When Absence Is Evidence: Evaluating Completeness-Sensitive Negative Reasoning in Large Language Models

Large language models (LLMs) are often asked whether something is absent from a record, list, or retrieved context. Yet non-observation licenses a negative answer only when evidence completely covers the query scope; otherwise, the answer should remain unknown. We call this completeness-sensitive negative reasoning. We introduce CROWN-QA, comprising CROWN-Synth, a controlled paired core that fixes the question and observed facts while varying only query-relative coverage, and CROWN-Real, a real-document contrast-set evaluation with controlled coverage variants. Across three LLM families, models show unstable closure judgments and substantial over-closure, failing to reliably distinguish a justified negative answer (Certified-Negative) from insufficient evidence (Unknown). The dominant CROWN-Synth failure is asymmetric: models often recognize implicitly complete evidence yet treat implicitly partial evidence as query-covering. Prompting redistributes errors between over- and under-closure rather than consistently resolving them. Structured certificate elicitation traces many errors to evidence-coverage mischaracterization. CROWN-Real shows that the core partial-coverage asymmetry persists on real-document content, while its strength and the balance between over- and under-closure vary by model, prompt, and source.

Better Understanding, Understanding Better

"Any fool can know; the point is to understand." A well-known remark often attributed to Einstein captures a widely shared intuition: understanding is more than merely knowing. Yet epistemic logic has paid relatively little attention to understanding, despite its central role in contemporary epistemology, philosophy of science, and recent debates about AI. A recurring theme in the philosophical literature is that, unlike knowledge, understanding comes in degrees: one may understand something more or less well, and one's understanding may be better than another's. We introduce a comparative epistemic logic of understanding with level-indexed understanding modalities and a comparative connective for saying that one agent understands why a proposition better than another agent does. Semantically, we enrich multi-agent epistemic models with agent-indexed graded explanation structures and a justification-style term algebra. This yields a unified framework for representing minimal, ordinary, more demanding, and ideal understanding, together with comparisons between agents with respect to the same formula at issue. We distinguish a finitary bounded-level calculus from an infinitary full-language companion system. We establish soundness and strong completeness, and show that each fixed finite-level fragment is decidable.