Reinforcement-learning (RL) post-training equips multimodal large reasoning models (MLRMs) with exploratory chains of thought (CoT), substantially improving visual reasoning. However, we find that this capability introduces a distinct privacy vulnerability: even when a sensitive fact is successfully unlearned from the final answer, the model may still reproduce it in its reasoning trace. This leakage is substantially more pronounced in natively RL-trained MLRMs than in their non -reasoning base models, revealing a privacy risk that existing unlearning methods are not designed to address. We show that RL-induced exploration leaves sensitive content with a distinctive token-level entropy signature that is largely absent from base models. Based on this observation, we propose LEMUR, a fully training-free, inference-time unlearning framework for natively RL-trained multimodal models. LEMUR uses entropy dynamics as a control signal to identify when sensitive reasoning begins and when sanitization should stop. During this interval, it redirects the reasoning trajectory through entropy-modulated visual-anchor latent injection, replacing committed tokens with sanitized, probability-weighted embeddings re-grounded in the input image. Across diverse MLRMs, LEMUR consistently outperforms existing unlearning met hods in suppressing both reasoning-trace and answer leakage, while better preserving non-sensitive utility and output fluency. These results demonstrate that RL-induced entropy dynamics provide a distinctive signal for privacy leakage and that exploiting this signal enables effective training-free unlearning for reasoning-capable multimodal models.
Neil F. Johnson, Frank Yingjie Huo, Bella Xinrui Liphysics.soc-ph cond-mat.dis-nn cs.AI nlin.AO physics.app-ph
Increasing the temperature of an ordinary many-state system increases access to a wider range of states and hence increases its entropy. We find the opposite in ChatGPT-like AIs, even though raising the decoder temperature likewise increases access to a wider range of states (next-token choices). Across 12,000 continuations from 11 AIs, autoregressive feedback drives the long-time output population through an entropy maximum and into population inversion. The transition features frozen states, cycles, intermittency and noise-induced ordering. We present evidence of a hidden coordinate that acts as the state variable of an effective nonlinear map. Its trajectory average strongly predicts output repetition in separate test trajectories. ChatGPT-like AIs therefore behave not as `stochastic parrots', but as a new class of controllable nonlinear physical systems whose internal dynamics can be measured and perturbed.
Sofiia Nikolenko, Michele Papucci, Mina Rezaei +1cs.CL cs.AI cs.LG
Jailbreak attacks reveal a persistent weakness in aligned Large Language Models: carefully crafted prompts can elicit policy-violating responses despite safety training. While most defenses operate at the prompt or output level, it remains unclear how harmful intent is encoded within the model's internal representations. We investigate this question by analyzing token-level predictive entropy trajectories across layers of a frozen LLM using the logit lens. We find that static aggregate statistics of prompt-level entropy (e.g., mean, variance) carry little discriminative signal, whereas features capturing how entropy evolves across token positions, such as monotonic rank-based trend scores, are substantially more informative. Importantly, this signal is not uniform across model depth: it is concentrated in intermediate layers and degrades at the final layer, indicating that jailbreak-relevant structure is most pronounced in mid-network representations rather than at the output head. Across multiple models (Llama, Qwen, Gemma) and adversarial benchmarks, these entropy dynamics provide architecture-consistent separation without additional training. Together, our findings show that jailbreak behavior is reflected in structured intermediate uncertainty dynamics, clarifying both which entropy-derived features encode harmful intent and where in the network that signal is most pronounced.