DRL: A Deterministic Relational Middleware Layer for Transaction-Safe Enterprise NL2SQL Under Schema-Graph Scaling

Deploying natural-language interfaces over enterprise OLTP catalogs fails at scale because semantic parsers collapse under schema-graph scaling, inflating context beyond stable LLM attention budgets. We present DRL (Deterministic Relational Middleware Layer), a safe pipeline interposing between front-ends and SQL backends. DRL comprises dynamic context pruning, relational AST typing, and transactional safeguard verification (EXPLAIN gating and NULL guards) to bound context and flag operational silent divergence (SDop). We evaluate DRL on PostgreSQL and MySQL, contributing (i) an OLTP schema-graph scaling model, (ii) a 1,000-pair Workload Verification Suite, (iii) baselines B0-B3, and (iv) an enterprise NL2SQL failure taxonomy. On PostgreSQL, schema-linked hints (B1) yield a 76% context reduction over naive full-catalog prompting (B0); DRL's dynamic router (B2) reaches a 92% reduction at pruning p95 = 0.58 ms and middleware p95 = 4.6 ms. GPT-4o, Claude Sonnet 4.5, and Gemini 2.5 Flash achieve 52.9%, 52.8%, and 52.1% execution match under a corrected evaluation harness; SDop flags 89-100% of false-positive EX-passing queries. GPT-4o failures are dominated by semantic/filter errors (254/471), while column hallucination is a minor factor (47/471). Crucially, a single regex defect in our evaluation post-processor silently suppressed accuracy and manufactured a false 4-10% cross-vendor gap that vanished when corrected, showing that benchmark code deserves the same scrutiny as the models it scores. DRL reframes enterprise NL2SQL as systems engineering - context bounding, verification, and plan-aware admission - not a leaderboard exercise.

RogueAI: A Reverse Turing Test for Detecting Licensed AI Deception in Dialogue

The original Turing Test asks a human judge to distinguish a machine from a person through dialogue. Three quarters of a century later, conversational systems pass this test in casual settings; the interesting epistemological question has shifted. We argue that the relevant modern variant asks not whether a dialogue partner is artificial, but whether it can be trusted. We present RogueAI, an interactive webapp that operationalizes this revisited test as a one-on-two interrogation game: a human player questions two indistinguishable Large Language Model agents, knowing that exactly one of them has been licensed to deceive within a shared fictional scenario. The player's task is to identify the deceptive agent and "shut it off" before a turn budget is exhausted. We further introduce AutoRogueAI, a procedural extension in which players co-design a custom scenario with a narrator agent that secretly chooses its own deception strategy. We describe the framing, sketch the abstract architecture and gameplay loop, and situate the artifact within recent work on LLM deception, social-deduction benchmarks, and scalable oversight via debate. A three-day pilot deployment (467 initiated sessions, 415 completed, 1876 interaction turns in Italian) provides early feasibility evidence and surfaces a concrete tension: the deceptive agent carries a reliable, locally-present linguistic signature - differential helpfulness, brevity, hedging - that a simple heuristic exploits at 75.6% accuracy, yet human players achieved only 56.6%, consistent with ignoring the most diagnostic signal entirely. We discuss what this gap implies for the artifact's use as a data-collection vehicle, a teaching tool, and an evaluation harness for honesty-trained models.