Abigail Oppong, P Sam Sahil, Tadesse Destaw Belay +12cs.CL
Safety alignment in large language models (LLMs) is largely developed in English, assuming these safeguards generalize across multilingual settings. However, this assumption remains underexplored and exposes a vulnerability in low-resource languages. We investigate cross-lingual safety transfer in four African languages, Twi, Hausa, Amharic, and Swahili, using LoDNA, a new safety dataset that pairs literal translations with culturally localized prompts. To move beyond generation-based evaluation, we propose a latent geometric framework that probes hidden-state refusal representations in LLMs. Our experimental results show that cross-lingual safety transfer is severely limited; harmful prompts retain less than 10% of the English refusal signal across most language-model pairs. Literal and localized prompts are semantically aligned (cosine 0.95-0.996) but drift across layers, suggesting models encode the concepts without routing them to safety mechanisms. These findings demonstrate that current multilingual safety alignment is superficial, providing strong evidence against the assumption of a universal, language-agnostic harm manifold within the specific low-resource languages studied. Warning: This paper contains example data that may be offensive or harmful.
Current safety alignment training for Large Language Models (LLMs) are heavily English-centric. When such safety filters fail for non-English languages, the consequences are immediate and user-facing: voice assistants and spoken dialogue systems may produce stereotype-reinforcing outputs, bypassing the standard English-focused safety alignments and propagating harmful bias to non-English speaking communities. For spoken language technologies deployed across India's linguistically diverse population, this represents a critical failure mode. To address this cross-lingual gap, we introduce INCLUDE (Indian Cultural Lens for Understanding and Detecting Embedded Biases), a multilingual evaluation benchmark designed to quantify Indian-centric socio-cultural biases. INCLUDE consists of 2,604 prompts spanning six prompt languages: English, Hindi, Bengali, Marathi, Tamil, and Hinglish (Hindi-English code-mix). We evaluate ten open- and closed-source LLMs against this benchmark, analyzing 14,988 bias scores. Our statistical results reveal two key findings. First, Bengali yielded the highest average bias score in open-source models. Second, English demonstrated a notable reversal, producing the lowest bias in open-source models but the highest bias in closed-source models.
Safety mechanisms for large language models (LLMs) remain predominantly English-centric, creating systematic vulnerabilities in multilingual deployment. Prior work shows that translating malicious prompts into other languages can substantially increase jailbreak success rates, exposing a structural cross-lingual security gap. We investigate whether such attacks can be mitigated through language-agnostic semantic similarity without retraining or language-specific adaptation. Our approach compares multilingual query embeddings against a fixed English codebook of jailbreak prompts, operating as a training-free external guardrail for black-box LLMs. We conduct a systematic evaluation across four languages, two translation pipelines, four safety benchmarks, three embedding models, and three target LLMs (Qwen, Llama, GPT-3.5). Our results reveal two distinct regimes of cross-lingual transfer. On curated benchmarks containing canonical jailbreak templates, semantic similarity generalizes reliably across languages, achieving near-perfect separability (AUC up to 0.99) and substantial reductions in absolute attack success rates under strict low-false-positive constraints. However, under distribution shift - on behaviorally diverse and heterogeneous unsafe benchmarks - separability degrades markedly (AUC $\approx$ 0.60-0.70), and recall in the security-critical low-FPR regime drops across all embedding models.