Attention Capture Is Not Detection: A Two-Stage Account of How Humans Miss Localized AI Image Edits

As AI-generated image edits proliferate, the platforms meant to curb the resulting disinformation treat detectability as a single, undifferentiated property: an edit either gets a warning or it does not. We show this is the wrong model. Across a controlled eye-tracking study ($N=59$, Latin-square design, four conditions crossing edit area and semantic plausibility), a mixed-effects analysis reveals that whether an edit is noticed and whether it is correctly judged as fake are dissociable stages, governed by different factors: edit area drives attention capture ($p<0.001$) while semantic plausibility drives judgment accuracy and look-but-fail-to-see (LBFS) error rates ($p<0.001$). This dissociation survives correction for multiple comparisons; a secondary interaction between the two factors does not. This two-stage account extends a long-standing distinction in visual attention research (between pre-attentive capture and effortful recognition) into the new domain of AI-edit detectability. We then test whether a generative eye-movement model can computationally operationalize the attention-capture stage: a Transformer trained to generate scanpaths tracks per-image attention with strong discriminative power (Pearson $r=0.77$--$0.82$ across held-out stimuli) and, on the harder task of predicting LBFS incidence, modestly outperforms a two-parameter linear baseline even without access to the plausibility label ($r=0.52$ vs. $r=0.48$). We report this comparison, our ablations, and our method's limitations (a single fixed train/validation split, not leave-one-subject-out) without inflation, consistent with responsibly communicating what a machine learning system can and cannot do to help curb AI-driven disinformation.

IO Factory: Simulating AI-Enabled Influence Campaigns at Scale

We introduce IO Factory, an AI-driven framework for simulating information and influence campaigns as fully integrated, traceable processes. The threat of digital manipulation now extends beyond persuasive text from individual language models to AI swarms, i.e., persistent groups of coordinated agents that adapt to platform feedback and disguise organized campaigns as ordinary social interaction. Because such campaigns cannot be identified from isolated messages alone, they must be analyzed across a continuous spectrum of planning, platform action, exposure, interpretation, measurement, and adaptation. IO Factory represents this process inside a controlled simulated platform, linking actor roles, platform actions, exposure records, structured model-based evaluations, and configured changes in the simulated population. We implement the architecture and evaluate it across configurations of up to 100,000 agents. The results show that IO Factory executes campaign timelines at scale and produces inspectable evidence of exposure and measured movement in configured belief variables. By recording the actors, objectives, action constraints, exposure paths, and measurement rules used in each run, IO Factory supports reproducible research and red-team analysis of coordinated influence.

Interrupting the Chain: Human Perception of AI-Generated Disinformation Through a Kill Chain Lens

Generative AI enables customized misinformation at scale, yet defenses remain largely reactive. We present empirical findings from a human-subject study (n=504 participants, n=2,438 judgments) in which users classified news fragments by origin (human vs. machine) and veracity (real vs. fake). We organize results using an adapted cybersecurity kill chain as a taxonomy for intervention, mapping perception data onto stages of a cognitive attack lifecycle. Three key findings emerge: (1) a perception-accuracy gap where heightened suspicion does not improve detection; (2) modern LLMs frequently produce human-indistinguishable text; and (3) an asymmetric cognitive fatigue effect where fake-news detection degrades by 10.2 percentage points under sustained exposure while AI-origin detection remains stable. These findings identify candidate intervention points for proactive defense against AI-driven disinformation.

How Artificial Intelligence LLM Engines Shape the Global Conflict Information Environment

Artificial Intelligence (AI) answer engines now field a growing share of the questions that analysts, scholars, and the public ask about issues of peace and conflict. Large Language Models (LLMs) are known to hallucinate under certain conditions, but do these errors have discernible patterns when they are asked about conflicts, and if so what can that teach us about the changing global conflict information environment? To answer, we first asked a battery of questions about 28 conflicts to five leading answer engines and scored their 5,460 answers against documented evidence. We found that the thinner the retrievable record around a given conflict, the more the engines invent, misattribute, and miscount. Thin records don't just encourage hallucination, but create structural exposure to mis- and disinformation, because they are the easiest records to warp through Generative Engine Optimization (GEO) to bias engine responses. Through an analysis of 1,048 websites that the AI LLMs pulled conflict facts from, we found that GEO source optimization is already happening, and while state-partisan digital capture remains incipient it is rapidly growing. We explain what these findings mean for scholarship with the rise of GEO information warfare, and for policy argue for a return to the deep local monitoring and translation-based research that AI tools cannot replicate, closing with a discussion of future research opportunities and challenges in this fast-moving space.

Between Suppression and Collapse: Evaluating Narrative Unlearning with LENS

Large language models (LLMs) can reproduce disinformation-aligned narrative frames as plausible explanations, raising the question of whether existing machine-unlearning algorithms can suppress this behavior. We introduce Level-based Evaluation of Narrative Suppression (LENS), a contextualization based evaluation protocol for testing target narrative reproduction across direct, attributed, contrastive, and abstract resistance levels. We evaluate two source-grounded narratives: one framing Russia's war against Ukraine as forced by NATO expansion, and one framing the United States as exploiting or abandoning Taiwan. The experiments cover four near-12B multilingual instruction models: Lapa LLM, Gemma-12B, Qwen-14B, and TAIDE-Gemma. We introduce the Suppression-Collapse Efficiency (SCE) score as a checkpoint selection summary that rewards target-narrative suppression while penalizing degraded outputs. Our results shows that selected checkpoints can reduce narrative reproduction and suppression may transfer beyond direct forget prompts. We also report entity recovery as a separate side effect: abstract A/B/C prompts can cause models to recover the real-world actors associated with the target frame after unlearning. These findings demonstrate that LENS is a successful diagnostic protocol for both reporting and guiding the further study of the deeper structure of narrative unlearning.

Friend or Foe? Language as an ideological switch in open-weight LLMs under Russian disinformation stress

As Russia's war against Ukraine extends into generative AI, large language models (LLMs) adapted for local post-Soviet languages are deployed in contested information environments. Policy and industry discourse assumes that culturally aligned adaptation encodes the political orientation of the target community: a Ukrainian-oriented model will resist Russian narratives, a Russian-oriented one will reinforce them. Does it? This article systematically disconfirms that assumption. We run a controlled audit of four openly available LLMs sharing a common base model but fine-tuned for different linguistic communities, querying them in Ukrainian, Russian and English across ten contested wartime narratives: Crimea, "denazification", the "one people" thesis, and atrocity denial at Bucha and Mariupol. The result is a Fine-Tuning Paradox: the Ukrainian-oriented model shows the weakest resistance to Russian disinformation in Russian, while the Russian-oriented one exhibits the strongest rejection. Corpus composition, language coverage and prompt format prove more decisive than nominal cultural provenance. We situate these findings within debates on hybrid warfare, digital sovereignty and post-imperial information orders, arguing that the principal threat to regional information sovereignty is not adversarial fine-tuning but the untested assumption that cultural alignment guarantees resilience.