Multi-modal recommenders fuse collaborative signals with item modalities such as text, images, and audio, but the usefulness of each drifts over time and at different rates. For example, chocolate purchases typically guided by textual ingredient cues can shift toward visual packaging and ambient audio around Valentine's Day. This modality time-scale mismatch gives rise to two coupled challenges: (1) users require different modality proportions across temporal contexts, and (2) less relevant modalities are more likely to introduce outdated or misleading signals into the recommender. We address both challenges within a unified diffusion-based recommender, TimeRoute. A temporal-aware modal router maps each user's aggregated behavioral features to a personalized modality distribution, replacing the globally shared fusion weights used in prior work. The diffusion-based graph reconstructor is then conditioned on the same temporal profile through Feature-wise Linear Modulation (FiLM) with dual-stream long- and short-term denoising heads, suppressing outdated modality edges before they enter the propagation graph. Experiments on TikTok, Amazon-Baby, and Amazon-Sports demonstrate consistent improvements of up to 9.8\% in Recall@K, Precision@K, and NDCG@K over strong baselines across 10-seed paired tests. Code is available at https://anonymous.4open.science/r/TimeRoute.
The application of graph data in numerous disciplines raises the need for gathering and analyzing huge volumes of data, some of which is private and sensitive. The non-Euclidean nature of the graph data makes the analysis computationally challenging, leading to the use of Graph Neural Networks (GNNs) in the age of AI. GNNs may inadvertently leak sensitive data they are trained on, which raises serious data security issues, including the model inversion attack. In this study, we analyze GNNs' vulnerabilities by introducing two novel graph inversion (i.e., reconstruction) attacks: graph-label conditioned (GLC) attack and embedding-label conditioned (ELC) attack, utilizing targetmodel predictions and their intermediate representations, respectively. We perform a comprehensive analysis of our introduced privacy attacks and compare them with existing baselines across three benchmark graph datasets (i.e., NCI1, PROTEINS, and AIDS) and four graph distributional/structural metrics (i.e., FGD, EGD, MMD, and GKS). Our work demonstrates that an adversary can use the generator-discriminator technique to reconstruct high-quality graphs in real-world black-box attack scenarios against GNNs. Additionally, we present a variant of our attacks (Ours--) with 50% reduced queries, achieving good or comparable reconstruction attack performance. In addition, we show that GNNs are highly vulnerable to privacy attacks, varying Laplacian noise-scales.