representations can improve adversarial robustness. However, attempts to integrate Hadamard codes into semantic segmentation fall far behind state-of-the-art models in mean intersection-over-union performance. Regarding object detection, such output encodings have not yet been investigated at all. Further, no prior art addressed intrinsic codeword inconsistencies or actually exploited intrinsic codeword redundancy. Accordingly, we first derive a novel decoding procedure for Hadamard codewords towards optimal class-wise probabilities, solving the underlying optimization problem by using the projection onto the probability simplex. Second, our optimization delivers a measure of prediction inconsistency. Third, we are the first to show how to exploit these inconsistencies for adversarial attack and disturbance detection. Fourth, we introduce HadamardNet, a framework employing Hadamard codes as output representations for semantic segmentation and object detection models and tasks. We conduct a comprehensive evaluation both on disturbances and adversarial attacks, achieving state-of-the-art perturbation detection performance for both tasks in only a single detection pass, while delivering equivalent or close-by reference performance on clean data.
The rise of edge-based machine learning has enabled distributed adaptation of language models across mobile and IoT devices, offering privacy preservation and real-time responsiveness. However, distributed fine-tuning of language models on untrusted or heterogeneous edge nodes introduces new vulnerabilities. Compromised or unreliable devices can inject poisoned updates, leading to stealthy model manipulation or convergence degradation. Classical defenses such as robust aggregation or temporal anomaly detection operate on a single global model and are therefore limited in detecting coordinated or persistent poisoning. This work proposes a new system-level defense based on model multiplicity. Instead of maintaining one global model, the system rotates or concurrently trains multiple small language models (e.g., DistilGPT-2), each updated by independently sampled subsets of edge nodes. These models evolve under distinct training trajectories, creating multiple independent views of the same distributed population. Divergence between models quantified through gradient similarity, loss evolution, or parameter variance serves as a signal of anomalous or adversarial behavior. When one model deviates significantly from the ensemble mean, the system flags its contributing nodes for isolation or re-weighting. We implement this framework and evaluate it on edge-scale simulations of Small Language Model (SLM) training under varying heterogeneity and attack conditions. Results show that model multiplicity enables earlier and more reliable detection of poisoning compared to classical single-model defenses such as Flanders and Robust methods. Our findings demonstrate that diversity in model evolution can serve as a practical and effective defense mechanism for secure distributed learning on resource-constrained edge devices.
The nonuniform and growing impact of adversarial noise across the layers of deep neural networks has been used in the literature, without a formal mathematical justification, to detect adversarial inputs and improve robustness. In this work, we study this phenomenon in detail and present a formal adversarial noise amplification theorem. We specify a set of sufficient conditions under which the adversarial noise amplification is mathematically guaranteed. Based on theoretical observations, we propose a novel training methodology with a custom spectral loss function and a specific architectural design to enhance the amplification signal for detecting adversarial data. Finally, we introduce a new, lightweight detection mechanism that leverages the enhanced amplification signal and operates entirely at inference time. To validate our approach, we demonstrate the detector's efficacy against both state-of-the-art attacks and a purpose-built adaptive attack, confirming that enhanced amplification can serve as a robust and reliable signal for adversarial defense.