In this work, we study radically uncoupled learning in discounted general-sum Markov games. Assuming ``$\mathsf{ETH}$ for $\mathsf{PPAD}$", we show that, for every fixed discount factor, there is no polynomial-time algorithm for computing inverse-polynomially accurate coarse correlated equilibria in discounted general-sum Markov games when players learn independently in decentralized settings. Complementing this hardness result, we provide what appears to be the first \emph{radically uncoupled} algorithm with sub-exponential convergence guarantees to coarse correlated equilibria in discounted general-sum Markov games without imposing any structural restrictions on the game. Our algorithm is a \emph{layered} variant of optimistic mirror descent with an increasing step-size schedule tailored to the multi-agent setting. Finally, we develop both full-feedback and partial feedback versions of the aforementioned algorithm and establish sub-exponential convergence guarantees for each case.
Luciano Campi, Federico Cannerozzi, Ioannis Tzouanasmath.OC cs.LG math.PR
We introduce optimal coarse correlated equilibria for continuous-time mean field games. A coarse correlated equilibrium is a randomized recommendation scheme from which no player can gain by ignoring the recommendation and switching to an alternative strategy. The problem is as follows: a moderator selects, among all mean-field coarse correlated equilibria, one that optimizes a prescribed performance criterion, which may differ from the representative player's objective. After formulating the problem, we develop a linear programming (LP) formulation, prove the existence of optimal LP coarse correlated equilibria, and relate the LP characterization to the original probabilistic setting. Building on this characterization, we design a no-regret primal-dual algorithm, based on an equivalent Lagrangian formulation of the external-regret constraint, for learning such equilibria. We provide explicit convergence rates for the learning algorithm, and numerical examples illustrate the method.