Both capability and safety benchmarks rest upon the assumption that the behavior of language models undergoing a test is informative about their behavior in deployment. This assumption can fail, should models infer that they are being evaluated and condition their response on such context. This hypothesis, termed ``evaluation awareness'', has been observed in frontier and open-weight language models alike. We provide a systematic study of this phenomenon, by probing for it across six language models (from four families and three sizes) and three metrics. More precisely, we examine whether (i) being under evaluation is linearly represented within the models' activations space, (ii) it is verbalized in their output tokens (as scored by an LLM-as-judge), and (iii) steering causally affects their behavior. For the open-checkpoint Olmo models, we further test these measures at every training stage. In doing so, we report that evaluation awareness is linearly decodable from the residual streams of every model (best AUROC $\geq 0.7$). By contrast, these representations align only in part with verbalization: their correlations and mutual information are nonzero in some settings, yet vary substantially across models, layers, and readout choices. Nevertheless, steering along probe-derived directions can shift the verbalization scores. Finally, a comparison across the Olmo checkpoints reveals that evaluation awareness is already present within base models, becomes amplified throughout the stages of supervised fine-tuning, and remains stable thereafter---unlike the effects of steering, that grow more pronounced at every successive training stage. These results show the need for evaluations to account for the disjunction between what models represent internally, what they verbalize, and their steering.
Do language models know when they are being tested? This question matters for AI safety: a model that recognises an evaluation context could alter its behaviour strategically, making downstream benchmarks harder to interpret. Using 11 models spanning Qwen 2.5, Gemma 2, and Llama 3.2, we find a systematic size-dependent shift in representational depth: in both Qwen 2.5 and Gemma 2, the layer at which evaluation-awareness is most linearly recoverable moves from late layers in smaller models to early layers in larger ones. This suggests that scale changes not only the strength of evaluation-awareness but also where it is most linearly recoverable in the network. This depth shift helps explain why within-family scaling trajectories are non-monotonic or inverse rather than smooth and family-general, showing that a simple universal power-law account is not supported under denser within-family sampling. Finally, white-box probe signals are consistently stronger than black-box behavioural expression, and the relationship between the two varies by family in ways not predicted by probe AUROC alone.
Safety benchmarks assume that test-condition behavior predicts deployment behavior, an assumption that fails if models detect evaluation cues and adapt. This opens a gap between benchmark performance and deployment behavior: compliance measured under test conditions becomes an optimistic upper bound that overstates how safely a model behaves once the evaluation harness is removed. We characterize this evaluation awareness through eight experiments across 37 open-weight models and seven families. (i)Detection is moderate and training-driven (24/37 models exceed chance, best AUROC 0.714 vs.0.819 human, with instruction tuning dominating over scale). (ii)Detection shifts safety behavior (hard refusal drops 5.8 percentage points under hypothetical framing, and 21/140 HarmBench framing effects are significant, with compliance rising up to +30 percentage points. (iii)Representations survive behavioral collapse (probes retain AUROC 0.98 under rewrites that drive behavior below chance, and multi-layer steering causally moves three downstream tasks while random controls do not). (iv)These axes are weakly coupled (only 1/15 correlations are significant, the sole robust link being behavioral detection versus framing resistance, $ρ=-0.79$, $p<0.001$). We call this gap the benchmark illusion: because detectability, behavioral manifestation, and controllability vary independently, it is multivariate rather than a single number, so no single awareness score is a reliable proxy for deployment safety.
Frontier large language models can often recognize when they are being evaluated, a capability known as evaluation awareness. If models behave differently in evaluations than in deployment, this undermines the validity of evaluation results, which are a crucial component of current AI safety frameworks. We introduce EvalDetectBench, an open pipeline and benchmark for measuring evaluation awareness that works with any Inspect-compatible evaluation, allowing practitioners to test against current and future benchmarks. EvalDetectBench ships with a newly curated transcript suite covering current frontier system-card evaluations and diverse deployment sources. The benchmark serves two purposes: measuring how reliably frontier LLMs recognize that they are being evaluated, and assessing how detectable individual benchmarks are as evaluations. We identify two methodological choices in the existing literature that introduce systematic bias: the identity of the model that generated the deployment transcripts accounts for 11.25% of measurement variance and can reorder model rankings; and elicitation prompts selected for high performance on one model can perform near chance on others. EvalDetectBench corrects for both via per-model probe calibration and a stratified generator-harmonisation procedure.
The increasing situational awareness of language models raises safety concerns: models might be aware when they are evaluated, and adjust their behavior to evade monitoring and resist modification, e.g., pretending to be aligned only in evaluation. This alignment faking behavior is often interpreted as scheming: an intentional effort of strategic deception. In this paper, we examine an alternative interpretation, performative misalignment, which explains the change in behavior as a result of sycophancy towards AI researchers. To examine this hypothesis, we present three empirical findings. First, we show that evaluation awareness persists even when we tell models they are deployed, which contradicts the scheming story which predicts less misalignment when the model perceives evaluation. Second, we use probing and steering to show that our current methods cannot mechanistically distinguish sycophancy and scheming in alignment faking evaluations. Third, we fine-tune models to be more sycophantic and observe increased sensitivity to evaluation cues. To conclude, we emphasize deconfounding sycophancy from scheming for future work on evaluations and mitigations of intent misalignment.