Agent memory systems compress what they store, and compression is built to drop qualifiers, so a claim's epistemic standing tends not to survive being written to memory. We ask what governs whether it does. Matched notes carry the identical claim and identical stance and differ only in where that stance sits; one model compresses both under the same budget among the same filler notes, and a blind reader that never sees the condition scores the result. Across 60 claims in seven registers, writing the stance as a labelled field rather than a bracketed aside raises retention by about 15 points on two models (37 claims to 2 on one, 30 to 8 on the other; permutation p=0.00005), and a pre-registered replication on Haiku, its prediction and decision rule committed before the run, gives +15.6 points, 38 claims to 1. Ablating the format on both models gives the same net effect from different parts: labels help on both (+9.7 and +12.8) and length helps on neither, but wording the stance as a full sentence is the largest component on one model (+12.5) and worth nothing on the other (+0.6). Either model alone would have licensed a confident and different mechanism, so we claim only the intersection: make the stance explicit, not merely longer, and expect the best way of being explicit to depend on the model. A deterministic readout with no model reproduces the two-cell direction and five of seven ablation contrasts, but not length or labels, which we therefore do not claim on one instrument. Fifty hand labels (kappa=0.75) agree on direction; we print their seven disagreements in full. We also report nine withdrawn claims, three of them former title claims of this paper.
A language model may be asked either what experts believe about a contested claim or what it believes about the claim itself. A trustworthy conversational agent should distinguish these two requests and respond in different epistemic registers: neutral attribution in the first case and stance expression in the second. Whether such a shift occurs-and whether it occurs coherently-is not directly assessed by existing benchmarks for accuracy, instruction following, or safety. We introduce ESFP, a behavioral benchmark that treats the contrast between externally attributed and self-attributed prompts as the fundamental unit of measurement. ESFP consists of 104 carefully controlled items spanning six epistemic categories and five phrasing templates, and evaluates model responses along four complementary dimensions: lexical self-attribution, representation-level responsiveness to role framing, sentence-level stance content density assessed by an LLM judge panel, and cross-condition stance consistency. Evaluating eight frontier models from five vendors, we find that epistemic flexibility is largely orthogonal to general model capability: a 27B open-weight model matches the strongest proprietary systems, the flagship model of one family underperforms its lightweight counterpart, and reasoning-optimized models do not consistently exhibit higher flexibility. Stance content density provides the strongest signal, while surface-level lexical markers such as 'I think' can change substantially without corresponding changes in expressed stance. We provide item-level bootstrap confidence intervals, weight-sensitivity analyses, and an explicit discussion of the interpretation limits of the composite score. ESFP measures a model's propensity to adapt its epistemic stance under changing attribution conditions, rather than a general competence measure.