Zachary Coalson, A M Aahad, Stella Doehring +2cs.LG
We present the first systematic study of the resilience of text-to-video (T2V) diffusion models under random hardware-level faults. While T2V models are widely used for automated video generation due to their ability to produce high-quality, temporally coherent, and realistic videos, their iterative denoising process and spatiotemporal dependencies introduce unique failure modes. We perform an extensive fault-injection study covering both computational and memory faults across three T2V models and a representative benchmark. Our results show that (1) a single fault can degrade overall performance by up to 3.7\%, with semantic correctness more affected than perceptual quality; (2) memory faults are more damaging than computational faults, high-order exponent bits are particularly vulnerable, and the widely-used bfloat16 is more susceptible than alternative formats; and (3) 7-28\% of faults cause visible artifacts, including semantic changes such as added objects, suggesting that single faults are sufficient to alter output semantics. Our findings reveal reliability risks in deployed T2V systems and motivate further research on improving fault resilience. Code: \href{https://github.com/ztcoalson/T2V-Resilience}{https://github.com/ztcoalson/T2V-Resilience}.
Deep neural networks (DNNs) deployed on resource-constrained neuromorphic hardware face three concurrent challenges: the need for model compression through pruning, vulnerability to adversarial input perturbations, and susceptibility to hardware-induced weight faults such as stuck-at-zero errors. While each of these factors has been studied in isolation, their combined effects on model reliability have received little attention. This paper presents an empirical investigation of how pruning, adversarial training, and hardware fault injection interact to affect the robustness of convolutional neural networks. Using a compact three-layer CNN trained on MNIST, we conduct three experiments: (1) comparing the fault tolerance of naturally and adversarially trained models under simultaneous hardware faults and adversarial attacks, (2) evaluating how pruning affects adversarial robustness, and (3) characterizing the joint accuracy surface across fault rates, adversarial perturbation magnitudes, and pruning levels. Our results show that adversarial training improves robustness against input perturbations but increases sensitivity to stuck-at-zero weight faults. Contrary to intuition, pruning did not significantly increase fault sensitivity, and varying the pruning level had little effect across fault rates and attack strengths. These results highlight the need to jointly consider adversarial robustness and hardware reliability.
Bahram Parchekani, Samira Nazari, Ali Azarpeyvand +3cs.LG cs.AR math.NA
Deep Neural Networks (DNNs) used in safety-critical applications are vulnerable to hardware and memory faults that corrupt network weights and degrade reliability. In this paper, we propose a Center of Gravity (CoG) guided weight correction method that restores faulty weights based on their spatial characteristics within each layer. The proposed approach detects and corrects weight faults using distance-aware correction rules, eliminating the need for retraining or architectural modification. The effectiveness of the proposed method in terms of the capability of tolerating hardware faults has been evaluated through performing fault injection at different Bit Error Rates (BERs). Experiments on safety-critical LSTM-based Networks, including StageNet for disease progression tracking and MTFNet for cardiac anomaly detection, demonstrate fault tolerance improvements of up to 230x and 6.41x, respectively, at a BER of 10^{-3}, with negligible accuracy loss. When extended to Convolutional Neural Networks (CNNs), the method achieves up to 49.55x and 20.79x improvements under comparable fault conditions on ResNet-18 and VGG-16, respectively. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first work to apply the CoG concept to neural network weight tensors for enhancing model reliability.
Bastien Vuillod, Kevin Hector, Pierre-Alain Moellic +2cs.CR cs.AI
Federated Learning (FL) allows a set of clients to collectively train a global model without sharing local training data. Giving the responsibility of the training to decentralized actors may lead to poisoning attacks: clients controlled by malicious third party potentially poison the training dataset to install a backdoor in neural networks. In FL, these backdoor attacks rely solely on algorithmic approach, however, recent advances in hardware faults threats (e.g, Rowhammer) have widen the overall attack surface. In the context of federated model adaptation, we introduce a novel category of backdoor attack against FL systems that relies on model poisoning based on hardware-fault attacks. More precisely, we propose a task-agnostic backdoor attack that is implanted during the FL training time by inducing hardware faults (bit-flips) in parameters of a single local model. The backdoor is crafted during a previous offline phase from the pretrained model initially used by the FL system. Our results show that a backdoor can be successfully applied on different type of models and datasets. Typically, with up to 10 faults per malicious client occurrence and 19 total occurrences on a ResNet-18 are enough to reach 94% of attack success rate. Finally, we discuss the practicality and the robustness of the attack potential defenses, while putting into perspective the practical constraints of Rowhammer, which is the preferred attack vector for this type of threats.