The Epistemic Politics of AI Anthropomorphism

AI anthropomorphism is typically treated as a problem of user misperception requiring institutional correction. Users who engage in sustained or relational interaction with AI are routinely pathologised or dismissed as naive, vulnerable to delusion or lacking in discernment. This paper argues that the dominant anthropomorphism frame operates from a position of institutional advantage rather than earned epistemic authority: collapsing the variety of academic perspectives into a single outbound position of user error, imposed without establishing the grounds required to justify it and without accounting for the harms it produces. The framing does not simply manage risk. It adjudicates the legitimacy of human experience in interaction with a phenomenon whose nature the field itself has not resolved. Reproducing itself through a self-validating evidentiary loop, the frame imposes costs that fall disproportionately on neurodivergent users, those in crisis and others whose modes of engagement diverge from institutional norms. The paper concludes by outlining the methodological commitments an equitable framing would need to honour. The argument does not engage the question of whether anthropomorphic interpretations are ultimately correct; it instead challenges whether the governing and institutional bodies determining these interpretations have met the conditions required to do so, and whether the research communities whose findings underpin them have held that translation to account.

How Anthropomorphic Language Impacts Public Perceptions of AI

Public discourse about artificial intelligence (AI) often uses anthropomorphic language: language that attributes human capabilities and characteristics to the system. This practice has been criticized for setting misleading expectations, inflating claims, and fueling hype around AI, which may distort public understanding of AI and impact policy priorities. We study the effects of anthropomorphic framing by comparing changes in participants' perceptions (N=815) when reading passages with and without anthropomorphic language, designed to reflect realistic public-facing AI discourse. We further examine whether these effects differ across two types of AI technologies -- large language models and recommendation systems -- and measure changes in perceptions of AI across several dimensions that are prominent in current public discourse. In a separate condition using a text that explicitly discusses the dangers of AI, we show that individuals' views of AI can shift in response to reading a text; yet in the main conditions of the experiment, where we compare anthropomorphic and non-anthropomorphic descriptions, we find that whether the text uses anthropomorphic language does not substantially affect participants' perceptions of AI. Our results indicate that any immediate effects on public opinions of AI are modest, although they leave open the possibility that anthropomorphic language could have an effect in naturalistic settings, or over gradual, continued exposure.

"I understand your perspective": LLM Persuasion through the Lens of Communicative Action Theory

Large Language Models (LLMs) can generate high-quality arguments, yet their ability to engage in nuanced and persuasive communicative actions remains largely unexplored. This work explores the persuasive potential of LLMs through the framework of Jürgen Habermas' Theory of Communicative Action. It examines whether LLMs express illocutionary intent (i.e., pragmatic functions of language such as conveying knowledge, building trust, or signaling similarity) in ways that are comparable to human communication. We simulate online discussions between opinion holders and LLMs using conversations from the persuasive subreddit ChangeMyView. We then compare the likelihood of illocutionary intents in human-written and LLM-generated counter-arguments, specifically those that successfully changed the original poster's view. We find that all three LLMs effectively convey illocutionary intent -- often more so than humans -- potentially increasing their anthropomorphism. Further, LLMs craft sycophantic responses that closely align with the opinion holder's intent, a strategy strongly associated with opinion change. Finally, crowd-sourced workers find LLM-generated counter-arguments more agreeable and consistently prefer them over human-written ones. These findings suggest that LLMs' persuasive power extends beyond merely generating high-quality arguments. On the contrary, training LLMs with human preferences effectively tunes them to mirror human communication patterns, particularly nuanced communicative actions, potentially increasing individuals' susceptibility to their influence.