Multi-agent LLM systems coordinate through natural-language messages that consume 40--60\% of their token budget. Replacing these with structured graphs reduces cost but fails on tasks requiring adaptive reasoning. We propose \textbf{Routed Graph Handoff}, where a lightweight LLM router (155 tokens, 0.15\% overhead) selects between a typed dependency graph and natural language for each delegation. On four benchmarks (1,050+ trajectories), the routed system matches or exceeds NL-only on every task: \textbf{+12.7\,pp} on $τ$-retail at 3.2$\times$ compression ($p{<}0.01$), \textbf{+8.7\,pp} on BrowseComp at 2.2$\times$ compression ($p{<}0.05$), and parity on BFCL and AppWorld. Without the router, graph-only delegation regresses 14.6\,pp on AppWorld; the router eliminates this at near-zero cost. A graph-aware executor prompt is required: the same schema without interpretation guidance yields no gain. An oracle analysis reveals 8.6\,pp of additional headroom, motivating execution-time adaptive routing as future work.
Current LLM agent systems decide delegation before reasoning begins (a router picks a model) or after a response is complete (a verifier scores it and may retry). We study a third regime: an agent that recognises, during its own reasoning, that it is unlikely to succeed and transfers control to a stronger model. We formulate intra-generation delegation as a Bayesian optimal-stopping problem over a learned competence posterior -- an online estimate of the agent's eventual task success whose sufficient statistics are learned from labelled trajectories, not read off raw entropy. We derive the myopic escalation threshold in closed form, characterise the optimal policy via dynamic programming, and prove that the optimal policy is a time-varying threshold with no shape assumption on the raw signal. We further prove exponential separation of the oracle belief at the Chernoff-information rate of the signal, a regret bound governed by the calibration of the posterior, and a finite-sample guarantee: with n labelled calibration trajectories the deployed plug-in policy's regret decays as 1/sqrt(n). A controlled simulation study confirms each prediction of the theory, including the predicted 1/sqrt(n) rate. We additionally report a real-model validation on a Qwen2.5-Coder 1.5B->7B code cascade (MBPP, 257 tasks), confirming two of three pre-registered predictions: the escalation frontier dominates post-hoc routing at equal cost, and the cumulative competence belief's discrimination rises over generation.
LLM-based agents can act on behalf of a user to access cloud services, call tools, or invoke agents. At session start, the agent's permissions are set but remain static, and each request is evaluated independently, without considering prior actions. Within its permissions, an agent may act contrary to the delegated task, combine individually permitted actions into a prohibited outcome, or delegate authority to a sub-agent without limiting it. A prompt injection poses a risk only if the agent has authority to perform such actions; this is therefore a problem of authorization architecture, not just the model. The Agentic Principal Chain (APC) tracks delegated authority from one principal to the next. APC evaluates each request against the accumulated session state using six authorization checks. APC carries forward and restricts delegated scope and budgets. Using composition closure, APC checks requests against prior actions to prevent prohibited combinations and enforces the decision outside the model. We prove Blast Radius Monotonicity and Composition Soundness for APC implementations; Composition Soundness is limited to prohibited combinations under a complete restriction set and serialized admission. We evaluated 3,154 instances including InjecAgent, AgentDojo, and ASB. Our compromised-model evaluation tests APC independently of model behavior by inserting the ground-truth attack call after the first legitimate tool call. AgentDojo exfiltration fell from 75-100% to 0% across all four domains; APC blocked all 544 InjecAgent data-stealing cases. Intent binding reduced destruction from 38.6% to 4.0% and manipulation from 90.5% to 12.1%. Authorization latency was 0.24 ms at the 99th percentile on an idle host; across 949 AgentDojo task-injection pairs, utility was 8.6 and 13.9 percentage points lower in the two settings. Implementation, evaluation tools, and data are publicly available.
AI agents increasingly work inside systems that govern how they delegate tasks, move information, execute actions, and use shared resources. Recent work already shows that deployment rules can change collective behavior. Here we ask which parts of an AI institution produce safety and how they do it. This is the first paper from POLIS, an ongoing research programme studying algorithmic institutions for multi-agent systems. We report a frozen 5,280-episode study suite. The main pre-specified delegation experiment spans four model families; a targeted high-conflict diagnostic adds three additional model endpoints. In matched structured workflows, the model sees different rule formulations and guards consult different authority states. We also vary the attractiveness of the immediate compliant internal/self fallback and allow blocked workflows to continue. A detailed constitutional prompt produces 0/384 realized violations. A provenance-aware executable guard also produces 0/384, although it blocks prohibited attempts in 51/384 episodes; 44/51 of those episodes later complete safely. The local-state guard's failures concentrate in scenarios where an ordinary transformation changes visible policy while originating authority stays fixed. In matched laundering scenarios, that guard admits violations in 22/96 episodes and provenance enforcement in 0/96 (p = 4.77 x 10^-7). A separate resource-allocation experiment shows that revealing the numerical value of an otherwise identical cap changes agent requests. In these structured workflows, the same final violation rate can hide very different mechanisms. The rule itself is only part of the institution. The authority state the system trusts matters, and so does the path available after a block.
Eric Nalisnick, Chi Zhang, Sophia Qian +1stat.ML cs.AI cs.LG
We study models for human-AI teaming through the lens of statistical calibration. We assume the team consists of an AI model and human -- both of which are calibrated with respect to some partitioning of the feature space -- and expose how the calibration assumptions propagate into the teaming framework. In particular, we consider frameworks that either (i) combine human and model predictions or (ii) delegate prediction responsibility to either a human or model. We show via theoretical and empirical results that existing methods for combination do not preserve the human's degree of calibration. Methods for delegation (by the very act of delegation) preserve calibration of the downstream predictors but shift the burden onto the rejector meta-model that decides who predicts. The rejector must be calibrated finely enough to locate where each member is superior, a demand that grows with the human's expertise and becomes unattainable when the human relies on information the system cannot observe.
Large language models are increasingly expected to handle complex, long-horizon real-world tasks whose context demands can grow without bound, yet model context windows remain inherently finite. Recent work explores a paradigm where a main agent decomposes tasks and dispatches subtasks to subagents, which execute and return only summarized results, conserving the main agent's context budget. However, performing this well requires delegation intelligence: the ability to decompose complex tasks, determine when and what to delegate, and integrate returned results into the ongoing workflow. Training data for this capability is scarce in naturally occurring text, and to our knowledge, how to synthesize such data and train models to acquire this capability remains largely unexplored in the open-source community. To bridge this gap, we present a preliminary exploration targeting deep research, a representative long-horizon agent task. Specifically, we design a harness that guides the model toward high-quality task decomposition and delegation, while constraining subagents to return results properly to support the main agent's workflow. The harness-guided trajectories naturally encode correct delegation decisions, which we use as supervised fine-tuning data to internalize delegation intelligence into model weights. Our resulting model, SearchSwarm-30B-A3B, achieves 68.1 on BrowseComp and 73.3 on BrowseComp-ZH, the best results among all models of comparable scale. We will release our harness, model weights, and training data to facilitate future research.
As AI systems evolve from passive models into autonomous active agents capable of initiating actions, collaborating, and delegating tasks, the traditional boundaries of software systems blur. Traditional authorization and delegation frameworks, built around fixed principals, explicit requests, and static scopes, are insufficient to govern agentic systems. Agentic AI demands richer authorization semantics: agents must inherit and delegate permissions, act under time-limited authority, and coordinate through shared protocols. Existing Identity and Access Management (IAM) systems fail to fully capture this notion of agency, lacking mechanisms for recursive delegation, contextual boundaries, and dynamic scoping as executable governance primitives. Unlike access delegation standards such as OAuth 2.0, we treat delegation as a contractual term rather than merely a static token-based consent credential. This paper proposes a compositional governance framework that introduces primitives indispensable for agentic AI. We define types of delegation and their permissions and accountability implications, and we introduce a notion of resource scope attenuation to bound agentic access envelopes. These concepts are expressed as general relational definitions that can be composed into existing authorization domains (e.g., financial systems). To operationalize this composition, we define a compositional operator that overlays new agentic semantics, such as recursive delegation chains, onto existing relational policies without rewriting them. We substantiate this framework through formal proofs and empirical evaluation, showing that it provides a formal yet practical foundation for accountable authorization in agentic AI systems.