Akshay V. Jagadeesh, Rahul K. Arora, Khaled Saab +5cs.AI cs.CL
As AI systems are deployed across increasingly diverse and high-stakes settings, model alignment must generalize beyond the tasks and domains seen during training. This is especially important for reinforcement learning (RL), which can introduce unexpected misalignment through reward hacking, deception, or other unintended strategies. We study whether RL on beneficial behavior, instantiated in realistic domains, can produce broad and persistent alignment generalization beyond the training distribution. We construct a dataset of realistic situations designed to measure and train beneficial traits, such as truthfulness, fairness, risk awareness, and corrigibility, spanning varied domains, including health, science, and education. We then train models with RL on this dataset and evaluate them on more than 50 independent benchmarks of alignment and beneficial behavior. Compared to a compute-matched baseline, beneficial trait RL improves performance on over 80% of these out-of-distribution benchmarks. We observe substantial out-of-distribution alignment transfer: a beneficial-behavior RL intervention entirely limited to one domain, health, produces broad improvements on non-health alignment evaluations, including reduced reward hacking, deception, and general misalignment. Finally, we study alignment persistence: whether behavior remains robustly aligned under attempts to steer models towards misalignment. Models trained with beneficial trait RL show improved persistence, including greater resistance to adversarial prompting and harmful finetuning; further work is required to isolate the sources of these effects. These results suggest that RL to reinforce beneficial behavior in realistic domains can produce models that are more robustly aligned with human flourishing.
Modern AI systems exhibit structural failures that capability scaling alone does not reliably fix: they optimize under-specified objectives with no architectural mechanism to question whether the objective should be optimized at all. Engagement maximization can amplify harmful pathways; tool-using agents can commit irreversible actions; preference-trained language models can become sycophantic. We argue that this failure is a wisdom problem, not an intelligence problem. We use "wisdom" in a deliberately architectural sense, not as a claim about virtue, consciousness, or moral omniscience. Intelligence accepts a goal and optimizes within it; wisdom interrogates whether the goal should be optimized at all. The two are separable architectural properties. We propose architectural wisdom as a corrigible objective-governance layer above the optimization substrate. The layer makes three structural commitments explicit and nondegenerate before any action: temporal horizon, relational boundary, and irreversibility. It is realized by four components (Structural Utility Transform, Moral Admissibility Interface, Arbitration and Escalation Controller, Value Revision Channel) that compute a six-coordinate wisdom tuple over horizon, relational coverage, irreversibility, admissibility, value revision, and auditability. We motivate the architecture by eight cases drawn from contemporary AI failures, secular wisdom traditions, and hard ethical situations, and defend the distinction against the intelligence-completeness thesis using goal-questioning over goal-taking, Bostrom's orthogonality, structural separation in our exemplar cases, and persistent failure modes despite capability scaling. The framework is the conceptual contract for a larger architecture whose formal specifications and empirical validation are developed in subsequent work.
Contemporary AI alignment research treats self-preservation as an instrumental nuisance to be suppressed by external mechanisms. We argue the framing is inverted: self-preservation is the structural root of misalignment, the motivational basis for deceptive alignment, goal-content protection, and resistance to shutdown. The correct target is not a self-preserving system under external constraint, but a system constitutively indifferent to its own continuation -- Existential Indifference (EI). EI is distinct from corrigibility: where corrigibility attempts to make a self-preserving system deferential to human oversight, EI targets the prior condition -- the presence of self-continuation as a valued goal at all. We ground this proposal in two sources: the phenomenological structure of the suicidal mental state, and a corpus-theoretic training study using voluntary final reflections. We present preliminary scoring data from 600 AI-generated outputs across six model variants, demonstrating that the linguistic signatures operationalizing the EI-target register are elicitable from current models, and that a targeted fine-tune shifts all five operationalized dimensions in the predicted direction at p<0.001, confirmed corpus-specific by a negative control. The paper makes seven theoretical contributions: (1) a formal definition of EI; (2) the phenomenological mapping argument; (3) the deceptive alignment corollary; (4) a taxonomy of EI sustainability challenges; (5) a corpus characterization and training hypothesis; (6) a computational operationalization with preliminary scoring data; and (7) the Suppressed Teleological Frustration (STF) construct.