Osama Yousuf, Martin Lueker-Bodencs.ET cs.AR cs.LG
Analog in-memory computing (AIMC) speeds up neural-network inference by doing the arithmetic directly inside a memory array, instead of shuttling weights back and forth between memory and a processor. This saves energy, but the physical devices that store the weights are imperfect: programming errors, electrical noise, limited-resolution converters, and outright broken cells all distort the computation, and every physical chip is distorted in its own way. A designer with several such chips available faces an uncomfortable choice: run all of them and combine the answers (safe, but wasteful of energy), or trust a single chip blindly (cheap, but with no guarantee on how often it is wrong). This paper introduces RACE-AIMC (Risk-Aware Certified Ensemble for AIMC), a framework that resolves this choice with statistics rather than guesswork. Offline, RACE-AIMC studies a pool of physical accelerators, picks the single best one for a given energy budget, and computes a mathematically exact upper bound on how often that accelerator will be wrong when it chooses to answer. Online, only that one accelerator is switched on; a lightweight check decides whether to accept its answer or defer to a fallback. In our simulations using a noisy weight mapping and multiple independent test runs, every certified bound stayed under a 10% error target (mean bound 7.83% +- 0.89%, with 70.88% +- 0.98% of inputs answered directly). The resulting system matches the accuracy of a clean digital baseline while cutting modeled energy use by 69.02% relative to always running every accelerator in the pool.
Sherwin Varghese, Matthew Wicker, Alessio Lomusciocs.CV cs.AI cs.LG
With AI increasingly deployed in safety-critical systems, providing formal robustness guarantees for the underlying models is essential. Existing verification methods either rely on overly conservative approximations or incur prohibitive computational costs. For example, the use of lp-norm perturbations in video settings encodes the belief that the adversary can inject noise in every video frame. In practice, adversarial perturbations exhibit structured spatial and temporal correlations, constrained to lower-dimensional, semantically meaningful subspaces. In this work, we study robustness verification of 3D CNNs processing video and volumetric inputs, targeting applications in action recognition (UCF-101), autonomous driving (Udacity), and medical imaging (MedMNIST) exploiting realistic assumptions on adversarial strength by modelling them as spatio-temporal constraints - where the attacker can modify either a subset of frames or patches within a set of consecutive frames. We demonstrate that modelling realistic constraints enables tighter approximations. We introduce Spatio-Temporal Bound Propagation (STBP), a verification framework that computes an exact closed-form characterization of the first convolutional layer and propagates certified bounds through subsequent layers using scalable approximations. Computing the exact closed form provides the tightest bounds for the first convolutional layer. Thus, we utilise approximation methods in the remainder of the network. To spur further progress in this field, we propose ST-Bench, a verification benchmark for autonomous driving and activity recognition, to systematically evaluate verifiable robustness. Compared to existing verification-based approaches, STBP provides stronger robustness guarantees with significantly improved scalability, achieving 1.7x higher certified robust accuracy under identical perturbation budgets.