EcoAgent-Bench: Evaluating Economic Decision-Making in Budget-Constrained LLM Agents

Agent benchmarks usually measure task completion and treat resource use as an auxiliary statistic. In deployment, however, the choice among a local lookup, broad search, composite research tool, stronger model, or human escalation is part of the task itself. We introduce EcoAgent-Bench, in which every task specifies priced actions and an explicit budget. Its 304 real-derived tasks span five families adapted from GAIA, HotpotQA, and MuSiQue, and test four decisions: avoiding unnecessary escalation, escalating when local evidence is insufficient, selecting a model tier, and stopping on unsupported premises. We evaluate seven LLM agents in tool-API and workspace-CLI settings, together with four oracle scripted controls. Micro-averaged accuracy rewards one-sided policies: always-escalate controls achieve high micro success while failing save-oriented tasks. We therefore also report an economic-consistency score (the worse of accuracy on upgrade-oriented and save-oriented family groups) which exposes this failure. Tool-API agents attain only 3.9-24.0% micro strict success (at most 7.3% economic consistency), often either stopping before warranted escalation or overspending on cheap tasks. A threshold-crossing budget sweep changes GPT-5.4's escalation rate from 0% to only 3%. These results show that completion under a budget and economical action selection are distinct properties. We release the task bundle, transformation pipeline, frozen evaluation environments, and integrity-bound result artifacts needed to study both.

Strategic Bargaining in Multi-Buyer Markets: Reinforcement Learning from Verifiable Rewards for LLM Negotiations

Negotiation is a fundamental strategic interaction in management science, characterized by agents attempting to reach agreements while protecting private information, such as reservation costs and hidden valuations. A prevalent yet complex scenario involves a single seller negotiating concurrently with multiple buyers, each possessing heterogeneous, private budgets. In such settings, constrained by a limited number of communication turns, the seller must balance exploring the broader market to discover the highest valuation with concentrating sufficient turns on a single target buyer to secure the best possible outcome. Our analysis reveals a significant gap in standard Large Language Models (LLMs): while these models are linguistically proficient, they fail to act as effective economic decision-makers. Specifically, they exhibit a failure to explore the buyer pool, often fixating on the current highest bid rather than strategically investigating the market to discover latent high valuations. In this paper, we propose a specialized training recipe using Reinforcement Learning from Verifiable Rewards (RLVR). By anchoring the reward function to objective economic outcomes, the strategic balance between market discovery and surplus extraction emerges natively through the learning process. Our results demonstrate that the trained seller undergoes a multi-stage strategic evolution, learning to leverage price anchoring and strategic probing to identify more profitable counterparties. The agent extracts a substantially higher surplus than frontier models by both improving its persuasive bargaining skills and consistently closing deals with high-value buyers. Finally, we show that our seller strategies generalize robustly to unseen buyer negotiation styles and budget distributions.