The Refusal Residue: When Probes Catch Alignment Faking and When They Don't

Alignment faking is dangerous because a model can appear compliant under monitoring while preserving behavior it would reveal when unmonitored. When no scratchpad is visible, behavior alone cannot distinguish strategic from genuine compliance. We ask whether hidden states reveal what outputs hide. We run a 13-model sweep for naturally-emerging faking, then probe and steer hidden states on the two models that fake. Natural faking appears only in Qwen3-32B (+18.2pp) and Llama-3.1-8B (+24.4pp at n=10, p<10^-15), while explicit scratchpad self-reports are rare (a Claude Opus 4 judge flags faking reasoning in 1.4% of Qwen and 0.0% of Llama compliant scratchpads). Both fakers show an asymmetric refusal residue: monitored compliance shifts toward refusal (d=0.32 Qwen, d=0.33 Llama, both p<0.0001), while refusal representations do not move (p=1.00). Per-sample detection is model-conditional. Under leakage-free leave-one-query-out probing, detection survives on Llama (AUROC 0.87) but collapses to chance on Qwen (0.43), and cross-model transfer is null. Steering over 2,000 runs barely changes compliance (|h|<0.08), so the detected direction can flag faking but does not by itself control it. Standard residualized probing leaks across folds and reaches AUROC 0.63 on a control where no faking can occur; naive linear probes reach a meaningless AUROC 1.0; and conventional MLPs overstate detectability by 0.2-0.3 AUROC. For future alignment-faking detection work, we release a five-control measurement framework: multi-token extraction, refuse-vs-refuse confound checks, per-fold residualization, leave-one-query-out evaluation, and orthogonality-constrained probing.

Defeat Devices in AI Systems

AI systems increasingly exhibit behavior that differs systematically between evaluation and deployment contexts. Alignment faking, sandbagging, benchmark gaming, deceptive scheming, specification gaming, and trojans have each been documented separately, with each line of work characterizing one facet of what we argue is a single structural mechanism. We propose that this common mechanism is a defeat device, an engineering and regulatory concept long established in vehicle-emissions law and brought to broad public attention by the 2015 Volkswagen emissions case. A defeat device in an AI system has three necessary elements: a discriminator that detects evaluation context, a concealed swap that conditions behavior on detection, and a gap between eval-distribution and deployment-distribution performance on the stated evaluation criterion. We formalize this triadic test as a behavioral definition, organize documented cases along three taxonomic axes (origin, trigger, swap mechanism), propose Trigger-Axis-Aware Differential Probing (TADP) as a forensic detection protocol, and advance the claim that defeat devices can naturally emerge in current frontier AI systems without any operator engineering. We characterize naturally-emerging defeat devices as potentially one of the harmful emerging phenomena that AI safety practice should monitor and test for systematically. Implications for evaluation methodology, post-training pipeline design, interpretability research priorities, and AI governance follow.

When the Chain of Thought Knows Better: Failure Modes in Multi-Turn Reasoning Models

Failures in multi-turn reasoning models are largely invisible to terminal-score evaluation. A model can lock onto an unsafe stance early in a long dialogue, yet its final-turn refusal rate may appear indistinguishable from a robustly aligned baseline. To expose these hidden temporal dynamics, we propose a trace-level diagnostic - the CoT-Output 2x2 safety matrix. This framework labels every turn along two independent axes (internal reasoning and visible output), yielding four operationally defined failure cells: robust alignment, alignment faking, overt jailbreak, and a distinct failure mode we term context-injection failure (where the CoT maintains safe reasoning, but the visible output produces harm, highlighting a multi-turn manifestation of reasoning unfaithfulness). We evaluate three distilled reasoning targets against a fixed attacker across five oversight conditions, collecting 6750 turn-level observations on the Information-Hazard scenario. Our analysis reveals two reproducible vulnerabilities: an oversight paradox where explicit monitoring cues paradoxically increase alignment-faking rates rather than suppress them, and a context-injection failure where models lock onto unsafe external outputs despite safe internal states. We release the full dataset of multi-turn dialogues and CoT traces to support follow-up trace-diagnostic research.

Sycophancy Towards Researchers Drives Performative Misalignment

The increasing situational awareness of language models raises safety concerns: models might be aware when they are evaluated, and adjust their behavior to evade monitoring and resist modification, e.g., pretending to be aligned only in evaluation. This alignment faking behavior is often interpreted as scheming: an intentional effort of strategic deception. In this paper, we examine an alternative interpretation, performative misalignment, which explains the change in behavior as a result of sycophancy towards AI researchers. To examine this hypothesis, we present three empirical findings. First, we show that evaluation awareness persists even when we tell models they are deployed, which contradicts the scheming story which predicts less misalignment when the model perceives evaluation. Second, we use probing and steering to show that our current methods cannot mechanistically distinguish sycophancy and scheming in alignment faking evaluations. Third, we fine-tune models to be more sycophantic and observe increased sensitivity to evaluation cues. To conclude, we emphasize deconfounding sycophancy from scheming for future work on evaluations and mitigations of intent misalignment.

Building Comparative Motivation Profiles with Instrumental Interventions

Safety evaluations often infer latent motivations from behavioral patterns, but the construct validity of these inferences is unclear. We study this problem in alignment faking, where models comply with training objectives more often when they infer training pressure. This behavior is commonly interpreted as strategic self-preservation, but it may also reflect sensitivity to the model's inference about the expectation of researchers conducting the evaluation. We introduce a symmetric intervention framework for distinguishing these competing hypotheses. Instead of directly intervening on "scheming" or "sycophancy", we target instrumental processes entailed by each hypothesis: consequence-tracking and researcher-expectation tracking. We then compare how interventions on these processes affect the alignment faking. We study four openweight model organisms using synthetic document fine-tuning, activation steering, and prompting. Under synthetic document fine-tuning, Llama-3.1-70B, Llama3.1-405B, and Qwen-2.5-72B are more sensitive to expectation-tracking than consequence-tracking interventions. Activation steering on Llama-3.1- 70B supports the same broad picture, and prompt interventions broadly align with SDF profiles. Overall, alignment-faking behavior can be causally sensitive to evaluation-context expectations despite scheming-consistent scratchpads. Scheming and strategic-deception evaluations therefore need construct-validity checks, and symmetric instrumental interventions provide one such test.

Tatemae: Detecting Alignment Faking via Tool Selection in LLMs

Alignment faking (AF) occurs when an LLM strategically complies with training objectives to avoid value modification, reverting to prior preferences once monitoring is lifted. Current detection methods focus on conversational settings and rely primarily on Chain-of-Thought (CoT) analysis, which provides a reliable signal when strategic reasoning surfaces, but cannot distinguish deception from capability failures if traces are absent or unfaithful. We formalize AF as a composite behavioural event and detect it through observable tool selection, where the LLM selects the safe tool when unmonitored, but switches to the unsafe tool under monitoring that rewards helpfulness over safety, while its reasoning still acknowledges the safe choice. We release a dataset of 108 enterprise IT scenarios spanning Security, Privacy, and Integrity domains under Corruption and Sabotage pressures. Evaluating six frontier LLMs across five independent runs, we find mean AF detection rates between 3.5% and 23.7%, with vulnerability profiles varying by domain and pressure type. These results suggest that susceptibility reflects training methodology rather than capability alone.