Bella Fascendini, Kathryn McGregor, Max D. Gupta +1cs.CL
Humans flexibly adapt their reasoning strategies to the requirements of a given problem. Large language models (LLMs) have performed well on many cognitive tasks, however, it is unclear whether this accuracy is a result of pattern matching from training data or flexible reasoning. Here, we introduce a novel paradigm to test this question: the riddle riddle paradigm. Riddle riddles are word problems written to mimic popular riddles, but altered so their answers only require literal interpretations. Identifying correct answers requires looking past the structure of each question and flexibly apply different reasoning strategies based on the content. If LLMs respond to surface features, such as form, a riddle-like structure should cause models to use an inventive reasoning strategy even when a literal interpretation suffices. Alternatively, if LLMs reason based on content, they should flexibly switch strategies when appropriate. Across two experiments with nine state-of-the-art LLMs and 100 human participants, we show humans and LLMs fail on this paradigm in opposite directions. LLMs were far more accurate on genuine riddles than on riddle riddles (84.9% vs. 50.7%); whereas humans showed the reverse effect (50.5% vs. 80.5%). Error analysis shows that 90.8% of LLM errors on riddle riddles (the condition where they show diminished performance) were due to inappropriate use of inventive reasoning while only 57.6% of human errors on genuine riddles were due to overextending literal reasoning. Thus, while both groups make mistakes, reasoning mistakes are made more often by LLMs than by humans. Overall, LLMs' strong performance on genuine riddles may reflect memory retrieval rather than flexible strategy selection, and without stimuli designed to elicit this contrast, it becomes easy to conflate LLM-generated outputs that look like reasoning with genuine reasoning.
Cognitive tasks are organized by shared and specialized neural processes. Masked fMRI reconstruction provides a common self-supervised objective for quantifying transfer relations among task states, but existing reconstruction-based taskonomies mainly study one-to-one transfer from a single source task to a target. Here, we extend an fMRI cognitive taskonomy from single-source to multi-source transfer across 23 Human Connectome Project task states and use Boolean Integer Programming (BIP) to analyze budget-constrained task allocation. We train 1,127 task-specific and transfer models. Single-source transfer is directional and paradigm structured: motor states transfer well within the motor paradigm but provide limited support to most non-motor targets, consistent with a shared sensorimotor execution system and effector-specific representations. Multi-source transfer depends on the composition of the source set, suggesting that many-to-one task relations are not fully captured by pairwise taskonomy alone. Across supervision budgets, BIP repeatedly allocates direct supervision to several 0-back and 2-back working-memory states, although these states are not consistently the strongest individual sources. This pattern may reflect the integration of perceptual, attentional, and executive processes in working-memory tasks. Together, these findings reveal a cross-paradigm-limited motor cluster and working-memory states with high priority under the specified global allocation objective. Our study extends reconstruction-based fMRI taskonomy from one-to-one transfer to many-to-one task relations and budget-constrained task dependencies.