The Model Context Protocol (MCP) has become the de-facto interface for connecting LLM agents to enterprise tools, and adoption has been explosive: within a year, large organizations went from zero to dozens of internally built MCP servers. That speed created a governance crisis. Each team implemented authentication independently -- some with no auth, some with API keys, some with full OAuth -- producing a fragmented landscape with no consistent way to authorize callers, track who did what, or offboard a departing employee across the fleet. This paper reports an industry deployment that resolves the crisis with a centralized MCP gateway: a single aggregation, governance, and authentication layer that fronts every downstream MCP server. We make four contributions grounded in production experience. First, a two-axis authentication model crossing persona (interactive user vs. automated non-user) with credential type (no-auth, static/dynamic API key, PKCE, client credentials, platform app-context). Second, a gateway authentication layer supporting three enterprise SSO grants and three token-provisioning models: Bring-Your-Own-Token, Generate-Your-Own-Token, and delegated OAuth via RFC 8693 token exchange. Third, three end-to-end identity flows -- User-to-OAuth2, Non-user-to-Service-Account, and User-to-Service-Account -- composing client, gateway, and server. Fourth, the deployment evolution from CDN/WAF/edge perimeter to private MCP tunnels and enterprise-wide connectors. The architecture is in production, fronting dozens of MCP servers across web, desktop, custom-SDK, and low-code clients.
Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly integrated into software development workflows, yet their ability to autonomously generate secure authentication code remains uncertain. This paper evaluates the security architecture of authentication systems generated by five prominent AI coding assistants through a bi-modal assessment framework combining static code analysis and dynamic penetration testing, mapped to NIST SP 800-63B guidelines. The study examines model behavior across four prompting strategies Basic, Secure, NIST-Based, and Reprompting to reflect varying levels of developer guidance. Empirical results demonstrate that code generated from functional or generically secure prompts consistently omits critical protections, particularly concerning brute-force resistance, session management, and robust password handling. While providing explicit, single-shot NIST context significantly improves compliance, the findings reveal that this remains structurally inadequate. Instead, iterative Reprompting: forcing models into a contextual self-auditing loop is strictly required to achieve a comprehensive, defense-in-depth security architecture. Ultimately, this study proves that current AI coding assistants do not produce secure-by-default applications, dictating that enterprise deployments must transition from single-shot prompt engineering to continuous, standards-driven verification pipelines.
Igor Kviatkovsky, Ehud Rivlin, Ilan Shimshonics.CV cs.HC
We consider the problem of identifying people based on their motion styles. We present a generative model describing the action instance creation process and derive a probabilistic identity inference scheme for two common person identification scenarios motivated by the surveillance and authentication applications. We introduce a novel, \emph{interactive}, scenario for person identification from motion patterns. To this end, we formalize the identification process in the context of a sequential message exchange session between the subject and the system. The subject's behavior is modeled using a probabilistic generative model inspired by the Human Information Processing (HIP) paradigm. At each stage, the system presents a visual stimulus (a cue) to the subject and records their motion response. The cue is selected so as to maximize the mutual information of the expected response and the subject's identity. Once recorded, the response is used to update the a posteriori probability over possible subjects' identities. The process terminates once a sufficient classification confidence level is reached. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first time person identification is addressed in such interactive setting. We report high recognition rates on five publicly available datasets and our own novel dataset consisting of 4,476 recordings of 22 test subjects responding to 15 cues.
Face recognition from a single image per person is a challenging problem because the training sample is extremely small. We consider a variation of this problem. In our problem, we recognize only one person, and there are no labeled data for any other person. This setting naturally arises in authentication on personal computers and mobile devices, and poses additional challenges because it lacks negative examples. We formalize our problem as one-class classification, and propose and analyze an algorithm that learns a non-parametric model of the face from a single labeled image and a stream of unlabeled data. In many domains, for instance when a person interacts with a computer with a camera, unlabeled data are abundant and easy to utilize. This is the first paper that investigates how these data can help in learning better models in the single-image-per-person setting. Our method is evaluated on a dataset of 43 people and we show that these people can be recognized 90% of time at nearly zero false positives. This recall is 25+% higher than the recall of our best performing baseline. Finally, we conduct a comprehensive sensitivity analysis of our algorithm and provide a guideline for setting its parameters in practice.