Multi-agent LLM systems relay key--value caches instead of text and credit their gains to exchanged ``latent thoughts''. That credit is a claim about \emph{which} example's cache is relayed, not merely that one is. We audit it causally in released systems. The cache is replaced with deranged (mismatched-example), zeroed, and moment-matched random counterparts, under two regimes defined by whether the receiver needs the sender's private information. Where it does, the battery reads ceiling: 100\% against 23--25\% for answer-irrelevant relays on the primary backbone, a contrast replicated across three families, five checkpoints, and a prose document-QA surface. Where it does not, a pre-registered five-seed protocol establishes equivalence within 2.8 points, a margin anchored to the audited system's reported gain, under Holm-corrected TOST on GSM8K and ARC-Challenge across three Qwen3 scales and on MedQA at 8B (one cell shows a small detected advantage inside the margin); a second family shows no detected advantage. A large cache effect need not be a pairing effect. In one natural cell, zeroing the relay costs 14.7 points; a mismatched cache, 0.4. Nor is need sufficient: under the same test, delivered channels span ceiling (LatentMAS's native relay), partial (KVComm's layer subset), and no detected example-specific transfer (C2C's released projector). Benchmark deltas do not by themselves establish latent-thought transmission; establishing it takes a mismatched-cache audit, which we release.
Latent communication in large language model (LLM)-based multi-agent systems (MAS) transmits continuous internal representations instead of text, but greater representational capacity does not establish that the receiver uses task-relevant information. End-task performance alone also cannot reveal whether an observed effect depends on message presence, content generated for the evaluated example, or information supplied by a separate agent. We introduce a causal audit that applies controlled message replacements at the boundary where the sender-produced representation enters the receiver. Four message settings support five measurements of encoded sender information, receiver sensitivity to message presence and identity, the task value of example-specific content, and the additional value supplied by a separate agent. We apply the audit to latent relay with Qwen3-4B and Qwen3-8B on GSM8K, ARC-C, and MATH-500. On GSM8K, the Qwen3-4B overall performance effect of -1.00 percentage point decomposes into a -6.17-point effect retained by an other-example message and a +5.17-point effect attributable to example-specific content; both component directions reverse at 8B. On MATH-500, the Qwen3-4B gain of 15.00 points comprises 8.33 points retained by an other-example message and 6.67 points attributable to example-specific content, while the 8B gain is dominated by the former component. Self-substitution comparisons further show that example-specific content and other-agent value are distinct. These results show that aggregate accuracy does not identify how a latent message affects the receiver and motivate controlled message comparisons as a standard evaluation for latent communication.
Stateful multimodal assistants encode an image once but may answer questions about it many turns later. Attention-guided visual-KV eviction assumes that evidence irrelevant now will remain dispensable, although future questions are unknown. We ask when a visual fact is actually safe to forget and introduce the Causal Visual Memory Audit (CVMA), a paired single-prefill framework that tests what later answers lose when a visual region, the whole image, or prior assistant text becomes unavailable. On VisDial and ConvBench, current attention can rank future-useful regions worse than random even though a diagnostic marginal-utility control shows substantial selection headroom. Aggregate scores hide this failure when later turns do not need vision; controlled and stock-generated histories reveal a second escape route, in which assistant-text KV replaces image KV for facts already stated but not reliably for unstated facts. In the tested stacks, safe forgetting is supported by low future visual dependence or fact-specific verbalization---not by low current attention.
Attribution scores increasingly identify which neuron rows of a language model matter for applications such as pruning, interpretability, and editing for safety, yet whether they identify causally important rows is rarely tested directly. We address this with two paired audits built on one-shot neuron-row zeroing. We first audit selectors at the language-modeling level: attribution methods substantially outperform activation and magnitude-based baselines at identifying dispensable rows across five LLMs. We then adapt the same intervention into a behavior test by driving it with a contrastive harmful-versus-benign signal; the attributed rows are sufficient to install refusal on hate and crime while keeping benign over-refusal low and preserving language model fluency, and specific in that layer-matched random controls at the same depths fail. Highly rank-stable selectors can be among the least causally valid. Refusal moreover lives in a redundant subspace, where different attribution methods install it through largely disjoint row sets, so the recovered edit is one realization of a sufficient set rather than a unique mechanism. Together, these findings show that rank-stability proxies miss the kinds of selector failures a direct causal audit can surface.%
Mahshad Lotfinia, Sebastian Ziegelmayer, Lisa Adams +3cs.CV cs.AI cs.CL cs.LG
Medical vision-language models report strong chest radiograph accuracy, and this is increasingly read as evidence that they use the image. That inference is unsafe: a model exploiting finding-name priors scores like one that reads the scan, and no standard benchmark separates them. We introduce a causal audit that intervenes on the image, occluding the relevant region, occluding an irrelevant one, and swapping in another patient's same-label scan, and combines three behavioral metrics to test whether a correct answer depends on the image. Across nine systems, a text-only model with no image access reaches within 5.7 accuracy points of the best multimodal one, and a 119-billion-parameter multimodal model is statistically indistinguishable from a 7-billion text-only baseline. The audit splits the cohort into three models that ignore the image, one that is unstable, and five that use it selectively, for a subset of findings; the categories hold across a second dataset, resolution, and prompt phrasing. Against board-certified radiologists, a text-only model is statistically indistinguishable from a radiologist's accuracy while grounding at zero, whereas the image-using models ground at radiologist-comparable rates. Reported confidence flags ungrounded answers only when a model uses the image. Grounding audits, not accuracy, should gate clinical deployment.