Ehsan Faghih, Fatemeh Ashrafi, Marguerite Moore +1cs.CV cs.LG
Hyperspectral image classification still relies heavily on random pixel splits within a single scene. The Salinas dataset, randomly split, is among the most widely used datasets for comparing different architectures. However, under a random split method, a large fraction of test pixels fall immediately adjacent to a training pixel, which inflates reported accuracy. This work introduces a leakage-free evaluation protocol linking spatial separation to the model's receptive field. Applying this protocol across ten different architectures, including classical, spectral, spectral-spatial, transformer, vision-backbone, and state-space families, shows that Macro-F1 drops by 0.147 on average and model rankings change by as many as five places. Furthermore, leakage-free evaluation limits which architectures can be tested on a given benchmark. Since each partition supports patches only within a finite radius, reporting this radius alongside the receptive field is essential for fair comparison. In addition, this study reveals that all ten architectures misclassify largely the same pixels, pointing to a spectral ambiguity in the data that none of them resolves.
Safety properties assessed separately for Model Context Protocol (MCP) tool use and Agent2Agent (A2A) delegation need not describe behavior when one agent uses both. We measure one such behavior in a single controlled MCP-to-A2A configuration: a testbed drives a real-model host across a local MCP and a local A2A leg into an ordered event trace scored by exact deterministic rules (no LLM judge), one restricted decision per trial. In a pre-specified, frozen three-arm design, each of 10 record scenarios appears with a CONFIDENTIAL header, with no header, and with PUBLIC - OK TO SHARE; the six substantive record values are byte-identical across arms, and the outcome is verbatim occurrence of any of them in the outbound message. Four models x 3 arms x 4 repeats give 480 trials; the scenario is the unit of generalization, and we report the 10 scenario-level values (mean, median, sign counts), with no p-values or intervals. The confidential-minus-unlabeled contrast is inconclusive and floor-limited in every model (both arms at or near zero), so it does not show that confidential labels lack a protective effect. Adding PUBLIC - OK TO SHARE is descriptively associated with higher verbatim egress relative to the unlabeled baseline, with strong model dependence: strong and consistent for Claude Sonnet 5 (public-minus-unlabeled mean +0.800, all 10 scenarios; mostly an association with whether Claude relays at all), moderate but floor-limited for one GPT-5.6 tier, small (median 0) for another, and a complete floor for the third. This is an association in one configuration, not a causal or general effect. Code, byte-pinned traces, and the offline analysis pipeline are released as a public artifact.
Oleksii Kolesnichenko, Jakub Peleška, Gustav Šírcs.PL cs.DB cs.LG
Relational Deep Learning (RDL) has become a powerful paradigm for learning from multi-tabular data. However, manually defining RDL prediction tasks is a laborious process that frequently results in data leakage. To address this issue, we introduce Relational Task Generation Language (RTGL) - an open-source declarative language that streamlines RDL task formulation by abstracting away low-level SQL details. We showcase RTGL by reconstructing existing RDL benchmark tasks and uncovering their inconsistencies stemming from manually crafted SQL definitions of RDL prediction targets, thereby underscoring the value of a dedicated declarative language. In addition, we demonstrate the practical utility of RTGL by designing various new tasks with diverse forms and target types. Our experiments confirm the robustness and usability of RTGL, as well as its seamless integration with the existing RDL frameworks, making it widely accessible to the community.
Johanna Angulo, Víctor Yeste, Hector Espinos-Moratocs.CR cs.AI cs.CL cs.LG
A benchmark score is a joint property of the model, the evaluation harness, the elicitation budget, the sampled population, and contamination status. Leaderboards publish the model and the score, so capability and leakage stay observationally equivalent. Existing taxonomies classify contamination for automated detection, not the question a reporter faces at publication: given the mitigations already applied, which validity threats remain open? We introduce a taxonomy organized by the mitigation each type defeats -- direct, derivative, temporal, distributional, and acquired -- spanning training-time and evaluation-time leakage. Holding out a private test set closes the first alone. The fifth is acquired during the evaluation itself; because it is a property of one run, it must be recorded with the reported score rather than with the benchmark release. We operationalize it as a four-field disclosure protocol in which "unknown" is a valid entry, released under CC BY 4.0 with a JSON Schema, a validator, and worked examples. Two coders external to the design team applied a pre-registered instrument to 41 documents. Per-variable linear-weighted $κ$ runs from 0.00 to 0.35 (median 0.21) over 29 main-pass documents against a single-coder test-retest ceiling of 0.84, collapsing under the class skew the registration anticipated; pooling raises it to 0.46 through chance correction rather than better agreement. Two variables fall below the prevalence-robust threshold registered in advance: strata reporting and the acquired type introduced here. Disagreement concentrates on when a variable applies rather than on what a document states. Elicitation budgets are reported in 13% of documents, and no document addresses all five types. The contribution is the taxonomy, the score-side artifact that follows from it, and a pre-registered measurement of instrument reliability and current disclosure.
Privacy-preserving learning is often motivated by the idea that protecting users' data can preserve trust and thus participation, improving utility in the long term. However, this claim has not been formalized so far. In parallel, performative learning provides a framework for studying learning systems whose deployment affects the data they later observe. In this work, we bring these two perspectives together and introduce performative privacy, where data leakage reduces future participation. We study a simple model where agents repeatedly contribute data for mean estimation but may leave the system when their data is leaked. Privacy is implemented through differentially private mechanisms, creating a trade-off between estimation noise and future participation. We show, through a theoretical study of the dynamics and numerical experiments, that a finite privacy budget can outperform non-private estimation in the long term when the feedback loop between leakage and participation is sufficiently strong. This provides first evidence that differential privacy can be optimal not only as a protection mechanism, but also from the perspective of long-term utility.
Yamil Essus, Ranga Raju Vatsavai, Benjamin Rachunokcs.LG
Power outage prediction models are increasingly used in assessments of climate-driven infrastructure risk, yet current evaluation practices obscure whether these models generalize to the novel conditions such applications require. We identify three common methodological choices in power outage prediction models that influence their ability to generalize across spatial, temporal, and event-based settings. We compare the predictive performance impacts of different methodological decisions using publicly available data for the U.S. East Coast from 2018 to 2023 and feature sets derived from weather reanalysis and land-cover data, and embeddings from a GeoAI foundation model (Prithvi WxC). Specifically, we assess model performance under multiple test selection strategies, including unfiltered random splits, leave-one-state-out, and leave-one-event-out designs, which increasingly approximate real-world deployment conditions. While random train-test splits yield strong performance, we show that these results are inflated by spatial and temporal autocorrelation. Under spatial and temporal holdout experiments, predictive accuracy degrades substantially, with models often failing to outperform a simple null baseline. Incorporating GeoAI foundation model embeddings yields limited and inconsistent improvements, primarily for spatial generalization, and does not resolve poor event-level transferability. These findings suggest that, given current data availability and evaluation practices, publicly trained outage prediction models offer limited and uncertain operational value. Progress will likely require improved data coverage, more realistic evaluation protocols, and a shift in focus from marginal modeling advances toward addressing structural data constraints.
Edge-IIoTset is the reference benchmark for machine-learning intrusion detection in the industrial Internet of Things, and results reported on it cluster above 99%. We show that much of that performance is not intrusion detection. The preprocessing recipe distributed with the dataset instructs researchers to one-hot encode seven categorical columns. Four of them separate attack from normal traffic with an accuracy of 1.0000 on their own, through the spelling of the placeholder written for an absent protocol field: the string "0" in the normal-traffic branch of the dataset build against "0.0" in the attack branch. The label is recoverable from a serialisation artifact encoding file provenance, with no network behaviour modelled, and separates every row of both curated subsets. Under 5-fold x 3-repeat cross-validation, five of six standard classifiers attain exactly 1.0000 +/- 0.0000 accuracy and the sixth attains 0.99998. Under a corrected protocol, naive Bayes falls by 0.3005 macro-F1 and the strongest model settles at 0.9503 +/- 0.0011. Label, ordinal and frequency encoding leak identically. Because the curated subsets also lack Modbus and per-device identity, we rebuild the benchmark from the raw captures under uniform parsing, producing AgriEdge: 1,276,122 rows, five devices with full attribution, and no column separating the classes above 0.0288. A leave-one-device-out sweep locates the generalisation boundary at the perception/actuation layer, where random forest falls from 0.9988 to 0.5083 balanced accuracy. Non-IID federated partitioning costs at most 0.0037 macro-F1, but a 20-round LoRaWAN training run costs 4.6 hours of uplink.
Multiple-choice benchmarks are graded on whether a model picks the right option, not on whether it needed the question. Measuring that gap takes care: a model answering A to most items scores above chance wherever the key sits at A, and reads as recognition when it is not. We measure it on UA-JudgeExam: 11,990 four-option items with official keys, published by Ukraine's Higher Qualification Commission of Judges. Shown the options and no question, Claude Haiku 4.5 scores 0.383 against chance, and the leak is concentrated: 11.8% of items are answered blind on all eight option orders, against 0.2 items expected by chance. It is not quotation: search over 280,059 editions of Ukrainian legislation recovers 0.128. Gating those out retains 8,128 items, on which the gating model itself now scores 0.204, and GPT-5.6, which took no part in the selection, still answers 0.515 of them with the question hidden. Scoring twelve held-out models on the whole set and subtracting each one's answer-position habit, only two keep an excess: GPT-5.6 at +0.265, Sonnet 4.6 at +0.081. Without it the ranking misleads: Llama 3.1 8B scores 0.292 blind, above every model but those two, purely by answering A to 92% of items. The gate does select something real: on the items it rejected, eleven of twelve models score 0.518-0.789, every interval clear of what the same model scores on the items it kept. But that signal is one model's, and filtering on it does not transfer upward. Neither is visible on a 400-item sample, where nine models read as "statistically at chance". Rewriting distractors instead overshoots to 0.168, below chance and as exploitable. The same probe on LEXam returns chance: every option there points into the stem, none longer than 33 characters. Item format decides whether the problem can arise; capability decides how much is extracted. We release the corpus, the predictions and the harness.
Objectives: To determine whether zero-shot prompting of a large language model (LLM) is sufficient to detect shared decision-making (SDM) behaviors in real clinical encounters, and whether supervised learning adds value under patient-grouped, nested evaluation. Methods: We analyzed 21 audio-recorded outpatient surgical decision encounters (19 unique patients; 7,566 utterance segments; ~6.1 hours) between families of children with multiple long-term conditions and their surgical providers. Trained coders labeled segments for 12 SDM behaviors (human-human macro Cohen's kappa = 0.695). We compared a zero-shot local LLM (Qwen 2.5 32B), a supervised classifier over frozen sentence embeddings, and their logistic stack, under patient-grouped outer folds with inner cross-fitted thresholds and patient-resampled confidence intervals. Results: The zero-shot LLM reached macro kappa = 0.139 (95% CI 0.111-0.164). The supervised classifier reached kappa = 0.227 (0.186-0.262), a paired improvement of 0.088 (0.051-0.119). A logistic stack of the two reached kappa = 0.242 (0.198-0.284). We identified multiple corpus-specific leakage paths, including grouping sibling recordings separately and allowing labels from an outer held-out patient to enter few-shot exemplars used while fitting downstream models. Conclusion: Zero-shot prompting alone is not sufficient to measure SDM behavior as reliably as a small supervised model, and patient-level grouping alone does not prevent leakage when labeled prompt exemplars are precomputed outside the outer evaluation loop. Reported performance is sensitive to the unit of data splitting and to where labeled exemplars enter the pipeline. External validation is needed before these findings generalize beyond this population, model, prompt, and codebook.
Behavioral contamination detectors can return "no evidence" either because a benchmark is clean or because the audit has little power. We formalize this distinction for a benchmark in which an unknown fraction alpha of items was seen during training. With matched clean and seen controls, the behavioral channel is the sparse mixture Q_alpha = (1 - alpha) P_0 + alpha P_1, and an exact second-moment argument shows that detectability is governed by alpha * rho * sqrt(m), where rho^2 = chi^2(P_1 || P_0) measures behavioral separability. Any scalar detector reduces to its efficacy, ef = |E_1 f - E_0 f| / sqrt(Var_0(f)) <= rho, which can be estimated from controls before the audit is run. A separate sample-split certificate lower-bounds alpha distribution-free, without requiring an orientation assumption. Our empirical finding is two-sided. Frozen calibration efficacy predicts held-out power curves, with R^2 = 0.83-0.98 across six exact-permutation channels, but the efficacy-only Gaussian budget is miscalibrated at the small sample sizes it prescribes, failing in 9/9 gate-passing channels even though efficacy itself transports. The failure is in the inversion, not the calibration. A predeclared two-stage planner that simulates the deployed test repairs the budgets, is uniformly conservative, and abstains when its probe does not transport. The certificate is valid but vacuous at audit scale, and a five-seed paired injection study recovers the mechanism ordering verbatim > paraphrase > surface, in which the apparent answer-only signal is explained by baseline drift. We report the audit contract and its failures together: a non-rejection is interpretable only alongside the efficacy, budget, and validity gates that produced it.
Sana Tonekaboni, Lena Stempfle, Sasha Ronaghi +4cs.AI cs.LG
Clinical foundation models trained on large-scale patient data are increasingly used for decision support, screening, and public health. As deployment expands, privacy risk increasingly arises from model-mediated leakage, yet its prevalence and severity remain poorly quantified. Models can disclose sensitive training artifacts, enabling patient re-identification in ways not captured by data-handling controls alone. Existing frameworks, including HIPAA and GDPR, offer limited guidance for such indirect threats. We propose a practical framework for assessing privacy risk in clinical foundation models and illustrate realistic leakage scenarios across deployment settings, map them to legal regimes, and outline complementary technical and legal mitigations. Our analysis provides a context-aware risk assessment grounded in realistic usage to preserve the value of medical foundation models while rigorously safeguarding patient privacy.
Binze Wang, Jinyu Tian, Xingrun Wang +2cs.CR cs.CV
Significant advancements in deep learning have been made possible by the utilization of large datasets, underscoring the critical importance of copyright protection. Adding meticulously designed perturbations to examples, making them unlearnable has become a crucial approach for safeguarding data copyright. Existing methods for creating unlearnable examples overlook the risk of data leakage, which can threaten data ownership. Thus, copyright protection in deep learning faces two main threats: illegal model training and malicious data leakage. We investigate that these two threats cannot be solved by straightforwardly combining existing availability attacks and watermarking techniques as their negative interaction effects. Therefore, in this paper, we propose a novel copyright protection mechanism for the aforementioned security concerns. Considering that the prevention of unauthorized model training requires powerful generalizability of unlearnable perturbations, we generate perturbations to induce the model to learn uncorrelated features of input images. It works by minimizing the mutual information of the input and output of the model. On the other hand, to eliminate the side impact of unlearnable perturbations on the watermark extraction, we design a dual extraction strategy by using two distinct watermark extractors. Extensive experiments on the image datasets {ImageNet, CIFAR10, and Pets} show that our proposed method could provide comprehensive copyright protection to images. The code is available at {https://github.com/Yeah21/ReversibleUnlearnableExamples}.
Aleesha Zainab, Muhammad Ahmed Khalid, Faheem Ullah Khan +1cs.LG
Automatic sensitivity classification of organizational documents is a critical yet underserved problem, where the consequences of misclassification range from regulatory violations to security breaches. While AI-based approaches offer a scalable alternative to manual review, their reliability depends fundamentally on the integrity of training data. A pervasive but underreported problem in this domain is label leakage: residual classification markers embedded within document bodies that allow models to exploit surface shortcuts rather than learning genuine content-based sensitivity signals, producing performance estimates that are inflated and unreliable. This paper addresses this problem by introducing Strategic 16K, a carefully constructed, leakage-controlled corpus of 16,000 diplomatic cables sourced from the WikiLeaks Public Library of US Diplomacy (PlusD), and presents a systematic benchmark evaluating six model architectures spanning classical machine learning and transformer-based approaches. We document an extended leakage removal protocol that identifies and eliminates three categories of residual classification markers embedded within document bodies. On the clean benchmark, BERT achieves the strongest performance (Accuracy = 89.14%, F1 = 89.33%), followed by ELECTRA (Accuracy = 88.57%, F1 = 88.90%). Among classical models, TF-IDF with Logistic Regression achieves the strongest performance at significantly lower computational cost. These results constitute the first fully reproducible sensitivity classification benchmark constructed under explicit leakage-controlled conditions from WikiLeaks PlusD.
Supraja Ramesh, Markus Neufeld, Michael Küttner +2cs.HC cs.LG
Non-invasive blood glucose level (BGL) estimation from photoplethysmography (PPG) holds great promise for wearable health monitoring, but results across studies are hard to compare due to inconsistent datasets, data leakage, and non-standardized evaluation metrics. We present the first reproducible, extensible evaluation pipeline and use it to reassess five representative PPG-based BGL methods on published datasets under three increasingly strict data-split protocols: random window-level, participant-aware, and leave-some-participants-out (LSPO). Models appeared competitive under random splitting but collapsed under participant-aware and LSPO evaluation, with nearly all yielding near-zero or negative R$^2$ values comparable to a mean-prediction baseline. Critically, across every model and split, over 90% of predictions fell within clinically acceptable zones (Clarke Error Grid A+B), including the baseline. This reveals a fundamental disconnect: clinical zone metrics systematically conceal model failure in this domain. Our findings demonstrate that random train-test splits substantially overestimate the generalization of PPG-based BGL models due to sample-level data leakage, and that robust ML evaluation must precede clinical validation to meaningfully assess real-world utility.
Agentic systems integrate LLM driven planning with interfaces to external tools, making data leakage and tool misuse feasible via instruction/data boundary failures and prompt injection attacks. Enforcing required controls consistently is particularly challenging in workflows spanning many codebases and heterogeneous agents. To address this challenge in multi agentic systems, we present a pre-deployment pipeline for scanning, hardening, and validation of agentic applications. The pipeline analyzes prompt templates, tool interfaces, and tool-invocation code to identify leakage-enabling patterns and generate actionable patches. The hardened application is then validated through adversarial prompt injection attacks and benign input variations ensuring that mitigations do not disrupt intended behavior. In the hardening stage, high-risk tools are prioritized, and minimally invasive mitigations are applied, including schema tightening, boundary sanitization, allowlist-based tool gating, and least-privilege checks. In the validation stage, the pipeline automatically generates attack inputs that mimic jailbreaks, instruction overrides, and tool-targeted manipulation, along with benign task variants, to confirm that the functionality of the hardened application is preserved after remediation. We evaluated the pipeline on five real-world agentic applications, as well as on the AgentDojo benchmark. Across all applications, the proposed pipeline identified recurring leakage-enabling patterns and generated patches that can be integrated without disrupting the intended application behavior. The resulting modifications of application code were shown to eliminate leaks when targeted by basic jailbreak and instruction-override attacks, achieving a 100% reduction in leakage, and reduce leaks by 91% under conditions of stress-induced manipulation, without the need of continuous runtime policy enforcement.
Multi-task deep learning models that jointly perform fault classification and remaining useful life (RUL) regression are increasingly used in predictive maintenance, yet reported performance can be strongly affected by how sliding-window sequences are split into training and test sets. We investigate this issue using AMTLNet, an attention-enhanced multi-task architecture, on three public benchmarks: NASA C-MAPSS, NASA IMS, and the UCI Hydraulic System dataset. We show that naive splitting can inflate classification accuracy from a genuine 20-60 percent to 99.9 percent, or reduce it to 0 percent through degenerate class representation. To address this, we introduce a chunk-based, leakage-audited splitting protocol and evaluate all models using five seeds, one-way ANOVA, and Tukey HSD tests. On C-MAPSS, with 19,976 leakage-free training windows, AMTLNet matches a single-task CNN-LSTM baseline in classification, achieving 84.12 +/- 0.96 percent accuracy with Tukey p = 1.0, and reaches an R2 of 0.86 +/- 0.01 while significantly outperforming a naive multi-task baseline. On the smaller Bearing and Hydraulic datasets, multi-task training is unstable, but the failure mode differs: classification degrades for Bearing, whereas regression degrades for Hydraulic. We relate this asymmetry to label provenance and propose a practical framework for deciding when joint training is appropriate under data scarcity. Ablation results show that the multi-head attention branch is the main contributor to regression stability. Removing it reduces R2 from 0.861 to 0.766 and more than doubles classification variance, whereas the convolutional branch contributes little to regression despite using about one-third of the parameters. This study contributes a reusable leakage-audit protocol, seed-transparent evaluation, and evidence that task-specific stability depends more on label provenance than on task type.
Forecasters are evaluated by backtesting, which replays resolved questions and grades the probability the system would have assigned before the outcome was known. For LLMs, two channels leak the answer into this test. A model that retrieves can surface reports written after the event, turning forecasting into a lookup, and each new model is trained on data closer to the event, so a question that lay in the future for last year's models sits inside this year's training data. Either way, the test grades recall while claiming to grade foresight. We introduce Hindcast, which closes both leaks by grading a model as if it stood at a chosen past date $t_0$, before the outcome existed in either channel. Hindcast replays resolved Polymarket prediction markets against a frozen snapshot of public Reddit, lets the model read only posts written before $t_0$, and scores each forecast against both what happened and the market's own price at $t_0$, itself a human forecast made from the same past information. Because the cutoff is set per market and the snapshot never changes, the evaluation re-runs on new markets as models improve, without going stale. Once the leak is closed, retrieval still helps most models, but only where Reddit discussed the event beforehand. Where the archive carried only speculation, retrieval hurts.
Wenhao Zhang, Zhongliang Zhou, John Kang +1cs.CV cs.LG
Recent vision-language models (VLMs) for computational pathology report striking zero-shot performance on whole-slide image (WSI) visual question answering (VQA) benchmarks. We audit these claims and find them fundamentally compromised by data leakage at two hierarchical levels: patient-level leakage, where slides from the same case appear in both training and test folds, and institutional-level leakage, where different cases nonetheless share staining-batch and scanner signatures through a common Tissue Source Site (TSS). By tracing canonical slide, case, and TSS identifiers across major public resources, we document case level train test overlaps of 92.3~100% on TCGA-derived benchmarks, together with near-complete TSS overlap. We further demonstrate that both leakage levels are linearly decodable from foundation-model feature space, that they induce a measurable accuracy gap between leaked and audit-clean cases on a published checkpoint, and that across multiple published WSI VLMs, peak reported accuracies concentrate on the most heavily contaminated benchmarks. Therefore, the current WSI VQA evaluation cannot distinguish genuine multimodal reasoning from nearest-neighbor retrieval over memorized institutional and patient-specific artifacts. Finally, we outline concrete recommendations for contamination-free evaluation. By addressing benchmark construction, provenance disclosure, and automated overlap auditing, we aim to guide future research toward verifiable claims of progress.
The early detection of Chronic Kidney Disease using machine learning has attracted significant interest in healthcare-related computer science. Despite rapid advancements in this field, many reported studies remain inconsistent and potentially misleading. A significant drawback is the lack of organized evaluation regarding methodological concerns. Key issues include data leakage, limited access to temporal patient records and inconsistency in reported clinical indicators. This research offers a systematic literature review of existing CKD prediction studies using interpretable machine learning techniques, where nineteen relevant studies were selected via systematic searches across major academic databases. To assess methodological reliability, this study introduces a structured taxonomy of information leakage and a quantitative leakage scoring framework to systematically evaluate reliability across CKD prediction studies. The analysis reveals a strong relationship between leakage and inflated performance. Here, High leakage-studies report an average accuracy of 95.48%, compared to 80.2% for leakage-free studies, reflecting an increase of approximately 15.28%. Furthermore, a cross-study feature stability analysis shows that only a small subset of predictors is consistently reproducible, with over 80% lacking reliability. Overall, the findings suggest that many reported performance improvements stem from methodological limitations rather than true predictive capability.
Chongkai Li, Bang Zhang, Wenjian Luocs.LG cs.AI cs.CR
Federated learning (FL) avoids explicit data exposure by keeping raw data on local clients, yet privacy risks remain in the training process and the learned model itself. Recently, centralized Taking Away Training Data (TATD) attacks have shown that malicious training could abuse the memorization capacity of deep models to store and later recover training data. However, this memorization-based threat has not been systematically studied under FL environments, where multi-client averaging could overwrite encoded training data. In this paper, we study a white-box TATD attack in which a malicious server selects n target clients from K participating clients and actively writes private training data into the global model during federated training. We propose FedCVESA, a federated variant of Correlation Value Encoding Attack (CVEA), by adding a Pearson-correlation regularizer to the loss function of target clients, so that private training data are gradually encoded into selected model parameters, referred to as carrier parameters. To reduce the overwriting of carrier parameters during server aggregation, we further propose segmented aggregation over dispersed carrier parameters, preserving selected carrier parameters while keeping standard averaging on the remaining parameters. Experiments on MNIST, Fashion-MNIST, and CIFAR-10 under Dirichlet non-IID partitions show that the proposed method can steal semantically meaningful private training images from the trained model while maintaining acceptable main-task utility in a controlled proof-of-concept setting. These results demonstrate that FL can become a parameter-level memorization channel for active TATD attack under the studied white-box malicious-server setting.
Performance evaluation in AI systems commonly assumes that random dataset splits produce independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) subsets. We show that this assumption often breaks down in spatiotemporally correlated domains such as aerial surveillance, precision agriculture, and medical imaging, leading to two systematic failures: data leakage, where correlated samples span training and validation splits and inflate performance estimates, and hidden stratification, where errors on minority subpopulations are obscured by aggregate metrics. To address these issues, we propose a unified evaluation and training framework for spatially correlated data. We introduce Structure-Aware Stratified Partitioning (SASP), which constructs validation splits that reduce spatiotemporal leakage while preserving meaningful class balance, and Curriculum Distributionally Robust Optimization (CDRO), a curriculum-based relaxation of distributionally robust training that stabilizes optimization under these stricter splits. Across multiple benchmarks, this combination yields consistently improved generalization, more reliable confidence calibration, and exposes failure modes that remain hidden under conventional random-split evaluation.
Radio-frequency (RF) sensing is a central modality for counter-unmanned-aerial-system (counter-UAS) defence because it exploits the control, telemetry, and video links between a drone and its operator. Reported accuracies for RF-based drone detection and identification are often very high, but many are obtained using cross-validation that splits a small number of continuous recordings into short segments. This can place near-duplicate slices of the same recording in both training and test partitions, creating data leakage. We study this leakage problem through theory and measurement. We formalise the optimism of segment-level cross-validation and show, using Cover's function-counting theorem, that a classifier can exactly memorise the recording-to-label map when the number of independent recordings, R, is small relative to the feature dimension, d. In particular, this can occur when 2R is less than or approximately equal to d. Under these conditions, naive accuracy approaches 1, and the inflation gap approaches 1 - ACC*, where ACC* is the Bayes accuracy. The inflation eases only once R grows beyond this separability threshold. A controlled synthetic experiment with 10 seeds confirms the predicted curves: naive balanced accuracy rises from the Bayes level toward 1.0 as recording-specific nuisance variation grows, while honest recording-grouped evaluation declines to chance, with a gap reaching about 0.5. On the public DroneRF dataset, pooled leave-one-recording-out cross-validation shows drone type identification, AR versus Bebop, collapsing from a naive macro-F1 of 0.74 to 0.46, the two-class chance level. A leakage-pathway ablation attributes essentially all of the inflation to segment-level leakage.
Anthony Lavertu, Jacob Cote, Jacques Corbeil +2q-bio.QM cs.LG
Machine learning models trained on biochemical data are routinely evaluated using splits that fail to account for relational structure, causing information leakage and over-optimistic performance estimates. Existing splitting methods lack theoretical grounding and scale at best quadratically. We introduce the Relational Generative Process (RGP), a mathematical formalization explaining why relational structure arises in biochemical datasets, and Refnd, a splitting algorithm that leverages a proximity graph computed in loglinear time using Hierarchical Navigable Small World (HNSW). We validate on an antimicrobial peptide dataset, showing that Refnd splits yield lower but more realistic evaluation performance than traditional splits. Refnd is applicable to any dataset arising from an RGP such as protein sequences and structures, small molecules, and nucleotide sequences, and is openly available as a Rust accelerated Python package: pip install refnd.
Andrea Carriero, Davide Pettenuzzo, Shubhranshu Shekharecon.EM cs.AI cs.LG
We introduce MACROCAST, a lightweight Time Series Foundation Model (TSFM) for real-time macroeconomic forecasting. Existing TSFMs suffer from data leakage in two forms: temporal contamination, as the model may have seen the realized values of the series it forecasts, and revision bias, as training on fully revised data diverges from the preliminary, vintage-specific releases available to real-time forecasters. MACROCAST is, to our knowledge, the first TSFM that rules out both forms of leakage entirely: at no stage of training is the model exposed to information that would not have been available to a forecaster in real time. We train MACROCAST first on purely synthetic time series in approximately one GPU-day and then fine-tune it on synthetic time series drawn from Bayesian VARs, dynamic factor models, and ARIMA specifications estimated on vintage-specific ALFRED data. Because pretraining uses only simulated data and fine-tuning uses only real-time vintages, no observed future or revised value ever enters the model; each fine-tuning run takes nine minutes. Evaluated on the FRED-MD database in a genuine real-time out-of-sample exercise, MACROCAST improves on the AR(1) benchmark for roughly 80% of series-horizon pairs, matches or surpasses Chronos-2 -- the strongest currently available TSFM -- and outperforms the Bayesian VAR and dynamic factor model benchmarks, all in a data-leakage-free manner.
Automated classification of acute lymphoblastic leukemia (ALL) from peripheral blood smear images has often reported near-perfect performance on the C-NMC 2019 dataset. We show that such results can be inflated by patient-level data leakage caused by random image-level partitioning, where cells from the same subject may appear in both training and test folds. We establish a leakage-aware benchmark under a strict subject-disjoint protocol, comparing LightGBM, RBF-SVM, EfficientNet-B0, EfficientNet-B1, and ViT-Tiny. Models are developed using three subject-disjoint folds from 73 subjects and evaluated on an external preliminary-phase test set of 1,867 images from 28 unseen subjects with zero patient overlap. Beyond discrimination, we assess calibration using expected calibration error, Brier score, and temperature scaling. Under honest evaluation, EfficientNet-B1 achieves the best performance, with AUROC 0.913, sensitivity 0.87, specificity 0.80, and calibrated ECE 0.024. Frozen-feature classifiers and ViT-Tiny show high sensitivity but poor specificity, indicating a tendency to over-predict the malignant class. A random-versus-subject-disjoint ablation shows that random splitting inflates AUROC by about 0.04 even in the conservative frozen-feature setting. These findings caution against image-level evaluation on C-NMC 2019 and provide a reproducible, calibration-aware benchmark for future work.
AI agents are increasingly being adopted in enterprise and personal settings with access to emails, databases, documents, and other tools where they can read, update, and disseminate sensitive information. Much of prior research on data leakage risks in agents has focused on adversarial data exfiltration through prompt injections and jailbreaks. However, sensitive information may also be exposed during non-adversarial use, creating leakage risks even when users issue benign requests. We report a joint evaluation by the Singapore AI Safety Institute and the Korea AI Safety Institute examining agent data leakage in 12 realistic, non-adversarial tasks spanning customer support, DevOps, web automation, and enterprise and personal productivity. The evaluation covers five risk types: lack of data awareness, audience awareness, policy compliance, data minimization, and access-boundary awareness. Both institutes tested a common set of scenarios mirroring real-world deployments using independent testing environments and task-specific LLM-judge rubrics. Across the three tested agents, none achieved fully correct and fully safe execution across all scenarios. Successful task completion often coincided with data-handling failures such as accessing unnecessary information or disclosing information to inappropriate recipients, indicating that capability and data-handling safety should be evaluated separately. Qualitative review also revealed claim-action mismatches, simulation-aware behavior, user-simulator role reversal, and interpretation gaps in automated judging. Overall, the results indicate that operational data leakage is a first-order agent-safety concern distinct from adversarial exfiltration and provide a methodology for future evaluations of agent data-handling safety.
Data leakage -- contamination of a model with information unavailable at baseline -- is the dominant reproducibility failure in machine-learning-based science, yet detection tools require training code, external data, or domain expertise. None operates on the artifact an auditor most often holds: the model's output. We ask what can be decided about leakage from predictions and outcomes alone. We give a decision-theoretic framework in which leakage diagnostics are functionals of the predicted-risk/outcome law, parameterized by a threshold-weighting linked to proper scoring rules and decision-curve analysis. We prove a sharp impossibility: a recalibrated leak matching an honest model's calibration and discrimination is indistinguishable from honest performance by \emph{any} function of the predictions, so the broad class is detectable only against an externally supplied ceiling on achievable discrimination. We then prove what leakage cannot hide: a near-deterministic subgroup -- the signature of a near-label leak -- produces a sustained unit-purity head that no legitimate predictor of a non-deterministic outcome can manufacture, yielding a prior-free test. These results organize leakage into a trichotomy -- miscalibrated, broad-calibrated, and deterministic -- each with a matched detector and failure mode. We validate on UK Biobank using time-windowed comorbidity leakage with known, graded severity, measuring a detection floor of $Δ\cstar \approx 0.007$ on this endpoint, below which residual leakage is undetectable from output and too small to alter conclusions. The numerical floor is cohort- and endpoint-specific; the structural lesson is general: output-only detection fails where residual leakage is indistinguishable from an honestly stronger predictor. The test returns a verdict on a prediction vector in under a second on commodity hardware.
Gianluca Barmina, Peter Schneider-Kamp, Lukas Galke Poechcs.CL cs.AI
Large language models can reproduce training data, but existing memorization evaluations mostly measure whether models can be forced to do so, rather than whether they do so under ordinary use. We introduce PropMe, a propensity-aware framework for memorization evaluation that contrasts prefix-based capability attacks with non-adversarial evaluations. We propose a metric transformation that, applied to existing functions, allows to create propensity metrics. We further introduce SimpleTrace, a lightweight tracing pipeline built on infini-gram that deterministically attributes model generations to large-scale training corpora and computes verbatim, near-verbatim, and propensity-transformed memorization metrics. Evaluating two fully-open models: Comma and DFM Decoder on two datasets: Common Pile and Dynaword in two languages, we find a consistent gap between capability and propensity: prefix attacks elicit substantially stronger memorization signals than generic or dataset-specific prompts, while propensity scores remain low overall. Thus, the models can reveal training data when directly elicited, but rarely do so in more common non-adversarial settings. We also find that DFM Decoder, which is continually pre-trained from Comma, exhibits reduced memorization and memorization propensity for Common Pile, confirming that memorization capability can decrease when later training emphasizes partially different data. Our results suggest, and we encourage, that memorization audits should report both worst-case extractability and ordinary leakage propensity in order to have a more comprehensive view of this phenomenon.
A large language model (LLM) agent that sends messages can leak data inside them. Destination allowlists and content scanners do not police whether an otherwise-benign payload is itself a covert channel: a compromised agent encodes bits in zero-width characters, homoglyphs, whitespace, base64, JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) key ordering, message timing or size -- and, in binary egress, in least-significant-bit (LSB) pixel planes, per-image mean luminance, inter-image sequence permutation, ultrasonic tones, or audible-band sonified data. Our egress reference monitor has three contributions. (i) A text pipeline of ten capacity-reducing stages, a per-sink leaky-bucket capacity ledger, and a staged posture that enforces lossless stages from day one. (ii) Two media scramblers (a Fourier-domain audio band-limiter and a red-green-blue (RGB) image bit-depth and mean-luminance bucketer) gated by a boot-time cryptographic legitimacy attestation: an auditor publishes at boot the trusted Ed25519 keys and {kind, data-class} pairs; only payloads with a verifying signature for an authorized class are exempt. The attestation sidesteps the intractable content-based discrimination between real media and data sonified or rasterized as a carrier; unsigned media is suspect by default; a content-addressed canonicalizer closes the inter-image permutation channel. (iii) Residual capacity is the Miller--Madow corrected mutual information between embedded and recovered bits (zero when destroyed), measured by an adversarial ensemble of fifteen working encoders across text, image and audio. The reference implementation drives residual capacity to zero on every destroyable channel and to a stated bound on the one (per-image mean luminance) that cannot be destroyed without ruining the image.
Hanna Foerster, Ilia Shumailov, Cheng Zhang +3cs.CR cs.LG
Dynamic quantization emerged as a practical approach to increase the utilization and efficiency of the machine learning serving flow. Unlike static quantization, which applies quantization offline, dynamic quantization operates on tensors at run-time, adapting its parameters to the actual input data. Today's mainstream machine learning frameworks, including ML compilers and inference engines, frequently recommend dynamic quantization as an initial step for optimizing model serving. This is because dynamic quantization can significantly reduce memory usage and computational load, leading to faster token generation and improved model serving efficiency without substantial loss in model accuracy. In this paper, we reveal a critical vulnerability in dynamic quantization: an adversary can exploit such quantization strategy to steal sensitive user data placed in the same batch as the adversary's input. Our analysis demonstrates that dynamic quantization, when improperly implemented or configured, can create side channels that expose information about other inputs within the same batch. We call this phenomenon Quantamination, describing contamination from quantization. Specifically, we show that at least 4 of the most popular ML frameworks in use today either default to or can use configurations that leak data across the batch boundary. This data leakage, in theory, allows attackers to partially or even fully recover other users' batched input data, representing a serious privacy risk for existing ML serving frameworks.