Joris Voerman, Nicolas Sidere, Jean-Christophe Buriecs.CV
Remote identity authentification using Identification Documents has been a major challenge for several years. DeepFakes advent and the development of AI-guided tools helps fraudsters creating counterfeit ID Documents. Ensuring the authenticity of ID Documents has become a real clue in the seurization of remote authentification. This need is all the more pressing given the increasing digitization of administrative and transactional processes. To ensure widespread accessibility, the system should rely solely on video captured via mobile devices. In this specific context, confirming the authenticity of ID is a real challenge as many security features needs specific device like infrared sensor for instance. Among underutilized but promising security features, holographic printings hold a special place. Difficult to counterfeit, they produce distinctive visual effects according enlightment, making them both detectable in a video captured by a smartphone camera and difficult to imitate. In this paper, we propose a Remote Identity Document Verification System (RIDVS) and an approach based on a video transformer for detecting holograms in simple videos captured by smartphones. Our system is designed for a smartphone-based capture process, followed by a server-side verification. The hologram detection method builds on a robust model previously validated in a related research domain. We demonstrate that it outperforms existing SotA methods, achieving near-perfect accuracy even when trained on medium- to small-sized datasets. In particular, we report improvements of +26.86\% in Recall and +17.93\% in accuracy over the best MIDV-Holo baseline. This study includes several experiments that evaluate the model adaptation to frugality, both for training samples and computational resources.
Glen Pouliquen, Joseph Chazalon, Guillaume Chiron +2cs.CV
This paper addresses the remote verification of the authenticity of Optically Variable Devices (commonly known as holograms) on identity documents. Typically placed over the cardholder's photo, these devices provide strong and easily verifiable security for human inspection but pose challenges for automated verification. Existing approaches easily cover static frauds (e.g. paper photocopy) and can be evaluated for such, but their capacity to detect real, dynamic fraud cases (e.g. handcrafted hologram) has not been evaluated to date because of the lack of public datasets. Furthermore, they are usually trained to detect known attack types, and few of them can generalize to new, unseen attacks. This work features three contributions to address these limitations: 1) a new public dataset, MIDV-DynAttack, which extends the existing MIDV-Holo dataset with realistic, static and dynamic attacks against identity document specimens, tripling the number of attack samples compared to the original dataset, 2) a novel verification method which can assess the authenticity of a specific hologram thanks to the analysis of its dynamic behavior and appearance, can be trained without dynamic attack samples, and exhibits new state-of-the-art performance, 3) a benchmark of existing approaches which follows a clear evaluation protocol and emphasizes the inability of other approaches to deal with dynamic attacks, as well as new challenging attacks to deal with. Code and dataset are publicly available at https://github.com/EPITAResearchLab/pouliquen.25.icdar.