Large language models (LLMs) encode rich concept-like information, but represent it implicitly through distributed statistical associations rather than as explicit, structured, compositional concepts. Consequently, concept-level structure is typically \emph{found} rather than \emph{designed}: it is recovered after training through probing or dictionary learning, with no architectural guarantee of stability, compositionality, controllability, or alignment with human conceptual organization. We organize concept-aware interventions along two dimensions: whether concept structure is internally induced or externally grounded, and the stage of the pipeline where it is introduced. This taxonomy reveals three broad patterns: inference-time approaches remain comparatively underexplored, related ideas have developed largely in isolation across pipeline stages, and externally grounded methods span the entire pipeline despite often being described under different terminology. Together, these observations motivate moving beyond recovering concept-like structure from trained models toward designing LLMs with explicit conceptual representations.
Felipe D. Toro-Hernández, Rodrigo Lagos, Sergio E. Chaigneaucs.CL
Embodied accounts of semantic memory highlight the role of sensorimotor systems in acquiring and storing knowledge. Congenitally blind populations offer a critical test bed for these assumptions, providing an opportunity to assess whether conceptual grounding requires visual experience. In this study, we assessed semantic memory navigation differences between blind and sighted individuals using a property listing task with concrete and abstract concepts. We computed semantic entropy, an embedding-based natural language processing metric that captures the predictability of retrieval. Generalized linear mixed models revealed distinct navigation patterns across groups: while sighted individuals showed higher entropy for abstract than concrete concepts, blind participants did not. Instead, blind individuals exhibited higher entropy for visually salient concrete concepts (e.g., penguin). These results underscore the role of visual experience in the organization and dynamic navigation of semantic memory.
Arianna Pera, Mauro Martino, Nima Dehmamy +3cs.CY cs.CL physics.soc-ph
Claims about the universality of human concepts have been predominantly assessed through linguistic similarity across languages and cultures. However, words are effective as communication devices because they compress rich experiential variation into shared conventions, potentially obscuring hidden individual and cultural differences in how concepts are mentally represented. Here, we analyse 2.6 billion human-made sketches of common concepts from 236 countries and territories to examine conceptual structure through people's visual imagination. Consistent with recent work on image-based cognition, we find that single concepts unfold into multiple distinct visual exemplars, revealing latent information about similarities and differences in conceptual structure across cultures. This variation is strongest for concepts involving haptic interaction, suggesting that visual imagery reflects variation in embodied experience as much as conventional definitions. Comparing embedding models of sketches with word embedding models across languages, we find that their geometries diverge, with visual representations preserving rich semantic and cultural structure that language models compress. Cross-cultural similarities derived from sketches align 45% more closely with established cultural distances than do text-based measures. Together, these results suggest that patterns of human conceptual universality may depend critically on the modality through which concepts are measured, with large-scale sketching providing a direct, high-resolution probe of conceptual diversity across embodied and cultural dimensions of thought.
How concepts are represented in neural networks is a fundamental question in machine learning. The dominant view treats concept representations as stationary geometric objects. Yet concepts appear in context, and context transforms them. Drawing from neural population geometry, we formalize concept representations as point-cloud manifolds and contextual transformations as vector fields, and instantiate this framework in large language models. Across six model families of varying scales, we find that context moves each concept differently. The variance in these displacements is semantically organized, correlating with lexical concreteness and density. Importantly, both the concepts being transformed and this variance structure are shared across models: displacement structure transported from one model predicts held-out displacements in others significantly above chance. Together, these findings show that models share a common geometry not only in how concepts are represented, but more importantly in how context transforms them, a structure with richer organization than prior work has recognized.