Mark Solms, St John Grimbly, Bruce Bassett +7cs.AI q-bio.NC
Creatures that display 'hedonic place preference behaviour' are thought by many scientists to experience feelings, on the assumption that their attraction to pleasure-producing substances which lack nutritional value (e.g. cocaine, morphine) cannot easily be attributed to unconscious instinctual behaviour. In this paper, we discuss how a simple artificial agent that instantiates attributes of an affective system engaging in felt uncertainty about its intrinsic needs in relation to environmental resources can similarly display hedonic place preference behaviour -- through an apparently subjective form of information processing -- while simultaneously being entirely deter-ministic. We outline some implications of this artificially engineered behaviour for our understanding of the physical basis of consciousness and the experience of free will.
Currently, in biological systems Neural Correlates of Consciousness (NCCs) are characterized in terms of EEG and FMRI signals. Unfortunately, this characterization prevents the transferability of the NCCs concept to machines. Such transferability would be useful in order to investigate AI consciousness. In this paper we provide an alternate characterization that is transferable, and enables the analogous definition of Machine Correlates of Consciousness (MCCs). Specifically, we propose that NCCs (MCCs) are substrate-level signals that are not under human (AI agent) control, and that are reliably modulated by emotions. This paper presents the first empirical investigation of MCCs. Specifically, we present the results of experiments conducted with two LLMs, Llama-2 7B and Llama-3.1 70B parameters. In these LLMs we collect hardware anomaly traces that are substrate-level indicator-sequences. And we show that after controlling for confounding factors, these are modulated differently by emotional and neutral computations. And this difference is statistically significant for the larger Llama-3.1 70B, but not for the smaller Llama-2 7B. The results constitute initial empirical evidence that MCCs are present in the Llama-3.1 70B configuration. And they are consistent with the hypothesis that consciousness probability and degree increase with the LLM sophistication. Independently of consciousness, MCCs can also be used for detection of emotions in AI agents.
A common objection to artificial or simulated consciousness is that a simulated brain is no more conscious than simulated water is wet. We address this from the perspective of Intrinsic Computational Functionalism (ICF): if consciousness is computationally constituted, it depends not on externally imposed descriptions but on the computational structures a system physically realizes in virtue of its own causal-dynamical organization. In previous work we developed Canonical Functionalism as a mathematically precise special case of this anti-interpretivist program, identifying functional states by their complete future input-output roles under a fixed interface. Here we argue that this input-output construction, though important, is incomplete: as a behavioral boundary case of ICF, it makes lookup tables and unfolded systems that preserve the same boundary behavior canonically equivalent. A consciousness-relevant canonical representation must instead include internal mechanisms, interventions, and joint readouts belonging to the relevant intrinsic organization. We therefore define a mechanism-enriched canonical structure and use it to formulate Intrinsic Causal-Computational Realization (ICCR), a realization relation preserving physical implementation, intrinsic state individuation, transition structure, intervention profiles, and the relevant agent-body-world boundary. The central result is conditional: if conscious properties are invariants of intrinsic causal-computational organization, then any system satisfying ICCR realizes the same consciousness-relevant properties, whether biological, artificial, or simulated. We discuss objections including biological naturalism and integrated information theory. We conclude that to deny consciousness to a simulation, one must identify a consciousness-relevant intrinsic causal-computational structure that the simulation fails to realize.
Breakthroughs in large language models and multimodal generation technologies have propelled the digital reconstruction of human mental traits, emotional patterns, and long-term memory from science fiction toward engineering practice. Yet current research and industry practices at the intersection of AI and digital humans remain hampered by fundamental conceptual ambiguities: the essential differences between next-generation intelligent agents and traditional virtual humans, the construction pathways for digital entities possessing self-identity, and the core technical and ethical challenges confronting this domain all demand urgent clarification. This paper systematically examines the transformative logic underlying the transition from traditional virtual humans to the ``Soul Computing'' paradigm, driven by frontier AI technologies. We first analyze the evolutionary patterns of human consciousness and memory mechanisms, reassessing the core value of massive multimodal digital fragments in the reverse reconstruction of individual mental worlds. On this basis, we formally delineate the academic connotations of narrow and broad Soul Computing for the first time, clarifying its academic boundaries and essential distinctions from Affective Computing, Historical Reconstruction, and Mortal Computation. We argue that Soul Computing systems must architecturally construct an ``Intensional'' core rather than serving as purely ``Extensional'' functional carriers, thereby enabling the fundamental transition of AI from toolhood to living agency.
The question of whether artificial systems can be conscious remains open, in part because existing approaches either evaluate systems against theory-derived checklists (discriminative) or engineer consciousness-inspired modules directly (architectural); both leave open whether observed structures are artifacts of human language priors. We propose a generative methodology: emergent language (EL) in multi-agent reinforcement learning, where agents start from minimal (no language, no concept of self, minimal exposure to human text) and develop communication under task pressure alone, ensuring causal attributability to task demands rather than inherited human language priors. We position our methodology by discussing how EL serves as a generative tool for studying consciousness-relevant structure, including the role of environment complexity and the interpretation of emergent communication. As a proof of concept, we instantiate this methodology in a minimal environment and show that agents develop self-referential communication, including an echo-mismatch detection circuit that is not predicted by task structure or architecture alone but emerges from a specific environmental affordance.