Populations of large language model agents are increasingly used as experimental societies. Three doubts shadow every such result: whether the agents behave like the humans they stand in for, whether a finding survives changes to the apparatus that leave the rules untouched, and whether apparent social dynamics are interaction at all rather than the reproduction of experiments the models have read. This article introduces SILICA, an open instrument that tests all three. Five environments carry published human anchors, each paired with perturbations that re-render the same rules and with variants whose payoffs point away from the memorised result. Twelve open-weight models were run through it on a single consumer graphics card. Agreement with human data is confined to starting points: first-round public-goods contributions fall inside the equivalence margin for eight of eleven models, while no model matches end-state contributions or the human corridor of cooperation. Merely swapping the order in which two actions are listed costs one model 58 points of cooperation. Presenting responders with a fixed schedule of offers shows that only one model, the sole reasoning-trained one, places its acceptance threshold where the incentive requires; two move theirs part of the way, two move them the wrong way, and three never acquire one. Conventions form through a shared prior over the names rather than through negotiation, though negotiation reappears once that prior is disrupted. On the certification ladder defined here, current silicon societies support exploratory claims and no more.
Brenden M. Lake, Akshay K. Jagadish, Guangyuan Jiangcs.LG
Researchers must often choose between Bayesian or neural network models of behavior, two paradigms with complementary strengths and weaknesses. An ideal paradigm would facilitate testing many kinds of representations and inductive biases; Bayesian models make this easy, while neural networks do not. Similarly, an ideal paradigm would avoid over-simplifications; neural networks make this easy, while Bayesian models do not. Here, we introduce Bayesian distillation with Behavioral Tuning (BBT) as an approach to getting the best of both traditions. BBT offers a simple recipe for model building: first, a neural network is trained to mimic a Bayesian model through synthetic data, and second, the network is fine-tuned on human behavior to capture additional structure and nuance. Across four case studies in human concept learning, we find that BBT outperforms traditional approaches at predicting human behavior while also revealing psychological insights, resulting in models that can both mimic Bayesian priors and capture heuristics and biases that violate simple modeling assumptions.
Humans often find good solutions to combinatorial optimization problems that are computationally hard even for advanced computer algorithms. In the Euclidean traveling salesman problems (TSP), people rapidly produce tours that are near-optimal, despite severe limits on time and computation. What makes a tour human-like, and how might such solutions be learned? Here we address these questions through a large-scale behavioral and computational investigation of human performance in Euclidean TSP. We sampled a broad space of TSP instances, collected human solutions, and compared them with neural policies based on Pointer Networks, which are recurrent neural networks with an attention-based pointing mechanism that define probability distributions over valid tours. We trained these networks under multiple objectives, including reinforcement learning (RL), supervised learning from optimal tours, supervised learning from human tours, and RL fine-tuning after optimal-supervised pretraining. Human tours were not identical to optimal tours, but occupied a near-optimal geometric basin: they shared many structural properties with optimal solutions while preserving systematic human-specific deviations. The best account of human tours was not direct imitation of optimal tours, but a model pretrained on optimal tours, fine-tuned by RL, and decoded through $\text{Best-of-}N$ sampling. These findings suggest that human-like solutions may emerge from a combination of structured supervised learning, RL, and test-time search, echoing computational principles underlying many modern artificial intelligence systems.
Henrique Ferraz de Arruda, Carlos Gracia Lázaro, Alberto Aleta +1physics.soc-ph cs.AI
Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly used as agents in simulations of social systems, yet it remains unclear when their behavior can be interpreted as a faithful proxy for human decision-making. Here we test LLM agents against a direct empirical benchmark: a large-scale networked Prisoner's Dilemma experiment with human participants. Using the same interaction protocol, payoff structure, and network topologies, we compare nine open-weight LLMs with the human data. The selected model reproduces several macro-level features of cooperation dynamics, including the early decline and later stabilization of cooperation. This aggregate agreement, however, does not extend uniformly to finer levels of behavior. LLM populations underestimate individual-level heterogeneity and generate conditional cooperation patterns that differ from those observed in humans. Adding a fraction of random agents improves some aspects of micro-level agreement, but does not remove the mismatch in decision rules. These findings reveal a macro--micro dissociation in LLM-based social agents: collective outcomes can appear human-like even when the underlying behavioral distributions and mechanisms are not. They suggest that validating LLM agents as human surrogates requires comparisons across aggregate dynamics, individual heterogeneity, and context-dependent decision rules, rather than outcome-level agreement alone.