Jiarui Ma, Jianghan Wang, Yuheng Ma +2eess.SY cs.AI
Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly used in circuit design workflows, yet their reliability on simulator-facing SPICE netlist recognition and manipulation remains poorly understood and is rarely separated from high-level design reasoning. Although netlists are textual, they encode structured circuit objects through topology and parameters. We present \textbf{NetlistBench}, a structure-verified benchmark for SPICE netlist recognition and manipulation. NetlistBench contains 2,342 cases across 24 task families, covering parameter and connectivity recognition and edits, hierarchical operations, equivalence judgment, and long-horizon compound editing. Model outputs are evaluated by a deterministic structure-aware oracle. Across six non-thinking LLMs, performance varies substantially with operation-level structural complexity. Simple local edits reach $96\%$--$100\%$ accuracy, while device addition drops to $41\%$--$83\%$ and equivalence judgment to $49\%$--$90\%$. Enabling reasoning substantially improves weaker models but does not eliminate structure-preservation failures, with performance still degrading sharply as the edit horizon increases. NetlistBench identifies netlist reliability as a distinct bottleneck for trustworthy LLM-based circuit design automation.
Rupesh Raj Karn, Johann Knechtel, Ozgur Sinanoglucs.LG cs.CR
As graph neural networks (GNNs) become standard tools for critical tasks in circuit design and analysis, their security and privacy risks require careful attention. Here, we present the first comprehensive evaluation of gradient leakage attacks (GLAs) on GNNs in circuit-design and hardware-security tasks, a practical threat that has been largely overlooked. We assess state-of-the-art (SOTA) GNNs, including GraphSAGE, GCN, GIN, and GAT, trained on standard netlist benchmarks (ISCAS'85, EPFL, and TrustHub), for their fundamental vulnerability to GLAs. We find that GLAs can expose sensitive information, such as gate types and distinctive properties of hardware Trojans, which may assist adversaries in analyzing logic locking schemes or evading Trojan detection mechanisms. Our analysis shows that these risks are influenced by architectural features, with attention mechanisms (GAT) exacerbating leakage, while injective aggregation (GIN) provides comparatively stronger resilience. We further evaluate several SOTA defense techniques, including differential privacy, gradient clipping, secure aggregation, model compression with quantization, and adversarial training. We find that these techniques improve resilience only in specific settings and can also compromise model performance. Overall, our work provides key insights toward privacy-preserving GNNs and highlights the need for more robust and efficient defenses. We release our full methodology and artifacts.
A recent trend is to leverage machine learning models to improve the evolutionary design and optimization process. We propose a novel transformer-based mutation operator for Cartesian genetic programming (CGP) for the automated design of approximate arithmetic circuits. We introduce a hybrid scheme for CGP in which the proposed mutation operator is switched with the standard mutation operator to prevent stagnation of the circuit approximation process. We also develop a new training scheme for the underlying transformer that utilizes training vectors composed of thousands of CGP chromosomes representing various approximate multipliers. For several target error constraints, the approximate multipliers evolved with CGP utilizing the transformer-based mutation achieve better trade-offs than the highly optimized designs available in the state-of-the-art EvoApproxLib library of approximate circuits. Although both training and evolutionary processes are computationally demanding, they appear to be necessary steps for improving existing approximate circuits and producing new, potentially patentable circuit designs.