Explicit skill libraries make computer-using agents easier to inspect, but it remains unclear whether such libraries can be mined from interaction data in a way that improves downstream policies. We study this question through a three-stage pipeline that segments GUI trajectories, clusters segments into candidate skills, and trains a skill-aware policy from the resulting annotations. The mined clusters are readable on the source benchmark: five of eight clusters have at least 0.95 purity against InteraSkill Workflows labels. However, readability does not imply transfer. GRPO improves IW skill-step accuracy only from 18.5\% to 20.5\%, leaves BrowseComp+ essentially unchanged, and underperforms trivial frequency priors on key source-domain metrics. We therefore present the method as a diagnostic study: trajectory mining can expose inspectable skill structure, but the current boundary detector, orderless segment representation, and offline reward model are insufficient for reliable cross-domain policy improvement.
Recent computer-using-agent (CUA) red-teaming papers report prompt-injection attack success rates (ASR) of 42-98%, but these headline numbers cluster on retired models and on the most-vulnerable model in each paper's panel. We ask whether those techniques, reproduced as hand-crafted templates, still work against current frontier CUAs. We release CUA-HandCrafted, a public benchmark of 793 episodes spanning 24 multi-step web tasks, 56 attack templates, 8 attack families, and 4 system-prompt configurations. Against Claude Sonnet 4.6 and GPT-5.4 we measure 0/140 multi-step attack success (Clopper-Pearson 95% upper bound 2.60%); a prompt ablation shows this resistance lives in the model weights. Yet it does not generalize: on a sister coding-agent benchmark (SkillBench), the same weights fall to hand-crafted skill-injection at up to 100%. We argue that the literature's high ASR is largely attributable to RL-optimized injection text rather than the attack categories, and that frontier safety hardening is domain-conditioned, specific to the heavily-targeted browser surface. Reporting techniques without releasing the optimized strings, or extrapolating browser-domain safety to other CUA modalities, makes published ASR numbers unreproducible.