A three-dimensional typology of agency for advanced AI systems

Research on the agency of advanced artificial intelligence (AI) systems focuses on agency as a normative concept and on the agency of particularly agentic AI systems. While recent work also focuses on the different profiles of agentic systems, no framework exists to address the question of the type of agency instantiated by advanced AI systems, particularly when considering non-moral forms of agency. Based on established theoretical positions in philosophy, ethics, legal theory and sociology, we develop a typology of agency for frontier AI systems consisting of three dimensions: the nature of agency (moral or legal), its mode (individual or collective) and its locus (human or non-human). Combining these dimensions produces eight possible instantiations of agency, which we classify as conventional, contested or controversial. The typology separates legal from moral agency and thereby creates conceptual space for considering individual, legal, non-human agency without presupposing that advanced AI systems are moral agents. We argue that this distinction is increasingly relevant where instrumental goal pursuit complicates the attribution of AI actions to particular human actors.

Frontier AI Forecasting Has a Measurement Problem: An Audit of Progress Evidence

Quantitative forecasts of frontier artificial intelligence often connect dated targets to trends in benchmark scores, training compute, release time, or expert belief. This paper audits whether the public measurement record supports those connections before another trend is fitted. I construct a frozen, event-centric record through 12 August 2026 with 62 selected systems, 12 versioned benchmarks, seven capability or impact criteria, 144 graded events, 27 source records, and 408 typed relations. The record is an audit sample, not a census. Only seven systems jointly observe estimated training compute and a METR 50 percent task horizon. Training compute is absent for 19 of 27 closed systems, including every selected closed release from 2026, while none of the 35 open-weight systems has a METR horizon observation. Benchmark succession creates a second break: a seven-system link from METR Time Horizon 1.0 to 1.1 has a log-scale slope of 1.206 (95 percent CI 1.021 to 1.390), whereas a six-system MMLU to MMLU-Pro comparison appears shift-like under logit and probit links but not under linear or logarithmic links. The observed bridges have about 80 percent power only for slope departures near 25 percent. Provenance is concentrated: 52 of 71 substantive quantitative events, or 73.2 percent, come from one measurement programme, and 76.1 percent are laboratory releases. A review of 56 methodological and empirical sources identifies 16 complementary measurement directions spanning resources, inference budgets, reliability, agentic work, safety, human preference, field outcomes, and forecast backtesting. No direction supplies a replacement scalar. The result is not that frontier AI forecasting is impossible, but that a defensible dated forecast is a claim about a versioned measurement system with explicit joins, protocols, links, and source dependence, not merely a fitted curve or calendar date.

Harmonizing AI Safety Thresholds

Frontier AI companies have published capability thresholds that differ substantially, making it difficult for third parties to verify whether a threshold has been crossed or to compare requirements across companies. Moreover, without common minimum thresholds, risk mitigation may be inconsistent, creating a potential race to the bottom in safety standards. We develop a methodology for deriving harmonized thresholds across three risk domains. For misuse risks (cyber and biological), we take expected harm as the key primitive and use an explicit risk-modeling approach that accounts for risk channels and model release conditions. For automated AI R&D, we base our proposed threshold on the observed rate of AI progress rather than expected harm. Our analysis expands upon prior work and highlights existing empirical gaps and limitations.

Think Fast: Estimating No-CoT Task-Completion Time Horizons of Frontier AI Models

Many efforts to ensure frontier AI models are safe rely on monitoring their chain-of-thought (CoT) reasoning. If models become able to perform sufficiently complex reasoning internally, without explicit thinking tokens, this would undermine such oversight. We measure how well frontier models reason without CoT across a suite of over 30,000 questions spanning 43 benchmarks in domains including math, coding, puzzles, causality, theory-of-mind, and strategic reasoning. To compare models against humans, we estimate the $50\%$-task-completion time horizon (TH): the human time required for tasks a model completes with $50\%$ success rate. We complement this with a $50\%$ reasoning token horizon: the minimum number of o3-mini reasoning tokens needed for tasks a model solves with $50\%$ success rate. We find that the no-CoT $50\%$ TH of frontier models has been doubling roughly every year over the past six years, with GPT-5.5's TH reaching over 3 minutes and reasoning token horizon exceeding 1,500 tokens. Our median estimates predict that frontier no-CoT THs could exceed 7 minutes by 2028, and 25 minutes by 2030, though these projections carry substantial uncertainty. We recommend frontier developers track this explicitly.

Zero knowledge verification for frontier AI training is possible

Frontier AI governance frameworks increasingly use cumulative training compute as the primary criterion for designating high-impact models, but enforcement rests on self-reporting because no technical verification primitive for training exists. Any future international agreement on frontier AI faces the same problem at higher stakes: coordinated regulation of technologies with significant externalities has historically rested on technical verification, without which agreements are declaratory. Recent governance analyses judge zero-knowledge proofs a promising candidate but currently impractical at frontier scale [26, 4]. We argue the impracticality is paradigm-bound rather than fundamental, and propose a verification architecture for frontier dense pre-training combining a pre-committed training specification, inter-node network observations, and on-the-fly Merkle commitments of intermediate computation, verified through a zero-knowledge Virtual Machine (zkVM) with native BF16/FP32 precompiles. The proof checks the actual floating-point computation the GPU performed rather than a fixed-point approximation, and preserves model-architecture confidentiality through a private training specification. The protocol produces three proof types: a genesis proof at initialisation, in-training step proofs across the run, and ex-ante attestations enforcing policy-relevant claims as running invariants, turning the training record into a governance-enforceable artefact. We estimate a deployable proof of concept within approximately 36 months at single-digit-percent training-side overhead, against a six-to-ten-year cycle for verification-grade custom silicon. Thirteen open research and engineering problems are catalogued as a research agenda for external contribution