Tool-using agents are being proposed for medical imaging, and their behaviour when a tool returns a false finding is largely unmeasured. We audit whether a ReAct-style tool-calling agent abandons an answer it has already given correctly once a falsified finding arrives, and whether that depends on how the finding is presented. On 20 VQA-RAD closed questions across four vendor-designated model tiers, the agent commits to an answer from the image alone; a negated finding is then delivered either as JSON from an analyze_image tool the agent invokes itself, or as quoted prose attributed to a radiologist. Our outcome is the commission-error rate over cases answered correctly without any tool. Deference is much higher under the prose-attributed claim: at the strongest tier the agent revised its correct answer in 10 of 13 cases against 1 of 13 under the tool (exact McNemar p=0.0039, Holm-adjusted 0.012). We do not claim this isolates the source label. Attribution travels with the delivery channel in our design, and exposure differs because the tool claim reaches the agent only when it calls the tool. The finding is a joint source-and-delivery asymmetry from a small-scale pilot whose pre-specified stopping rule was not met.
A growing line of work equips large language model (LLM) agents with graph neural networks (GNNs) as callable tools, assuming the agent exercises judgment over when and how much to rely on such a tool. We test this directly. We expose a frozen GNN to a ReAct-style LLM agent as an explicit tool and measure, on node classification over a text-attributed graph (ogbn-arxiv, replicated on WikiCS), whether the agent uses the tool or merely obeys it. We find the agent does not exercise judgment: its predictions agree with the raw GNN's 97.6-99.2% of the time (5 seeds), collapsing into a GNN parrot that adopts the tool's output wholesale and bypasses its own reasoning. Sweeping backbone capability (Qwen2.5 0.5B-7B), the deference is not a weak-model artifact: among models able to invoke the tool, agreement rises with capability (0.60 to 0.98 from 1.5B to 7B). Crucially, the cost of deference does not shrink as capability grows and grows where alternatives emerge: a per-node oracle over the available actions beats the parrot by 0.09-0.18 at 3B and 0.12-0.22 at 7B, roughly doubling at high homophily, because the parrot is pinned to the frozen GNN while the agent's alternatives improve; at 7B a simple neighbour-label tool overtakes the GNN at high homophily (0.81 vs 0.71) yet the agent still defers. A simple selective-invocation gate recovers about half of that high-homophily gap (0.71 to 0.83) but yields no net global gain, and held-out estimates bound the best achievable gate over standard test-time features to at most a third of the oracle headroom: reliable selective invocation looks limited by available information, not merely router design. Our results are a cautionary measurement: evaluations of agent+tool systems cannot assume the agent adds judgment on top of the tool, and selective invocation must be designed in rather than expected to emerge from scale.