Memory-based anomaly detectors store nominal training patches and score test patches against this memory. A patch selected for coverage therefore becomes a nor- mal reference without a separate check that geometric rarity makes it safe to trust. We probe this coupling with sparse training contamination. Under fixed representa- tions and memory budgets, we compare random, medoid, local, and global coverage selectors. We then use CLEANCON, an out-of-bag cross-image support gate that changes candidate-image eligibility while fixing the representation, absolute mem- ory size, builder, and inference rule. Global coverage strongly over-represents sparse contamination. CLEANCON reduces final-memory contamination to approx- imately zero and increases category-macro P-AP in all 12 matched comparisons. Yet along a retention sweep, the lowest-contamination memory does not attain the highest P-AP; performance continues to improve while contamination rises. Mem- ory contamination therefore does not order the resulting memories by P-AP.Code is publicly available at https://github.com/jw-chae/cleancon.
Memory-based anomaly detectors store nominal training patches and score test patches against this memory. A patch selected for coverage therefore becomes a nor- mal reference without a separate check that geometric rarity makes it safe to trust. We probe this coupling with sparse training contamination. Under fixed representa- tions and memory budgets, we compare random, medoid, local, and global coverage selectors. We then use CLEANCON, an out-of-bag cross-image support gate that changes candidate-image eligibility while fixing the representation, absolute mem- ory size, builder, and inference rule. Global coverage strongly over-represents sparse contamination. CLEANCON reduces final-memory contamination to approx- imately zero and increases category-macro P-AP in all 12 matched comparisons. Yet along a retention sweep, the lowest-contamination memory does not attain the highest P-AP; performance continues to improve while contamination rises. Mem- ory contamination therefore does not order the resulting memories by P-AP
Multimodal automated fact-checking (MAFC) verifies claims by retrieving and reasoning over external evidence. However, most existing static benchmarks risk contamination: they primarily consist of outdated claims verifiable using an LLM's internal knowledge without external evidence. This can inflate performance estimates and fail to reflect true capability on novel claims that require up-to-date information. To address this, emerging dynamic benchmarks collect claims published after LLMs' knowledge cut-off dates, assuming they are uncontaminated. This work revisits this assumption by empirically studying contamination risks in both the state-of-the-art (SOTA) static AVeriTeC benchmark and our newly constructed dynamic ClaimReview2025Q4 benchmark, as well as their impact on MAFC evaluation. Our experiments yield 16 findings, highlighting three key results: (1) Dynamic evaluation reduces but does not eliminate contamination risks, as 17.09\%--29.30\% of post-cut-off claims remain potentially contaminated; (2) Many newly published claims can be verified either directly or by synthesizing multiple pieces of public knowledge available before the cut-off; and (3) Contamination can induce statistically significant inflation in MAFC performance, increasing Macro-F1 by up to 11.34 points and distorting system rankings. In light of these findings, we re-evaluate SOTA LLMs under a strictly contamination-controlled setting. Our study provides practical guidelines for trustworthy MAFC evaluation.
Developers increasingly delegate real maintenance work to product-grade coding agents, and many state tasks in their native language, in the style of a customer request rather than a curated English issue. Existing repository-level agentic benchmarks do not measure this setting: their task statements are English by design. We introduce RuBench 1.0, a benchmark of 25 tasks mined from recent fix commits in five live open-source repositories (aiohttp, aiogram, Laravel, NestJS, Fastify; Python, PHP, TypeScript, JavaScript), where each task is specified natively in Russian -- written from scratch in the style of an actual customer request, not translated -- and judged by the upstream maintainer's regression tests, which we withhold from release. All 25 fix commits postdate the training-data cutoffs of every evaluated model, giving a contamination argument that holds task-by-task. We evaluate deployed product configurations (CLI agent + model + reasoning effort) -- Claude Code with Opus 4.8, Sonnet 5, and Haiku 4.5, and Codex CLI with GPT-5.5 -- with three independent runs each, reporting pass@1 with task-level confidence intervals, paired comparisons, dollar cost, and token usage. The best configuration resolves 78.7% of tasks; at N=25 only the gaps to the weakest model are statistically resolvable, which we state explicitly. Auditing full trajectories of a fifth, hors-concours configuration (Claude Code + Fable 5, July 2, 2026 release), we caught the product silently substituting the model: on 5 of 25 tasks (20%) an official safeguard fallback re-routed routine HTTP-protocol fixes to Opus 4.8 -- direct, reproducible evidence that the deployed product, not the model, is the unit actually measured. We release task statements, metadata, full agent trajectories, and diffs; grading oracles are withheld, with a SHA-256 manifest committed at publication time.