While machine learning models have demonstrated strong performance in many domains, these models have shown profound vulnerabilities when they are exposed to adversarial threats. While adversarial attacks fall into various categories, the most prominent category in research studies is evasion. In evasion attacks, the adversary generates perturbed versions of samples, which might not be observable by human eyes. These samples generally fool the machine learning models with high confidence. This phenomenon poses a significant security violation against machine learning models. In this paper, we investigate the certified and empirical robustness of various Kolmogorov-Arnold network architectures against strong evasion attacks. At first, we provide the mathematical foundations for randomized smoothing and interval bound propagation, and report the $\ell_2$-certified robustness of the models under randomized smoothing. After that, we systematically evaluate the robustness of various defended and undefended KAN models under FGSM, PGD, and C&W attacks in order to find out the optimal defense strategies and architectures.
Large language models (LLMs) are vulnerable to multi-turn jailbreak attacks that progressively manipulate conversation context. Existing certified robustness methods are limited to single-turn inputs; naive multi-turn composition yields bounds that degrade exponentially in the number of turns. We introduce Multi-Turn Certified Robustness (MTCR), a framework that models conversational safety via State-Adversarial MDPs and defines $k$-turn certified robustness as the worst-case safety probability across $k$ adversarial turns. MTCR comprises: (i) compositional certification via embedding-space mode decomposition, yielding tighter certified lower bounds than naive multiplication; (ii) $(α,β)$-safety persistence, improving the degradation rate from $\underline{p}^{k}$ to $β^k$ (with $β> \underline{p}$) and yielding interpretable horizon estimates; (iii) matching information-theoretic upper bounds establishing tightness; and (iv) a unified algorithm combining these results. Experiments on six LLMs under $ε$-bounded and Crescendo-style attacks confirm that empirical safety consistently exceeds the certified bounds.
Large language model (LLM)-based intrusion detection systems (IDS) are increasingly studied for security monitoring, yet their robustness against feasible traffic manipulation remains largely empirical. We present Traffic-Aware Randomized Smoothing (TA-RS), a classifier-agnostic certified defense that injects Gaussian noise exclusively into the directly controllable (DC) subspace -- features a remote attacker can modify -- during both fine-tuning and certification, aligning the smoothing distribution with the attacker-controllable subspace. We identify a critical prerequisite: applying standard randomized smoothing to clean-trained LLM-IDS yields weak certified accuracy in three of four (model, dataset) pairs tested (14-33%, at or below random) and only 57% in the fourth (43 pp below the noise-augmented result); noise-augmented fine-tuning recovers to 68-100% on two of three benchmark datasets (at sigma=0.25). At the L_inf-equivalent threshold R_inf = epsilon*sqrt(|DC|) (epsilon=0.05), TA-RS achieves 55-100% certified accuracy on CIC-IDS-2018 and HIKARI-2021, with median certified radii (R approx 0.45-0.96) exceeding R_inf by 1.8-5x (across sigma=0.25-1.00). Against a fairly trained iso-trained RS baseline the residual advantage is dataset-dependent (4-19 pp on CIC-IDS-2018). The larger gap -- up to 72 pp against an isotropic RS baseline that shares the DC-noise-augmented training recipe -- primarily reflects the training-certification mismatch rather than DC alignment alone: isotropic test-time noise perturbs uncontrollable features the attacker cannot exploit, triggering abstention rates up to 68%. RT-IoT2022 probes the limits of the method: it fails under the default fine-tuning recipe but recovers to 76%/69% certified accuracy (LLaMA3-8B/Qwen3-8B) when noise augmentation is increased.
Randomized smoothing has emerged as a scalable technique for certifying the adversarial robustness of classifiers. However, its application to regression remains under-explored and faces unique challenges. Existing regression certificates rely on probabilistic acceptance regions and fail to exploit the local geometry of the function. In this work, we present a novel framework for certified robust regression that addresses these limitations. We derive a prediction-centered certificate that guarantees the stability of the smoothed model's prediction and ensures practical computability at test time. We investigate several alternatives for constructing these certificates by explicitly incorporating means, variances, and gradients. In particular, we demonstrate on the MNIST rotation task that utilizing gradient information yields significantly tighter robustness certificates compared to the current state-of-the-art, alpha-smoothing.
Matteo Melis, Jesus Martinez Del Rincon, Vishal Sharmacs.LG cs.AI
Certified training aims to produce models whose predictions can be formally verified against adversarial perturbations, typically by optimising upper bounds on the worst-case loss over an allowed perturbation set. For neural networks, certified training methods based purely on tight relaxation bounds produce networks that are amenable to certification, but sacrifice standard accuracy. Conversely, adversarial training often yields stronger empirical robustness and standard accuracy, but the resulting models are generally difficult to certify with neural network verifiers. Recently, the literature has shown that better standard-certified accuracy trade-offs can be achieved by combining adversarial training objectives with loose over-approximations based on Interval Bound Propagation (IBP), effectively interpolating between lower and upper bounds of the worst-case loss. Building on this, we introduce AD-CERT, a certified training objective that combines adversarial distillation with an IBP upper bound. We show that distilling adversarial information over the logit space from an empirically robust teacher provides an effective lower bound surrogate for certified training, with AD-CERT achieving state-of-the-art certified performance on several robustness benchmarks. Furthermore, in a unified setup, distilling adversarial information at the logit-level is shown to improve certified accuracy over a robust feature-space distillation objective by up to 5.40 percentage points.
The robustness of trajectory prediction models is crucial for developing safe autonomous driving systems. Adversarial attacks on trajectory prediction can significantly impair the accuracy of predicted trajectories, leading to hazardous driving behaviors. While heuristic defense strategies have been implemented to enhance the robustness of trajectory prediction models, these measures often fail against more sophisticated, targeted adversarial attacks. Hence, there is a pressing need to establish verifiable safety assurances for trajectory prediction models. In this paper, we extend the traditional Randomized Smoothing framework to "TrajRS", which provides a certified robust radius for smoothed trajectory predictors. We clarify and expand the formal definitions of robustness in trajectory prediction and tailor the practical TrajRS scheme specifically to "robustness for the optimal prediction" and "robustness for all possible predictions". An extensive set of experiments demonstrates that TrajRS effectively achieves robustness certification for all smoothed pedestrian trajectory predictors in this work.
Andrew C. Cullen, Paul Montague, Benjamin I. P. Rubinsteincs.LG cs.AI cs.CR
Randomized Smoothing (RS) provides rigorous robustness guarantees for neural networks without architectural constraints, yet its adoption is limited by extreme computational costs. Standard RS requires tens of thousands of model evaluations per input and forces practitioners to commit to fixed sample sizes a priori. In this work, we present a novel meta-learning framework for anytime-valid certified robustness that adaptively deploys computational resources. By using a lightweight meta-learner to predict image-specific priors for a sequential E-process, we achieve a 20-fold reduction in sample complexity compared to traditional methods while maintaining rigorous statistical guarantees. Beyond raw efficiency, we demonstrate how anytime-validity enables adaptively allocating compute based upon application-specific risk thresholds, a form of resource triage impossible under classic certification frameworks. That this is achievable while also providing similar certification performance demonstrates that our approach provides a pathway for real-time, safety-critical certification deployments.
Mohammed Bouri, Mohammed Erradi, Adnane Saoudcs.CL cs.LG
Despite recent progress in Natural Language Processing (NLP), models remain vulnerable to word substitution attacks. Most existing defenses focus on first order sensitivity and measure how much the output changes when the input is slightly perturbed. However, they ignore how this sensitivity evolves, which is described by curvature. When gradients vary sharply, models can still fail. This paper introduces the Smooth Growth Bound Tensor (S-GBT), a second order method that bounds the Hessian element-wise, for which we provide formal theoretical proofs on the resulting robustness bounds. A regularization term is added during training to minimize these bounds. This yields tighter certified robustness against word substitution attacks. The change in the output under word substitution is bounded by both a linear term and a quadratic term. S-GBT is derived for two architectures: Long Short-Term Memory (LSTM) and Convolutional Neural Networks (CNN). The method is integrated directly into the training objective. Its effectiveness is evaluated on multiple benchmark datasets. The results show that combining first and second order regularization improves certified robust accuracy by up to 23.4% compared to prior methods, while clean accuracy remains competitive. These findings indicate that controlling both the gradient and its variation is a promising direction for building more robust models.
Retrieval-augmented generation (RAG) agents increasingly run with persistent memory that accumulates across user sessions. This creates a new attack surface: an adversary interacting only through normal channels can inject crafted memories that, once retrieved, steer the agent's responses for future users, without touching model weights or code. We call this Multi-Session Memory Poisoning (MSMP) and show that no existing defence certifies against it; static-corpus defences (RobustRAG, ReliabilityRAG) assume a fixed knowledge base, and heuristic filters are bypassed by fluent enterprise-style text. We present Signed Memory with Smoothed Retrieval (SMSR), the first defence with a certified robustness bound for this setting. Component 1 adds HMAC-SHA256 provenance at write time, blocking unsigned injection. Component 2 applies randomised memory ablation with verdict-based majority voting at query time, bounding the influence of authenticated adversaries. We prove that no provenance-free retrieval-time filter can certify against adaptive injection, derive a hypergeometric certificate for Component 2, and formalise the Consistent Minority Effect, whereby a consistent adversarial answer wins string-based voting as a numerical minority while verdict-based voting removes it. Across 15 enterprise scenarios (3,150 repeated trials), Component 1 cuts attack success from 93-100% to 0% for all unsigned variants. For an authenticated adversary with a single injection, Component 2 holds success to 8.0% (95% CI [5.8, 10.9], n=450), below the certified worst case. In an end-to-end query-only attack where the agent itself writes the poison rather than it being pre-seeded, SMSR reduces success from 65.3% to 5.3% (n=150, non-overlapping CIs) on a live agent stack. Clean-query utility is 90% (Component 1) and 85% (combined).
Jong-Ik Park, Shreyas Chaudhari, Carlee Joe-Wong +1cs.LG
Randomized smoothing (RS) uses a smoothed classifier to provide architecture-agnostic certificates of $\ell_2$ classification robustness, but its dependence on per-input Monte Carlo (MC) sampling undermines its use in real-time systems. We argue that this cost is structural rather than fundamental, such that it can be significantly reduced by sharing information across the deployment stream. We introduce RRISE, an RS framework that compresses certification into a single forward pass through a learned surrogate. RRISE trains the surrogate against precomputed MC class-count targets via a soft-label cross-entropy loss and converts surrogate predictions into provably conservative certified radii through a one-time conformal calibration step. The resulting certificate is deployment-verifiable: whenever the calibrated radius is positive, the surrogate's prediction provably matches the smoothed classifier's and the smoothed classifier is constant on a ball of that radius around the input. Across image classification benchmarks, RRISE matches fixed-budget MC certified accuracy within $0.84$ percentage points while replacing up to $10^4$ noisy base-model evaluations per query with a single surrogate forward pass, recouping MC training cost after $\approx 10^5$ deployment queries. On CIFAR-100 and Tiny ImageNet, where the only prior offline-surrogate method collapses, RRISE achieves $1.23$ to $1.91\times$ higher certified accuracy, establishing efficient randomized smoothing as a practical path to certified robustness in repeated-deployment settings.