We study nonnegative submodular maximization subject to a general matroid when the offline algorithm is given an arbitrary controlled value oracle. Our main result is an adversarial resilience theorem for the Spiteful Greedy Swap Poisson Process (SGS-Poisson): without modifying its Poisson intensity, single-element exchange rule, or spiteful drop step, the algorithm retains limiting approximation factors $1/e$ for non-monotone objectives and $1-1/e$ for monotone objectives. More precisely, under every controlled oracle $\widehat f$ satisfying $|\widehat f(S)-f(S)|\le ξ$ for every set $S$, our implementation returns a feasible set with expected value at least $(1/e-\varepsilon)\OPT-O(kξ)$ and $(1-1/e-\varepsilon)\OPT-O(kξ)$, respectively, using $\widetilde O(nk^2\varepsilon^{-2})$ oracle calls. As a consequence, the offline-to-online reduction yields full-bandit CMAB algorithms for general matroid-constrained submodular rewards with exact limiting approximation-regret factors $1/e$ and $1-1/e$ and $\widetilde O(n^{1/5}k^{4/5}T^{4/5})$ regret.
We study repeated contextual procurement auctions in which the platform must learn context-dependent product values from bandit feedback. We give an exactly truthful explore-then-commit mechanism with $\widetilde O((ng)^{1/3}T^{2/3})$ regret. We also give a frozen-payment UCB mechanism with a regret-incentive tradeoff: the near-UCB tuning attains \(\widetilde O(\sqrt{ngT})\) welfare regret, while for fixed \(n,g\) its total incentive error is \(\widetilde O(T^{3/4})\); the balanced tuning gives \(\widetilde O(T^{2/3})\) on both scales. Regret is measured as welfare loss relative to the full-information efficient allocation. We prove a matching lower bound for the frozen-payment regret-incentive tradeoff.