Online advertising bidding systems typically deploy multiple offline-trained expert models (e.g., PID controllers, model predictive control, offline RL policies) but face two critical limitations: lack of online adaptability to non-stationary auction markets, and reliance on costly manual tuning of hyperparameters such as bid bounds and budget pacing constraints. We propose HOBA (Hierarchical On-policy Bidding Agents), a hierarchical reinforcement learning framework that decouples strategic reasoning, model selection, and bid execution across three time scales. At the high level, a large language model infers hyperparameters from contextual signals through a Think-Act-Observe-Reflect loop with historical experience retrieval. At the mid level, a SARSA agent dynamically selects among expert models, incorporating causal adjustment to eliminate selection bias. At the low level, a dynamic expert pool (PID, MPC, IQL, Decision Transformer) executes bids under high-level constraints. This design confines online learning to discrete expert selection rather than continuous bid optimization, significantly reducing exploration risk while maintaining adaptability. Experiments on the AuctionNet benchmark and a large-scale A/B test demonstrate consistent improvements over state-of-the-art baselines. In a large-scale online deployment, HOBA delivered substantial business value, achieving a +3.6\% increase in target cost, proving the effectiveness of our hierarchical multi-agent bidding paradigm.
Qintong Xie, Edward Koh, Xavier Cadet +1cs.GT cs.LG
Many real-world competitive systems require multiple decision-makers to act simultaneously under shared constraints, limited information, and repeated interaction, as in auctions, resource allocation, and security competition. We study multi-turn simultaneous bidding as a controlled testbed for such problems and propose DNQ, a solver-in-the-loop equilibrium supervision framework for training bidding agents. DNQ alternates between trajectory collection, critic-based payoff estimation, equilibrium computation, and policy imitation. At each visited state, a shared critic predicts either pairwise payoff matrices or an exact N-player payoff tensor, an external solver computes equilibrium strategies, and the agents are trained by minimizing the KL divergence between their masked policies and the solver-derived equilibrium targets. We focus on a scalable pairwise formulation that greatly reduces equilibrium-solving cost and training time compared with the exact formulation, while the shared critic amortizes payoff learning across agents and states. Experiments compare the pairwise and exact variants using critic loss, policy entropy, bidding resource usage, and training cost, showing that the pairwise method scales to larger numbers of agents, whereas the exact method becomes computationally impractical as the joint game grows. These results illustrate the trade-off between strategic fidelity and scalability in repeated competitive environments.