Mind the Gaps: Mixture-of-Minds for Human Simulation

Predicting how a population will answer a new question is a long-standing goal. Statistical methods succeed at the level of the mass but falter at the level of the individual. Large language model simulators inherit this gap. They recover a population's central tendencies while flattening its heterogeneity, and they carry social biases and prompt brittleness that distort individual predictions. This paper introduces Anacreon, an audience simulation model that targets the individual level within a narrow, well-specified domain. Anacreon learns an authorship embedding that separates individuals, clusters a real qualitative corpus around seed people, and trains a dedicated adapter for each cluster, a mixture of minds, on a Gemma~4 12B base. It harvests demographics, psychological traits, and survey responses from public text, and augments each record with a chain-of-emotion. It reduces prompt brittleness by shuffling response options and reduces positive bias by balancing the training distribution. On a large, externally sourced survey, Anacreon reaches a state-of-the-art ordinal alignment of 0.775, the individual-level accuracy measure on which the field has converged, with a small residual bias. The work is a step toward drawing aggregate insight from faithfully simulated individuals.

LLMs struggle to simulate human belief updates in controlled environments

LLMs are increasingly deployed as proxies for human study participants in social science experiments, yet the fidelity of this practice has rarely been tested directly. We test whether six LLMs can simulate individual human belief updates, comparing LLM outputs 1-to-1 against ground truth data from 391 UK participants on Prolific, who updated their stances on three discussion topics after reading Reddit comments. Each participant was simulated by an LLM conditioned on a persona derived from their demographic and personality trait data. We find that some LLMs (Qwen3-32B and GPT-5-Mini) can match the human post-stance distribution, but only when given participants' actual initial stances. All six models fail to simulate initial stances themselves and to produce faithful belief updates from self-generated stances. Three systematic biases emerge across all models: overrepresentation of neutral positions, more frequent but smaller belief shifts than humans, and a failure to rank comments by convincingness. Demographic and personality trait personas had no consistent effect on fidelity. LLM simulations of human belief dynamics are only reliable when grounded in realistic starting conditions, that current multi-round social media simulations rarely provide.

Analyzing and Correcting Benevolence Bias in Large Language Models

Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly used as stand-ins for human respondents, from opinion polls and simulated survey participants to agent-based social simulations. These uses rest on one assumption: that conditioning a model on who a person is yields answers resembling those of real people from that group. Here we identify and measure benevolence bias, a small but consistent tendency for aligned LLMs to lean toward the kinder, safer, more socially approved answer on value-laden survey questions. Across 18 widely used models, four social-science datasets (ANES, GSS, WVS, and a cross-cultural prospect-theory replication) and six psychological categories, we find that the bias is a stable model property, not a quirk of any one system: it points the same way across models, grows with model size, and traces to the post-training stage. Prompt language and framing change its size but never its direction, and a "malicious persona" stress test shows a one-sided limit: aligned models struggle to play people who are less kind, less prosocial or more harm-tolerant than average. The issue is thus not only a shifted average, but a narrowed range of people the model can imitate. The bias sits in the middle of the answer distribution rather than its tails, and survives changes in sampling temperature and simple prompted reflection. The encouraging news is that it is easy to diagnose and straightforward to fix: a light-touch contrastive calibration, which needs no retraining and works on black-box APIs, brings all six categories back to the human baseline. Our results give researchers a clear map of where aligned LLMs can already be trusted as human stand-ins, where they need care, and a ready-to-use method for closing the gap.

Using Cognitive Models to Improve Language Model Simulation of Human Persuasion Games

People make decisions differently in strategic interactions. Some update beliefs like a Bayesian; others exhibit biases like motivated reasoning. Although creators of large language models use simulated humans for safety evaluations and training, they often fail to cover this breadth of human behavior. We argue that cognitive science and economics provide a convenient tool for doing so, making use of mathematical models of human decision-making. We propose an approach that we call Equation-to-Behavior Prompting for guiding large language models to match cognitive models, and evaluate this approach on persuasion games based on legal decision-making. We find that large models can approximate equation-based specifications -- Bayesian updating, affine distortion, motivated updating, and Grether's $α$-$β$ model -- using prompting, but small models fail to do so. However, training small models with reinforcement learning to adhere to mathematical rules, Equation-to-Behavior RL, reduces belief error by 26.5% in out-of-distribution parameterizations. We show that these simulations can help create diverse training environments; training small models to consider different kinds of decision-makers improves average belief change by 2.5%--12% over Bayesian-only training, even when persuading GPT-5-mini. Our work could improve human simulations for training and evaluation in increasingly realistic settings, and could also enable novel research into more complicated mathematical models of human decision-making.