This paper develops a continuum theory of exit-and-join coalition dynamics in nonatomic cooperative games. We extend the Aumann-Shapley value and the Aumann-Drèze value to coalition structures in which each coalition is treated as a restricted nonatomic game, yielding a marginal-contribution-based payoff density that governs incentives for agents to remain in, exit, or join coalitions. We derive deterministic mean-field dynamics from decentralized switching rules and show that payoff-difference switching recovers replicator dynamics as a special case. We characterize exit-and-join equilibrium by the absence of profitable positive-mass deviations and prove its equivalence with stationarity of the induced mass dynamics under incentive-compatible and strictly payoff-responsive switching rates. For mass-based cooperative games, we construct a Lyapunov function and establish global convergence under strict concavity. We further show that the equilibrium is equivalent to a Wardrop equilibrium of an induced nonatomic population game and admits a variational inequality formulation. The framework is extended to incorporate switching costs and endogenous coalition acceptance rules, leading to constrained equilibria characterized by quasi-variational inequalities. The proposed theory unifies cooperative value allocation, noncooperative coalition mobility, mean-field dynamics, evolutionary game theory, and population games within a common framework for analyzing coalition formation and adaptation in large-scale multi-agent systems.
Agentic AI systems are increasingly being deployed as productive resources in organizational workflows, yet existing evaluation methods primarily measure isolated technical performance rather than economic contribution. This paper introduces \emph{Agentomics}, a workflow-based framework for valuing, attributing, and pricing human and artificial agents. The framework models a workflow as a configuration of heterogeneous agents whose collective performance determines gross value, deployment cost, reliability, and expected failure loss. Workflow value is treated as a team-level quantity that may include complementarities, substitution effects, bottlenecks, and nonlinear production; additive stage-level value is only a special case. Building on this workflow model, the paper formulates AI deployment as a coalition-formation problem and defines coalition value as the incremental net surplus generated relative to a benchmark human workflow. The Shapley value is then used to attribute economic surplus among participating AI agents, yielding a principled connection among valuation, accountability, and market pricing. The resulting Shapley pricing equilibrium provides a normative benchmark for assessing whether agent prices reflect expected marginal contribution. A security-operations case study illustrates how the framework accounts for productivity gains, deployment costs, reliability losses, and coalition-level complementarities in hybrid human--AI workflows.