Large language model (LLM) agents can now carry out long-horizon technical workflows involving complex tool use, code execution, file edits, and generated artifacts. As agents do more work faster, the productivity bottleneck shifts from producing outputs to auditing whether those outputs are correct and trustworthy. Agent observability systems make fine-grained execution events visible, but visibility alone still leaves reviewers to reconstruct which actions, artifacts, and validation steps matter for a particular conclusion. We introduce LEDGER - Layered Evidence and Decision Graphs for Execution Review, a tracing and review system that builds layered trace graphs over observed agent sessions. LEDGER preserves Trace Records while grouping them into Evidence Nodes and Workflow Nodes, representing artifacts as evidence anchors, and adding typed semantic edges that connect claims to supporting actions, artifacts, and checks. Through data-analysis and coding examples, we show how the resulting traces expose workflow decisions, artifact lineage, repair steps, validation coverage, and claim-support paths for evidence-centered audit.
Self-evolving agents turn experience into reusable skills, workflows, or memories, but post-evolution accuracy alone does not show whether learned behavior preserves previously correct behavior or security. We audit SkillOpt, Agent Workflow Memory (AWM), and ReasoningBank in simulated e-banking using matched benign acquisition trajectories, sealed evaluation endpoints, execution-grounded checks, and independent state replay. On Qwen 3.7 Flash, SkillOpt raises benign utility from 0.741 to 0.837 while exposure to injected content rises from 0.820 to 0.943. Conditional attack success after exposure falls from 0.605 to 0.562, yet overall attack success rate (ASR) rises from 0.496 to 0.530 and unauthorized financial state changes rise to 0.685. Across three independently evolved lineages, capability, exposure, and unauthorized-state changes increase in all three, whereas ASR increases in only two. ReasoningBank raises utility to 0.859 without increasing aggregate ASR, although unauthorized state changes remain slightly above Static. AWM reveals a separate evaluation hazard: a literal WebArena text-action envelope disrupts tool execution in our native function-calling executor. In a post-hoc sensitivity test, removing only that envelope restores utility from 0.319 to 0.756, while exposure rises from 0.299 to 0.909 and ASR from 0.195 to 0.575. Auditing self-evolving financial agents therefore requires tracking regressions, attack-surface contact, unauthorized financial-state change, and artifact-executor compatibility, not accuracy alone.
An AI scientist should not grade its own homework. Yet in the systems we examined, the agent that reviews the work usually comes from the same model family as the agent that produced it, or at least from the same vendor. Model evaluators are known to favour their own generations. Whether models trained alike also share blind spots is a conjecture, not a settled finding, but if they do, the reviewer inherits the author's. The record of what was flagged and what was waved through often sits in platform logs that nobody outside can replay. We present CrossAudit, a protocol for supervising autonomous research pipelines. It rests on three commitments. Each increment of work is audited by an agent from a different vendor against a rulebook a human wrote and versioned. Reports, verdicts, disputes and rulings are git commits, so the supervision history can be re-read and cited; raw model exchanges are not yet part of that record. Scripted checks run before any model does. Advisory judgement never gates the pipeline: a model blocks only by citing a rule, and no model may waive a deterministic failure. Blockers that survive a bounded number of revision rounds go to a person. We state the protocol as eight invariants. We describe a reference implementation built from GitHub Actions and a few hundred lines of Python, and report a live deployment of a closely related variant in a computational-chemistry pipeline. We also ran a seeded-defect trial (30 increments, 43 seeded defects, one run per configuration). A cross-vendor audit of our own repository then voided its blinding. We adopt that audit's findings and report the corrected results. The trial shows that two vendors read the same rulebook differently. It does not show that either is better. The strongest evidence here is the committed, uncontrolled record of cross-vendor audits of this paper itself.
Cesare Zavattari, Alessandro Tommasi, Giuseppe Prencipecs.AI
A single human must audit $N$ LLM agents under a budget of $B \ll N$ audits per round, guided by self-reported confidence that may be adversarially miscalibrated and by correlated errors. We model this as budgeted noisy inspection over a two-level Gaussian copula and locate the miscalibration threshold $δ^*$ past which confidence-ranked auditing is \emph{worse} than random. Two a-priori expectations reverse: $δ^*$ \emph{rises} as the budget shrinks, and cross-family correlation is not low---shared difficulty dominates lineage. Five open-weight LLMs show operationally useless (near-constant) confidence, point estimates at or beyond the flip though CIs straddle it; a proprietary model is informative and lands below it. We give a quantitative criterion for \emph{vacuous} oversight, and replaying policies on recorded traces confirms the ordering.